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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the nineteenth century Colombia has had but
two major political

parties.

While historically exhibiting distinct

positions with regard to important political

question whether the differences between
disappeared.

thern

issues, there is some
have not now all but

Collaboration between these two traditional competitors

reached its structural zenith during the period known as the ''National
Front" (1958-1974) when both parties were constitutionally obligated
to evenly divide positions

in the

legislature and the bureaucracy,

while every four years alternating the presidency between them.
The implications of such an historical and structural context

upon the efforts of the Colombian government to consciously pursue

strategies of "development" are presently unclear.

This dissertation

examines the role of the national government in modernization and

economic development.

Two interrelated research targets were formu-

lated to illuminate this question.

The first was to determine system-

atic annual variations since 1960 in four development policy areas--

politico-administrative, industrial, agricultural, and infrastructure.
The second was to evaluate the impact of political party affiliation

of key decision makers in the above policy areas.

Together, the re-

search targets were designed to determine to what extent there have
been ideological variations in the actual policy outputs and their

implications for further development policy.
v

Using

a

functional classification of budget items, the study

traces the actual

(as opposed to budgeted) expenditures of the Colom-

bian national government from 1961 to 1976.

In addition

to.

politico-

administrative development policy, three sectors of economic development policy are examined in detail.
Within the area of politico-administrative policy, the findings indicate that while the Liberal

and Conservative Parties tend to

agree, on the most general level, with the desirability for (or scope
of) active state involvement in the economy, there are differences be-

tween them in terms of preferred methods and administrative arrange-

ments within the public sector.

Specifically, differences are mani-

fest over issues of decentralization, the role of planning and pro-

ject evaluation, and methods of financing the development effort.
Differences between the parties are also examined with respect to
emphasis given to the overall economic development effort, as opposed
to social, cultural, or administrative development.

Within the industrial sector, attention is focused upon differences in strategies of industrialization.

Included here are dif-

ferences not only in the actual scope of government involvement in
the industrialization effort, but also methods of involvement, in par-

ticular commercial policies such as balance of payments concerns, tariffs, tax credits and rebates, export promotion, credit availability,

and exchange rate regulation.

Particular attention is given to the

sources and consequences of Import Substituting Industrialization as
a

strategy of economic development.
vi

Within the agricultural sector, most emphasis is given to the
role that that sector has played with respect to the industrialization
effort.

Included here is consideration of government support for agri-

cultural export promotion, research and development, and agrarian reform.

Particular attention is given to the role of the agricultural

sector as

a

source of foreign exchange.

Within the infrastructure sector, variations are examined with

respect to three areas—transportation

,

energy, and communications.

The implications of manifest patterns of support both within and between these sectors, especially transportation, are examined in light

of their contribution to the economic development effort.

The implications of systematic variations found in the above

policy areas are discussed with respect to their possible impact upon:
1)

the alignment of internal political power relations; 2) the impact

upon other sectors of economic development; and

3)

the political/eco-

nomic relationship between Colombia and the rest of the world.

vi
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CHAPTER

1

PUBLIC POLICY, POLITICAL PARTY
AND IDEOLOGY IN COLOMBIA

Life's Single Lesson:
There's
more accident to it than anyone
can admit to and remain sane.'

Determinants of Public Policy

The belief expressed above by Thomas Pynchon is undoubtedly

true with respect to both sampling designs and null hypotheses; its

validity with respect to public policy outcomes is not as undisputed.
As defined by Dye, not only are policy outcomes the chief output of
a

society's political system, but on

a

larger plane, they express
In Dye's words, policy out-

the value allocations of that society.

comes are "a result of forces brought to bear upon

causing it to make particular responses
"forces" are of

a

among public policy analysts.
ially emanate from

a

system and

The extent to which such

."

political character is

a

a

sharply debated topic

Just because public policies offic-

political authority (government) does not

necessarily mean that the political authority is the most important
force in determining their composition.

Indeed, many political

scientists argue that the political authority represents the "system"
upon which whatever forces are important in

a

society impinge in

preserve
order to affect some kind of change (or, alternatively, to
a

condition which is subject to change).

1

The most important of such forces are usually found
within
the realm of economics.

The idea that economic conditions affect

political life in general and the policies of
new; the intellectual origins of such

least as far as Aristotle.

a

a

government

is not

proposition extend back at

Currently, this idea has its most devel-

oped and systematic expression in the writings of Marxists of all

varieties.

However, the importance of economic factors in explain-

ing political

reality is by no means limited to the left, as

a

perusal of the works of Pareto, Michels, and Weber would testify.
In his pioneering study on the determinants of public policy out-

comes in the United States, Dye comes to the conclusion that overall,
the effects of levels of economic development are more important in

explaining policy variations than political system characteristics.

3

In fact, quite a few studies of policy making among the states and

cities in the United States have come to
1

a

similar conclusion.^

It is not only with respect to the United States that policy

variations have been attributed principally to economic factors.
For instance, Pryor, in his pathbreaking study comparing public

policy variations in six communist and six capitalist nations,
notes that "if the basic economic circumstances (in Marx's termin-

ology 'productive forces') are similar, it should not be surprising
that the directions taken [in policy] are also roughly similar."

Other works in the relatively unexplored area of cross-national
impolicy studies also indicate that economic variables are quite

outcomes.
portant in explaining variations in different types of policy

3

We noted above that policy outcomes are the result
of forces

brought to bear upon

a

system.

But just because the political

authority may better capture the essence of the "system"
from which
public policy may emanate does not mean that there are not
important
political

forces which

may act upon it or within it.

Political

forces, like economic forces, also have an impact upon policy outcomes.

The exploration of this hypothesis in one particular con-

text -the Republic of Colombia— will be the central concern of this
study.

The idea that political forces affect policy outcomes has

been assumed in most political

science research.

It was not until

policy studies in the late 1960s demonstrated the importance of

economic variables that political scientists have attempted to distinguish systematically between the relative weight of political
and economic variables in explaining policy outcomes.
in the ,subfield of United States state and local

Largely with-

government, a de-

bate was begun in which such scholars as Sharkansky, Hofferbert,
and others have sought to reassess the balance between economic and

political

forces.^

Perhaps the most significant outcome of this

reassessment has been the realization that while economic variables
are generally important in the explanation of policy outputs, so
too are political

variables.

the influences of political

This is especially true when examining
and economic forces on certain specific

policy areas such as welfare benefits.
There has been more research in the area of cross-national
impacts of political variables in explaining policy outputs.

Research

4

in Latin America has been particularly instructive with regard to

variations in policy outputs by different types of political regimes. 9
The findings of these studies indicate that there are variations in

policy output among different regime types.

while economic and social constraints have

They indicate that
a

definite impact on

defining the context of possible policy outputs, the former variables
in and of

themselves give

iations.

Most would agree with Schmitter's conclusion that political

a

very incomplete picture of observed var-

structural variables "are relevant to an understanding of the nature
of public policy in this region of the world [Latin America], definitely more so than the more limited, homogenous area of North American

state politics."

10

Before one can judge the relative importance of economic or
political

forces in explaining public policy outputs, an analytical

distinction must be made concerning the state and politics as explanOn one hand, the state itself may be said to con-

atory variables.

stitute

a

political force in the determination of policy.

In this

case the state—any state— will constitute an independent variable
in any model

of policy output.

government of the state,

is

In such a conception the state, or

held to be important regardless of the

particular arrangements which might make up that government.
example of this

is

has generally taken

An

the contention that the state in Latin America
a

more activist stance in matters of certain

development policy, than
types of public policy, especially economic
West.
many other states in the liberal, democratic

5

But the state does not exhaust the set of political variables
of potential relevance in explaining policy.

States, like most other

interesting phenomena in society, are multi-dimensional.

That is,

the specific structural arrangements peculiar to any state may be
as important in explaining policy variation as the existence of the

state itself.

In

other words, the political forces which are hypothe-

sized to affect policy output may be characteristics of the state or
part of its governing structure.

The political characteristics which

define the structures of the state may be of more consequence in

analyzing policy variations than just the existence of the state
itself as

a

political

force.

The concept of the state itself as

a

political force which affects policy output will be dealt with in

further detail below.
of political

The use as explanatory variables the concepts

forces acting within the state has been the norm for
The extent of their influence

most policy studies discussed above.

vis a vis economic characteristics in explaining policy variations
is

as much as anything an empirical

question.

Much of the confusion as to the relative contribution that
political and economic forces make in explaining public policy outputs can be traced to three elements.

ational

forces.

i

The first concerns the oper-

zation of the independent variables—political and economic
In Dye's original

conception, policy variations were ex-

plained using both types of forces, with one set of indicators representing political system characteristics and the other representing

economic forces.

11

Dye himself later noted that the political var-

important in
iables he used, all of which had referents to concepts

6

pluralist conception of politics, may not themselves be the most

a

influential

in the determination of public policy. 12

The use of

other types of political variables has produced better explanations

of policy variations, particularly in non-United States settings. 13
Independent variables of

political or economic nature must not

a

only be theoretically grounded but also relevant for the type of

policy being explained.
A second source of confusion is the operational ization of

the dependent variable.

sisting of the outputs of
a

If we conceptualize public policy as cona

political

system we are left with quite

data management problem to say the least.

It is necessary to

specify and distinguish between different types of policy outputs.
Lowi

,

for example, takes an analytic approach when he distinguishes

between policies which are distributive, redistributi ve
ulatory.

14

Dye, on the other hand, takes more of

a

,

and reg-

sectoral approach,

categorizing policies on the basis of functions which the policy
designed to serve.

15

is

It is this latter approach which is used in

this study.

The final

source of confusion in relating political and

economic forces to public policy outputs concerns the level of

measurement of both independent and dependent variables.

All

para-

assumption
metric statistical procedures of analysis are based on the
that the data which is analyzed is at least interval

in scale.

often not
(Other properties which are theoretically required but

distribution characterrigorously adhered to in practice concern the
being studied.
istics of the variables in the population

Such a

7

requirement seriously limits both the type of data which can be
utilized as indicative of the independent and dependent variables
as well

as

the types of analysis which can validly be performed.

Many variables which may be considered important in explaining

policy outputs do not have natural

(or at least accessible) refer-

ents or indicators which measure them according to the scale deemed

appropriate for the type of analysis being contemplated.
is

true for policy outputs themselves.

In

The same

most of the policy studies

cited above, policy output variables have consisted principally of
levels of public taxing, spending benefits, and services.

In this

study the operational ization of the quantitative aspects of public

policy output is also based on government expenditures and taxation,
but instead of absolute level

,

we have used sectoral distribution

.

The significance of this distinction, as well as other aspects of the

operational ization and measurement of our independent and control

variables, is discussed in the Methodological Appendix.

Modernization and Economic Development

The public policies surrounding the issue of modernization
and how

a

than just

society may become economically developed represent more
a

measurement problem.

In the Third World in general

and

Latin America in particular, the second half of the twentieth century
conhas been marked by an increase in the levels of many variables

sidered indicative of economic development.
urbanization, national

But as growth rates,

income, productivity, and industrialization

have increased, so too has the role of the state.

At the same time,

8

there has also been growth in the belief on part of
many that mod-

ernization

is

not necessarily

a

concomitant phenomenon of economic

development, especially if the former is measured by quality
of
life criteria and the latter by growth rates of the
Gross National
1

Product.

c

Nevertheless, something labeled economic development

has been the driving telos of

actors in the past century.

a

As

multitude of public and private
ill-defined as it may be, the pur-

suit of this elusive concept has occupied the energies of countless

members of society employed in the service of the state.

Latin

America in particular has utilized the mechanisms of the state to
encourage various types of economic production and expansion.

In

short, political forces in Latin America have sought to influence
the course of economic development.

But economic development occurs neither in

out historical antecedent.

a

vacuum nor with-

Both the form that such political

forces

have assumed and their success in achieving developmental goals are

conditioned by this fact.

Urbanization, industrialization, and

economic change on an unprecedented scale are characteristics not
only of the developed societies of the twentieth century but also
many of those which have been termed "underdeveloped."

This is

especially true in Latin America and other parts of the world that
have been integrated into the world economic system since last century.
This world economic system is most often characterized by its dom-

inant mode of production--capi tal ism.

In the West in general, and

Latin America in particular, virtually all changes in the arrangements and techniques devised to produce material goods have come

9

under the aegis of this system.

Whether this

good or bad, de-

is

liberate or accidental, controlled or spontaneous
continual debate among those who live in

a

is

a

matter of

world conditioned by its

existence.
One major portion of this debate concerns the extent to

which the ostensibly legitimate organized expression of the political

will --the state--is an autonomous actor in the processes which

characterize the capitalist system.

Or put another way, to what

extent do the actions taken by (or in the name of) the state influence the processes of the capitalist system?
This is particularly important when we consider that the

purported result of the workings of this system
ial

prosperi ty--or economic development.

is

increasing mater-

As noted above, the concept

of economic development is an especially difficult one to define.
At its most basic level economic development represents the growth

of the material product of the system.

The boundaries of the system

ultimately are defined by the context within which the system fun-

ctions—in this case the boundaries of the capitalist market.

In

the twentieth century, however, there are another set of boundaries

which, at least in the sense of marketing rationality, are artificially imposed—the boundaries of the nation-state.

The boundaries of

this latter system have important implications not only for the fun-

ctioning of the entire world capitalist system itself.

The boundar-

ies of the nation-state also serve as contextual boundaries within

which

a

given system of economic production must operate.

In other

10

words, although capitalism

is

recognized as

a

world-wide system of

production, economic development can be defined in national terms
as wel

1

Within the context of

a

world capitalist system, the sit-

uation in which the nation-states of Latin America find themselves
is one of dependency.

The increase in the literature devoted to

exploring this concept has mushroomed in the last decade. 17
dency as used here refers to

a

Depen-

structural condition defined in terms

of the actual relatinoship between particular national economic
systems and the world economic system.

In the

words of Cardoso,

There exists among the developed and underdeveloped
economies a difference, not only of the stage or the state
of the productive system, but also of function or position
within the international economic structure of production
Some produce industrial goods; others,
and distribution:
This requires a definite structure of reraw materials.
lations of domination to assure an international trade
based on merchandise produced at unequal levels of techThe idea of dependence refers
nology and labor cost.
to the conditions under which alone the economic and
political system can exist and function in its connections
with the world productive structure.
.

In other words,

American economy are to

.

the manuvering limits within any Latin
a

great extent set by the external world.

This is not to say that policy in

a

peripheral economy is com-

pletely "dependent" upon actions taken in the center or that policy
in the periphery is directed from the outside.

But,

it does mean

that the range of possible public policy responses to economic dev-

elopment problems is bounded by the conditions of dependency.
there
of course, will vary from country to country, not because
a

This,
is

character
difference in the "degree" of dependency but because the

11

of dependency and therefore the limits within
which to manuever will
vary over time and space. 19
The extent to which the boundaries defined by dependency

limit the ability of political forces to affect economic develop-

ment is

a

matter of disagreement.

Furtado, on one hand, seems quite

pessimistic about the ability of political forces to affect industrialization and meaningful development within the limits imposed by
structural dependency.

Of]

economic development in

Cardoso, on the other hand, denies that
a

dependent context must necessarily lead

to stagnation; under certain conditions there may be "room for some

kind of associated capitalistic development.

This "associated

capitalistic development" may or may not represent (or lead to) modernization as it

is

conceived by those who stress the aggregate

growth aspects of development.

Much depends upon the extent to

which" increases in aggregate growth rates truly represent real

in-

creases in material well being rather than more modern accounting

procedures, or the placing of

a

monetary value on production which

was previously "outside" the market.

It is clear, however, that

especially in the context of dependency, the probability of such

development depends, among other things, upon

a

fundamental role

being assumed by the state.

Political Parties and Public Policy

The assertion that the state is important in determining

policy outputs gives little indication as to why

may affect the policies that it does.

a

particular state

In other words,

it does not

12

indicate the characteristics of the state which
produce one type of
policy as opposed to another.

The reasons commonly asserted by

political scientists to have an impact on this include
class interest,

interest group interaction, rational weighing of alternatives,
inertia,
and ideology.

Furthermore, in Western democratic systems there

usually exists

a

formal

to combine some or all

policy direction.

political structure which allegedly serves
of these and produce some kind of coherent

This structure is the political party system.

In

the words of LaPalombara and Weiner, "Political parties and party

systems are not only the product of their environment but also in-

struments of organized human acition for affecting that environment." 2 ^
Political parties in contemporary Latin America represent an

interesting twist to such

a

conceptualization.

It has been asserted

that historically, parties in Latin America have been weaker in the

political decision-making process than their counterparts in Western

Europe and North America.

This is largely because parties in Latin

America have traditionally been dominated by the executive.

This is

true not only for the overwhelming number of nations in the region

which have military executives but also those which have civilian
regimes.

Furthermore, in the few nations in which they are permitted

to function,

political

parties have been classified as being "tra-

ditional," meaning that they represent the vested interests of small
ruling cliques and do not perform such "brokerage" functions as in-

tegration and aggregation.

24

This does not mean necessarily that

of
they have no impact on public policy; it does mean that the basis

their impact would draw from sources other than brokerage functions.

13

Such sources may be economic and social as well as political.
the contention of this study that

It is

a

party in power may draw

upon all of these sources to affect state action or public policy.

What

is

not clear

a

priori

is

the extent to which public policy out-

puts reflect a random as opposed to

a

systematic alignment of such

forces.

A random alignment would be more expressive of the political

party as

a

broker metaphor.

In

this conception, policy implemented

by a party in power would reflect the outcomes of temporary and con-

tingent alliances of various forces.

Such alliances would be highly

specific not only as to the type or character of policy but also its
scope and timing as well.

As such, policy output would vary with

the nature of the alliances within the political party which came to

dominate at that particular time.
A systematic alignment, on the other hand, would be more

characteristic of political parties which to some extent adhered to
an ideology.

ideological

The degree to which political

influences in their policies to

upon the definition of the term ideological.

parties in power reflect
a

great extent depends
The concept of ideology,

as it is used in this study, follows that which Seliger calls an

"inclusive" conception:

What defines the inclusive use of 'ideology' in the context
of social and political theory and science is that it covers
sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends
poland means of organized social action, and specifically
to
aims
action
such
whether
of
irrespective
itical action,
order.
given
a
rebuild
or
uproot
preserve, amend,
Such

a

conception

is

by Mannheim and Marx.

broader than the more restricted use of the term
26

Instead, it is much more akin to what Convers

14

refers to as a "belief system." 27

term "ideology"

is

In

the inclusive concept, the

applicable to all political belief systems; in

the restrictive conception, the use of the term is
confined to

specific political belief systems.

In

Seliger's words:

In the restrictive use of the term, 'ideology' is reserved
for extremist belief systems and parties, or ideological
factors are held to be present in some and absent from
other belief systems, or at least they are assumed to be
more important in some than in others. 28

Under an inclusive conception, systematic policy outputs

of any political system can be said to reflect ideological positions.
a

When discussing the relationship of ideology to policy

further distinction made by Seliger is particularly important.

This is the distinction between two dimensions of ideology--a fun-

damental and an operative dimension.

[I]deology applied in action inevitably bifurcates into
that of fundamental
two dimensions of argumentation:
principles, which determine the final goals and grand
vistas in which they will be realized, and which set
above the second dimension, that of the principles which
actually underlie policies and are evoked to justify them.
This second dimension of argumentation I have proposed
calling operative ideology. 29
In

many ways there can be said to be an isomorphism between

Seliger's fundamental and operative dimensions of ideology and
Sartori's distinction between "rationalistic processing-coding" and
on

"empirical processing-coding,"

and Lindblom's distinction between

"synoptic problem solving" and "disjointed incremental ism."
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ever, whereas Sartori's and Lindblom's conceptions are to

a

extent mutually exclusive concepts, Seliger's distinction

is

How-

great
based

more on emphasis and centrality of what he calls "technical prescrip-

15

tions" which are "more or less directly derived from facts, i.e.,

from their descriptive and

cl

assificatory as well as from their

analytical and causal perception and presentation."
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In the fun-

damental dimension of ideology, on the other hand, central ity

is

accorded to "moral prescriptions" which are "also predicated on the

description and analysis of facts, but they present

a

value judge-

ment on them which may run counter to and prevail over technical
norms."

Figure
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This distinction has been diagrarnatically presented in

1

D = Descri

ption

A = Analysis
=

Implements

R =

Rejections

I

Fundamental
Dimension

P

P

=

m

Moral Prescriptions

Operative
Dimension

Technical Prescriptions
t

Martin Seliger,
[SOURCE:
Dimensions of Ideology.
Figure 1.
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1976)
Ideoloay and Politics (London:
p.

110]

—
Although they both represent aspects of the same phenomenon
for the
ideology--the operative dimension has particular relevance

policy,
study of the ideological forces affecting public

true for two reasons.

'ihis

is

The first is that ideological differences and

operative dimension.
change first manifest themselves in the
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The

inevitably evinced in the
second reason is that "even if change is

operative dimension, it

is

far from certain that change will be

dimension of fundaacknowledged overtly there, let alone in the

16

mentals."
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Inasmuch as policy variations can be explained by

reference to ideological forces upon political parties
will

in power,

it

be from the more flexible and more "action" oriented operative

dimension.
The fundamental dimension need not change to accomodate

ideological variations in the operative dimension except in the
very long run.

Differences in the operative dimension, therefore,

may be reflected in policy outputs long before they are reflected
in ideological

fundamentals.

outputs are of

a

This is especially true if policy

type which constitute only a weak part of the sub-

stance of the fundamental ideology.

distant in the past that

a

In other words,

the more

party's ideology was first formulated,

and the more variety of policy options which must be confronted by
a

party in power which were not directly addressed in initial form-

ulations of party ideology, the less we can rely on pronouncements

concerning the fundamental dimension to reflect accurately the
actual

ideological content of public policy outputs.

the greater extent to which there is

a

Likewise,

distinct and systematic

variation in policy between different parties in power, the greater
the probability that such policy variations will reflect differences
in the operative dimension of ideology.

Latin
The oldest contemporary functioning party system in

America

is

in Colombia.

has maintained

a

In fact,

it is the only party system which

basic two-party structure.

and Conservative parties have been

a

Inasmuch as the Liberal

ubiquitous part of the Colombian

17

political landscape for over

a

century, one would expect that they

not only have their roots deep in Colombian society but
also serve
as viable instruments of public policy.

In

order to determine the

extent to which the political parties (and the ideologies embedded
therein) continue to have

a

systematic impact on policy outputs we

must first examine the relationship of the party structure to the
state itself.
At the most basic level

this study is concerned with whether

there have been ideological differences in recent times between the
Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia as to who in society
is

to benefit from state action (or inaction).

The question as to

whether ideological distinctions have become irrelevant in distinguishing Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties has been ans-

wered by researchers in both the affirmative and the negative.

Payne,

in particular, has been insistent in his contention that there are

currently no manifest differences between the Liberals and ConserOther researchers have not been so certain that ideology

vatives.^

can be completely dismissed as irrelevant in discussing Colombian

politics.

37

This is particularly relevant inasmuch as the structural

arrangements of the Colombian government since 1958 may have removed
other salient dimensions of conflict.

Hoskin and Swanson, for ex-

ample, note that:
Two salient dimensions of conflict characterize the [Colombian]
party system, a government-opposition pole and an ideological
Conflict centering around control of the governpole.
ment traditionally has been more forceful than ideological
conflict, but this is changing, in part as a consequence of
the National Front, with prospects for increased political
38
and governmental instability.
.

.
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The question of whether there are ideological differences

between Colombian political parties, and if so, over what issues

relevant to development policy,
To answer such

a

is

the main thrust of this study.

question meaningfully we must first examine the

extent to which the parties can be said to differ with respect to
their relationship to the state.

As discussed above, to say that

the state is an important force in determining policy outputs does

not necessarily answer the qeustion of why certain sectors in

society will benefit more from that state intervention than others.

Nonetheless, to answer this latter question, we must first deter-

mine the extent to which the former

true.

is

In

other words, to

answer the question of whether the Liberal and Conservative parties
differ with respect to their distribution of state benefits while
in power, we must first determine the extent to which they differ
in their relationships vis a vis

the state mechanisms through which

they will distribute such benefits.

In

the words of Seliger, "as

long as it is neither near total nor near m'll, it is not the amount
of government intervention but its purpose which preeminently fulfills the function of ideological differentiation of political
,..

parties

„39

turn our
It is to this former aspect to which we must first

attention.

The second aspect, whether policy variations can be

the rediscerned in the purpose of state intervention will occupy

mainder of this study.

19

The State and Political

The ideal of

ditional

a

Parties in Co lombia.

non-interventionist state enshrined

in tra-

capitalist thought has never taken strong root in Colombia.

The political mechanisms of the state have been an important part

of the economic environment since its independence.

Furthermore,

this role was not the direct result of the Wars of Independence.

It

has been argued that economic systems of the Spanish colonies them-

selves were the deliberate results of active intervention on part of
the Spanish state to transfer an economic surplus from the Colonies
to Spain.
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Even if this were not so much the case with the earlier

Spanish monarchs, the situation became much more explicit with the

change from Hapsburg to Bourbon rule in the early eighteenth century
and especially the accession to the throne of Charles III in 1759.

Whereas the earlier Hapsburgs may have been somewhat lax in their
1

view of the colonies as

a

major supplier of wealth for Spain, under

the Bourbons the instruments of the state were used in an unpresce-

dented fashion not only to organize the extraction of

a

surplus from

the colonies but also to effectuate the transfer of that surplus to

the mother country.

Indeed, one observer goes as far as to assert

that "Bourbon policies in Colombia brought the advent of

export-oriented economy.

a

truly

.,41

It cannot be overemphasized that the emergence of the Liberal

and Conservative parties in Colombia did not occur in either

a

pol-

nineteenth
itical or an economic vacuum during the middle of the

century.

The period following the Wars of Independence marked the

20

fruition of earlier Bourbon colonial policies.

The state apparatus

which existed during three hundred years of colonial rule was not

demolished with the Wars of Independence.

Indeed, it may be argued

that in many important respects the state emerged from the Wars of
AO

Independence even stronger than before.

In a sense,

it was not

the Colombian state which was being captured by an emerging bour-

geoisie to facilitate its accumulation of surplus in the middle of
the nineteenth century; it was rather the emerging bourgeoisie

which was being captured by

a

changing state to facilitate national

integration and the creation of wealth.

It is for this reason that

Colmenares argues that both the Liberal and Conservative parties
were more than anything, organized responses on part of both older
and emergent groups in Colombian society to the prospect of increased

domination by the state.
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Neither the Liberal nor the Conservative party was the result
of "like-minded men" banding together to express, via

a

political

vehicle, either the sentiments and proclivities or the arguments and
logic of an explicit ideology.

Neither the Liberals nor the Conser-

support
vatives were interested in the building of new coalitions of

among the masses through exposition of the "rationality," "economic
their
efficiency," "moral superiority," or "realism" embodied in

respective party pronouncements.
fall

Instead, as Leal notes, after the

(1853-54), "party
of the government of General Jose Maria Melo

two major sectors
differentiation was more clearly defined between the
the two forms of social organof the dominant class (which represented

ization of the time):

the emergthe existing colonial latrfjjndja. and

21

ing m ercantile capital

1,44

It was not until

.

later in the nineteenth

century that this move was actually embodied in coherent systems of
ideology which were to allegedly serve as the raison d'etre for party
differentiation.
It was

45

in this context,

vative parties emerged.

then, that the Liberal and Conser-

Colombia had been independent from Spain

for almost thirty years before a president came to power upon whom

we may place a party label.

It was also during the rule of one of

the first "party affiliated" presidents, General Tomas Cipriano de

Mosquera (1845-49), that
bian state vis

a

a

marked change in the nature of the Colom-

vis society was affected:

the adoption of

a

policy

of free trade and manufacturing and the abolition of the state

tobacco monopoly.

Mosquera, nominally

in office by General

went

e,ven

Jose'

a

Conservative, was followed

Hilario l_6pez, nominally

a

Liberal.

L6pez

further by promulgating the Reforms of 1850, which, in

addition to supporting the reduced tariff policies of his predecessor,
also enacted monetary reform, the expulsion of the Jesuits, the

emancipation of the slaves, and
the elimination of communal

a

land reform which provided for

Indian resguardos (communal lands or

reservations)
The Reforms of 1850 were different from governmental policy
society.
prior to that time in terms of their impact upon state and

changes did accrue to
It is true that the benefits of these policiy

particular individuals.

In

that sense, a "Liberal" General L6pez

in rewarding
differed little from his "non-partisan" predecessors

certain favored elements in society.

But the individuals who bene-
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fited from such changes were individuals unlike those who had been

rewarded with political spoils before.

represented

a

These were individuals who

new way of thinking and who were impatient with the

fetters the state and society had heretofore placed on their actions.
With the same act of bestowing upon

group of individuals

a

certain perogatives and opportunities previously denied, the mechanisms of the state under both Conservative and Liberal administrations

following the Reforms of 1850 bestowed upon
ional

class--a nacient nat-

a

bourgeoisie—the heretofore illegitimate right

to engage in

trade and commerce for the benefit of the individual rather than in
the name of society or the state.

While individuals demanded access

to markets and the opportunity to engage in trade, it was the state

which was the fount of such privileges.

It was the state, then,

which consciously permitted the first direct commercial links between
a

nacient Colombian bourgeoisie and the emerging colonial powers in

Europe, particularly Great Britain.

Economic growth based on direct state intervention on behalf
of the national bourgeoisie within

a

capitalist world context may be

Finance Mintraced at least as far back as General Mosquera and his

ister Florentino Gonzalez.

The model of growth chosen--the direct

marketpromotion of commercial agriculture oriented toward the world
provided

a

keystone of Colombian development policy which was to

emerge with varying intensity for more than

a

century.

But what is

acting on behalf of
important to note is the fact that the state,

way the masses), provided
private Colombian citizens (although in no
guide
the policy tools with which to

a

mode of economic development.
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The idea of an active state must not be taken
too abstractly.
The idea of the state actively intervening to promote
the expansion

of plantation agriculture is evidence of an active state.

But that

same active state declined to become involved in industrialization.

After an initial attempt in the 1840s to spearhead an incipient

industrialization drive failed, the attempt was not repeated again
for half a century.

Florentino Gonzalez, Mosquera's finance minis-

ter and architect of the state intervention on behalf of agrarian
and commercial

interests, was

division of labor.

a

strong believer in the international

The state, he believed, should limit itself to

encouraging the development of primary materials and agriculture
because Colombia "has not been called upon to become

a

manufacturing

Citing three reasons which would be echoed all along the

nation."

next century of Colombian development, Gonzalez, in the early 1840s,
held that it would be foolish for the state to encourage such ven-

tures because:

1)

Colombia lacked adequate capital and technical ex-

pertise; 2) it lacked
ization; and

3)

a

natural resource base to sustain industrial-

it could not compete with foreign manufactures for

consumer allegiance in an open market.

Gonzalez went so far as to

assert that consumers would prefer imported manufactures to those
produced domestically even in the face of protection guaranteed by
a

high tariff.
The Conservative administration of President Mosquera and

his Liberal successors did use the power of the state for practical

ideological purposes.

bourgeoisie.

They created, almost singlehandedly,

a

national

Needless to say, the instruments of state power were
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not brought to the aid of all private individuals who
sought it as
an ally.

The nacient commercial and agri cul'tural bourgeoisie in-

itially found little in common with those attempting to begin
basic industries in Colombia.

a

few

Particularly before the state patron

the standing of these two sectors was not equal.

,

The question of

why the state initially favored commercial and agricultural interests
over those of industry and manufacturing
which cannot be answered here.

is

an interesting one, but

What is important to note is that

the state did actually intervene to encourage economic development

and growth, and that the state action in this regard was neither

accidental

nor incidental.

The degree to which this intervention

can be seen as systematic and coherent in later years in Colombia is
as much a function of empirical

construction.

investigation as it is of theoretical

State intervention has been accepted by both the

Liberal and Conservative parties since their organization in the

middle of the nineteenth century.

The extent to which there are

systematic variations between them with respect to their utilization
of state intervention in the middle of the twentieth century has

yet to be established.
From the Constitution of 1886 until the golpe de estado which

unseated Conservative President Laureano Gomez in 1953, political
parties in Colombia were accustomed to one overriding reality—the

party in power was also the country's largest patron
the state meant control of the national budget.

hampered by serious restriction and served as
take power seriously.

a

.

Control of

This control was un-

strong incentive to

If nothing else the century between the found-
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ing of the political

1957 had been

a

parties and their temporary eclipse from 1953-

period of four mini -hegemonies.

The Liberal Party

from the 1860s until the 1830s used its decentralized, federalist,

free-trade constitutions to not only stake out
but also stake out an economic reality.

political

a

ideal

Decentralization and fed-

eralism did not mean that power was absent from the system, only
from the central government.

At the departmental and municipal

level --the level of the local

gamonales

,

casigues

,

and patronec—

power (and wealth) was sought and defended.
From 1886 to 1930, the Conservative Party, through its central ist, grudgingly secular,

unified, free-trade Constitution also was

beneficiary of the public weal.
having become

a

The concept of

a

unified state

reality in structure, this epoch also saw several

attempts to institutionalize bipartisan party structures.

The

Nationalist Party, founded by Rafael Nunez in the 1880s and the
Republican Union of 1909 both represented attempts to ameliorate
the effects of Conservative Party hegemony upon the still existent
,

Liberals.

All

of these attempts were temporary and lacked

stitutional basis.

a

con-

And most important, according to Dix, was the

fact that in all experiments with bipartisan governmental arrange-

ments prior to the National Front (1958-76), "one or the other party
was the clearly dominant partner, or it was tacitly understood which

one would emerge as such after

a

period of transition."

With the return to power of the Liberal Party in 1930, and

especially after the politico-administrative reforms of President
control
Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo's Revolucidn en Marcha begun in 1934,
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of the state became at once more complex and more subtle.

The po-

tentialities of power bacame even more attractive as the idea of
an actively interventionist state began to be expressed in non-

budgetary terms.

Control of the state after several Constitutional

modifications in 1936 implied control not only over the budget,
which after all was limited in both its depth as well as its viability, but also over an increasingly important generator of wealth —
the private sector.

Always subject to one degree or another to the

power of the state, the private sector in Colombia finally became
worth noticing in economic terms during the 1920s.

In the years of

unprecedented economic growth between the War of 1000 Days and the
First World War, the private sector of Colombia grew at

precedented before or since in history.

a

rate un-

It was finally during the

1930s that the worth of the economy passed that of the national
budget.

48

In a sense, control

of the state now meant not only that

the budget would be "on tap"; the power of the state could also be

used to help one's supporters prosper through the "free market" of
the private sector.
By the time that the Conservatives returned to power in 1946,

the state in many ways was quite different than that which they had

left in 1930.
ful

But while the state in the late 1940s was more power-

Conserthan it ever had been before, the party leadership of the

terms.
vatives still seemed to view it in somewhat antequated

To

the national
control the state in 1946 meant not only to control
to
budget, but also access to the private sector

ted in Colombian history.

a

degree unpreceden-

And to deny access to private as well as

27

public sources of wealth would be no less than an economic death
sentence.
The state, as an object sought by both the Liberal and

Conservative parties, was becoming more and more powerful and valuable.

Control of the state began to imply even greater power in

both economic and political matters than it ever had before.

instruments that

a

The

party possessed if it controlled the state con-

tinued to grow in importance even as the parties themselves would
be busily deciding how the spoils were to be divided.

In

one sense,

the state had developed more rapidly than had the political parties

which sought to control it.

What is more, the country had developed

along with the state in ways unanticipated by the leaders in either
political party, but especially the Conservative.

The conscientious

mobilization of urban labor by the Liberals (and later the Conservatives) had produced more than the corporate units which would rep-

resent the voice of the aristocracy of the working class
councils of government.

in the

A genuine class leader had emerged and

fallen by 1948, and increasingly politics and conflict was being seen
in class

rather than party terms.

Colombia was becoming more indus-

trialized, more integrated into the world economy, more regionally
integrated,

arid

more aware of its situation vis

a

vis other Latin

American countries as well as the world.
partisan
That the state could function without the active
Liberals or
participation of many important segments of either the
General Rojas Pinilla between
the Conservatives was demonstrated by

1953 and 1957.

could
That the Liberal and Conservative parties
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function without formal access to and control
of state mechanisms
was becoming less obvious as the years of the
Rojas Interregnum pro-

ceeded.

The Colombian economy was growing at an average annual
rate

substantially higher than during either the Liberal or
Conservative
administrations which preceeded it.

The quasi-civil war called la

violencia which had been raging in the countryside since 1948 was
being attenuated after some 300,000 lives had been lost.

Civil

liberties, while severely constrained due to the State of Seige which
was in existence throughout the entire Rojas period, were at

a

much

higher level than during the Conservative civilian government which

preceeded him.

And many Colombians for the first time were beginning

to contemplate seriously the possibility of a future without either

the Liberals or the Conservatives with

ation of the state.
It was this

a

formal stake in the oper-
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last trend which the leadership of both the

Liberals and the Conservatives perhaps feared most.

It was

becoming

apparent that it was the state, and not the political parties which

controlled it, that was important in the continued growth and development of Colombian society.

Indeed, it was becoming apparent that

the energy spent on the competition and conflict between the parties

was a luxury which many Colombians could do without; the state did
not need this sort of situation in order to persue economic growth.
In

other words, as far as many Colombians were concerned the role of

the state in fostering economic development could be separated from
the role of the political party structure.
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But the political party structure which had evolved over a

century of conflict and compromise proved more durable than most
observers thought at the time.

In a period of less than five years

the two parties which were literally at "arms" length from each

other developed

plan whereby they both would participate in the

a

management of the state— the Frente Nacional
Frente Nacional
structural

a

,

or simply the Frente

level

,

(National

Front).

The

was at least two things.

On

it was a plan whereby the two parties shared formal

control of the mechanisms of the state, to the exclusion of all other

political parties or groups.

On a metaphysical

level

it was a con-

sensus whereby the Liberals and Conservatives recognized that both

were facets of the same socio-economic heritage.
The structural aspects of the Frente were simple enough, pro-

viding for changes in the Constitutional structure which were ratified by a national

plebiscite at the end of 1957.

tural' changes were provided:

al

1)

ternacion

,

Three basic struc-

or the alternation of

the presidency between the two traditional .political parties; 2)

paridad

,

or equality of representation by members of the two tradi-

in
tional parties in all executive, legislative, and judicial bodies

the Republic; and 3)

a

requirement for the decisions of all legis-

lative bodies to be ratified by

a

two-thirds vote.

The

al

ternacion

terms or twelve
provision was originally to have lasted for three

years.

the paridad
This was subsequently changed to sixteen years;

provision was extended at the national level

(although not at the

and the two-thirds redepartmental and local levels) until 1978;
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quirement was eliminated (except in certain cases) in the 1968 Constitutional Reform.
The structural changes embodied in the Frente were unique in
the annals of government structures.

But their ultimate significance

was not so much in their novelty but in their "therapeutic" effect. 50
In

other words, it provided relief from both the violence of the

civil war and the vagaries of

a

military government.

In this

view,

the Frente was an unqualified success in that it reestablished for
the Liberal

and Conservative parties

role in the state.

a

This pos-

ition is perhpas best summed up by Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, son of the

president overthrown by the military in 1953 and himself
tial

a

presiden-

candidate in 1974:
The Frente Nacional is neither a structure nor a set of rules.
The Frente Nacional is not al ternacion it is not al ternacion
and pari dad ; it is not al ternacion pari dad and the two thirds
It is not, in addition, a simple problem of
requirement.
it is a system of
more than all of this:
much
It is
dates.
guarantees.
;

,

In

many ways the structural aspects of the Frente provide

a

unique opportunity to study the effects of political party ideology
in the execution of public policy.

All

important public offices

below the president—in the executive, legislature, and judiciary-

were equally divided among members of the Liberal and Conservative
parties.

The only exception was the alternation of the presidency

every four years.

Until

1968 the legislature was usually ineffective

proportion to pass
due to the difficulty of obtaining the required

legislation.

Furthermore, the president retained quite

a

bit of

especially through his
power in his ability to modify the budget,
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ability to transfer funds from one account to another,
and after
1968, the requirement that all

bills dealing with economic develop-

ment policy must originate with the executive. 52
provided the president with

a

Such

situation

a

unique opportunity to engage in policy

making with the understanding that not only would he be unable
to
seek reelection, but that the next president would be

a

member of

the opposite party.

Public policy outcomes in Colombia are the result of

number of forces—both political and economic.
of using the period of the Frente as

a

a

One of the advantages

focus when attempting to

assess the relative importance of each is that it provided "controls"
at the systemic level.

The political structures in effect during

the Frente (and immediately thereafter) only serve to heighten the

visibility of the major political variation which did occur during
those sixteen years--the party affiliation of the president.

Also

during this period Colombia became the first country in Latin America to develop

a

national plan for economic development.

above, any development policies promulgated under such

apart from

a

a

As noted

plan (or

plan for that matter) would have to take cognizance of

the constraints inherent in Colombia's position as

italist economy.
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a

dependent cap-

But regardless of such constraints, for

a

number

of reasons the Colombian political leadership felt it essential to

embark on

a

self-conscious, deliberate, and sustained effort to in-

crease the rate of economic growth.
ies of this policy

It

is

effort— the bureaucracy,

the sectoral

beneficiar-

the agricultural

sector,

the industrial sector, and the infrastructure sectors— which con-
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stitute the bulk of this study.

wered is whether there has been

The principal question to be ansa

discernable and systematic differ-

ence between development policy outputs of Liberal and Conservative
regimes in as far as these sectors are concerned.

Sectors of Development Policy

When speaking of development and modernization it

is

in the West to think almost exclusively in economic terms.

customary
Most of

the literature concerning development not only in the Third World but

also the "developed" nations assumes that it is economic development

which underlies the transition from "tradition" to "modernity."
is often argued that all

types of development--pol i tical

,

It

social, cul-

tural, and so on--depend upon economic development, and indeed cannot
be considered as occuring in any meaningful sense until

level of economic abundance has been achieved.

certain

It is not within the

scope of this study to debate whether all development

economic development.

a

is

at its core

As it is used in this study, the concept of

economic development is much narrower.
Although the fullest concept of economic development
broad one, at its base

is

is a

the idea that when productivity is in-

creased development will occur.

Indeed, increasing productivity is

development,
often the principal criterion for judging all types of
not just economic.

The question then becomes, how does one go about

increasing productivity?

Most approaches look at increased produc-

and increasing output
tivity as the result of lowering factor costs

per unit of input.

There are several interrelated societal compon-
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ents, sectors, and subsectors within which action may be pursued
to

achieve this end.

This study examines Colombian development policy

during the Frente period (1961-1976) with particular attention to
three of its aspects:

1)

the role of the state in the definition

and execution of what its leaders consider to be "development;" 2)
the state's reification of that concept of development along its

principal dimension—industrial ization--and the strategies evolved
in the agricultural

sector to aid in this transformation; and

3)

the state's policy with respect to the development of basic social

overhead capital or infrastructure in the context of both the development model chosen and the condition of structural economic dependency.

The promotion of economic development through an active

policy of increasing industrialization has been the hallmark of

economic development policy since the turn of the century.
the principal

One of

incentives to persue economic development via indus-

trialization has been the desire to preserve foreign exchange.

This

type of industrial ization—import substituting industrialization
(

ISI

)

— has

1930s.

been particularly important since the Depression of the

The collapse of the world market demand for agricultural

and primary products at that time drastically limited the ability
the sale
of nations such as Colombia to earn foreign exchange from

of rural

products.

This led to

a

scarcity of foreign exchange and

manufactures
thus prevented Colombia from purchasing many of the

which it had previously bought on the world market.

The solution,
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in simple terms, was seen as

increasing the ability to produce domes-

tically that which previously had been
imported.

Aside from providing tax breaks and other fiscal
incentives
to the private sector to encourage this process,
the active inter-

vention of the state can take two major forms.

First, the state may

direct resources and investments to the industrial sector
itself.
It may create or subsidize the creation of various
types of manu-

facturing concerns, and maintain varying degrees of control over
them after their creation.

A second means of active state inter-

vention is to establish special financial and credit institutions

expressly for the purpose of serving the private industrial sector.
This method, which in this study shall be called business promotion
(as opposed to the former method of state industrialization)

is

in-

creasingly popular in Latin America.
Regardless of which industrialization process the state may
prefer,
all

a

nation such as Colombia could never economically produce

the manufactures it would need.

Economies of scale, advanced

production techniques, as well as lack of favorable prerequisites
and conditions for industrialization all would make it imperative
(or at least much less costly)

to import some manufactures rather

than attempt to produce them domestically.

In

Colombia, as most

of Latin America, the ability to earn foreign exchange depends upon
an overriding concern--the ability to export agricultural and pri-

mary material

s

Historically, the principal export commodity in much of Latin
America has not been what is grown upon the earth, but what is ex-
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tracted from beneath it.
cipal

Colombia today remains the world's prin-

producer and exporter of emeralds, as well as

of gold and platinum.

a

major producer

But mining in Colombia has never assumed the

importance that it has for Mexico or Chile, and its impact on either
earning foreign exchange or serving as

a

source of domestic savings

has been less during the period of the Frente than in previous decades.

Instead, the development of Colombian industrialization has predom-

inantly been due to transformations in the countryside involving
the cultivation and marketing of

relationship between the two

is

a

perennial crop--cof fee.

The

clearly stated by McGreevey when

he notes that Colombia "began economic development through

a

process

involving mutual interdependence between export expansion and manUCA

facturing activity.

1

The other major component of economic development explored
in this study shall

be infrastructure.

A precise characterization

of infrastructure development is difficult.

In one sense,

it is

difficult to argue with the proposition that "Infrastructure development, far from being the exclusive concern of economics, cuts
across the entire devel operant process."
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On the other hand, a more

restricted conceptualization must be sought if it
as an analytic tool
As

is

to have value

for understanding economic development policy.

it is used in this study,

infrastructure refers to three sectors-

transportation, energy, and communication.
The first of these, transportation, is of particular im-

portance for economic development policy in Colombia.
the difficulties encountered in providing

a

Historically

unified, coordinated
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system of transportation have been one of the major
obstacles in
lowering the costs of production not only for the external
market
but the internal market as well.
in developing a national

Foremost among the difficulties

transportation system has been the extremely

rugged nature of the terrain through which transportation lines must
run.

This is particularly acute for developing

network which would serve the internal market.

a

transportation

For this reason and

others discussed later, the transportation system in Colombia has
been principally oriented toward servicing foreign trade requirements.^

Energy, the second sector of infrastructure, becomes increasingly important as the country proceeds along the road of industrialization.

Power production capabilities must at least keep pace with

industrialization if the latter

is

not to experience production

bottlenecks.

And while the use of electricity, petroleum, and coal

are essential

in the

is

industrialization process, the demand for power
While the

also increasing as the country becomes more urbanized.

non-industrial consumption of electricity

is not as crucial

for econ-

omic development, the provision of electricity services is one of the
basic tasks of any urban community.
The final sector of infrastructure development

communication.

is

that of

While not as fundamental for economic development as

transportation and power, the provision of

a

modern communications

network is necessary for other development to take place.

For ex-

geographical
ample, an increased use of air transportation to overcome

communication
obstacles in land transportation requires an extended
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system.

Also, the efficiency of financial, business and other econ-

omic transactions depends upon smoothly functioning communications

networks
Taken together, these three sectors

— industry

,

agriculture,

and infrastructure—constitute the targets or focii of the central

government's efforts in effecting economic development.

Since at

least the decade beginning in 1960 the committment of the Colombian
national

government to economic development (as contrasted with

politico-administrative or socio-cul tural development) has fluctuated,
but not widely.

As can be seen in Figure 2 below, on the average

about 22 percent of the annual budget has been spent on programs
which have been classified as contributing directly to economic
development.
Liberal

Overall, it appears

that during the years when the

Party controlled the presidency, especially during the years

of the Lleras Restrepo administration, economic development programs

consumed their greatest portion of national government expenditures.
Since 1971

this percentage has remained almost constant.

As will

be seen in more detail

in the next chapter,

the

intervention of the state in the Colombian economy has been neither
new nor insignificant.

In Colombia,

the chief government official

responsible for coordinating and effectuating this involvement is
the Minister of Finance.

Legally the finance minister has several

responsibilities, including

1)

to direct and develop the fiscal

revenues,
policy of the state; 2) collect and administer national taxes,

formulation of
fees, and other sources of income; 3) supervise in the
the national

budget and exercise administrative control over its
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implementation; and 5) participate in the formulation of
policy

concerning international commerce and capital markets. 57

As such,

the portfolio of the finance minister is the broadest of all
members

of the cabinet.

The political

party relationship between the pres-

ident and the finance minister throughout the period of the Frente
and until 1976 is presented in Table

1.

As we can see, the party

affiliation has been the same as that of the president since the
beginning of the Lleras Restrepo administration.

Regardless of party

affiliation, however, one would expect that the views of the president with respect to the broad outlines of state intervention in
the economy would be mirrored by the finance minister.

TABLE

1

Control of the Finance Ministry by Party
During the Frente, 1958-1976

President
Lleras
Camargo
(Lib.)

Fi nance
Minister

Conservative
(# of Years)
Liberal
(# of Years)

Valencia
Tovar
(Cons.

10
4

3

Lleras
Restrepo
(Lib.)

Pastrana
Borrero
(Cons

.

Lopez
Michel sen
(Lib.)

0

4

0

4

0

2

Over the sixteen years under consideration, the Liberals have

tended to devote

a

greater proportion of national resources to economic

development policies.

As can be seen from Table 2, the adjusted average
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proportion of national expenditures devoted to economic development
under Liberal presidents has been over 20 percent greater than under

Conservatives.

TABLE

2

Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Expenditures for Economic Development

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

20.14

22.75

Liberal

24.38

22.04

Pol i tical Party and
Strength of Association

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial

.56

Beta

=

.627

=

.307

.09

It should be noted here that in this table, as in all other

subsequent tables of

a

similar format, the figures in the body of

the table represent the average proportion of central government allo-

cations actually expended, adjusted for both the other independent
political variable as well as the economic control variables.

More

precisely, the effects of the economic control variables—off icial
capital

imports from abroad, the budget deficit in the previous year,

year, and the contrithe anticipated budget receipts of the current

GDP—have been
bution of the public sector in the generation of the
calculation of the
accounted for or controlled statistically in the
figures.

political varLikewise, the effects of the other relevant

president, deiable—party affiliation of the finance minister or

statistically controlled.
pending on the figure-have also been
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Therefore, the figures presented do not necessarily represent the
exact expenditure distribution of Liberal and Conservative finance

ministers and presidents.

Instead, they represent expenditure dis-

tributions from which the effects of our other possible explanatory

variables have been partialled out.

(See Methodological Appendix)

Much of the variation in Table

2

above may be due to the

presidential administrations of Lleras Camargo and
In the

LI

eras Restrepo.

period covered, both administrations were substantially

above the mean with regard to expenditures for economic development.

The administration of Lopez Michelsen, however, deviates

from this pattern.

Not only was his performance in this areas

essentially the same as his Conservative predecessor, but also in
the last year under consideration he became the only president of
the Frente era to devote less than 20 percent of the national

budget to programs in the economic development sectors.
The continuation by Lopez of the relative de-emphasis of

government resource allocation to economic development begun by
One possible ex-

Pastrana may be indicative of several things.

planation would be that as Colombia is becoming more "developed"

economically there is more need to devote national resources to other
areas in order to maintain thp levels already achieved.

possible explanation would be that the state

is

Another

channeling its

support of economic development programs through official agencies
other than the national government, i.e., the departments and de-

centralized agencies and institutes.

A related explanation would be

that the central government is restructuring its direct involvement
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in the economic development process along what Lowi would call

"reg-

ulatory" instead of "distributive" or "redistributi ve" lines. 58
None of these explanations can be tested directly through
this study.

The time series used in the study

discern any long term secular trend.

is

not long enough to

Expenditure data of the depart-

ments and decentralized agencies are generally unavailable for the

earlier years of the study and are in

a

form which is only marginally

compatible with the data from the national government.

At the aggre-

gate level, then, the importance of ideological differences in ex-

plaining variations which have been observed must be qualified.
Some clarification will be possible as variations in the specific

components within the economic development sphere are examined in
detail

below.

Before we elaborate upon the particular sectors of economic

development policy and political party variation

in

it, we must first

examine more closely the concept of the state and its relationship
with the process of development.

Following this discussion in the

next chapter, the remainder of the study will examine the active

intervention of the Colombian national government within the sectors
of economic development outlined above.

It will

explicitly assess

variations in economic development policy as measured by the committment of national resources by the central government during the
Frente period from 1961

to 1976.

Particularly it will examine the

impact of the party affiliation of two actors--the president and
the finance

minister— in economic policy decisions.

It will

assess

affiliation
not only the relative strength that variations in party

has on explaining variations in policy but more importantly
the

extent to which the Liberal and Conservative parties have actually
differed in their

al

locative decisions.

CHAPTER

II

THE STATE AS FACILITATOR
OF DEVELOPMENT

The state has never assumed
the process of development.

a

completely passive role in

The question of state involvement,

especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, does not
revolve around the issues of "whether" but "how much" and "how."
Even economists who are not noted for radical inclinations note
several areas in which active state intervention can be beneficial
for economic development.^

ment which adhere to

a

^os t prescriptions for state involve-

"liberal" perspective focus upon activities

which provide basic public services and stability, as well as
support for growth-stimulating policies.

The latter is often limited

to stimulating the growth of the private sector.

Such

a

view of the

state's role in economic development can be summed up as "to simply

provide

a

framework within which economic development

given the presence of active agents."

is

possible,

60

This model of state involvement in the economy is activist

only in

a

limited sense.

Indeed, it may be argued that such

a

form-

ulation represents the state's involvement in any society; the state
does not have to be actively involved in promoting economic develop-

ment in order for it to subscribe to the state/society relationship
noted above.

Instead, for the most part, the above functions may be

fulfill
termed "executive" functions, or those which are "designed to
all

the legal

requirements of governmental operations and to maintain
44

45

social

stability."

the essential

process.

In a

61

The executive functions of the state provide

basis for its further involvement in the development

sense, they refer to those governmental structures

which ostensibly permit the society to maintain its integrity and
evolve as

a

society.

There are at least four basic executive fun-

ctions which must be performed in order to make
a

capitalistic framework.

a

state viable within

For convenience, these functions have been

grouped into "sectors;" within each sector, administrative and political

structures have emerged or been created purportedly to satisfy

the functional

requisites of the society.

The first--the law and order sector—consists of those

structures which provide what

justification of
security.

a

is

considered by some as the only real

government in the first place, stability and

The second--the administrative sector—consists of those

structures which provide the mechanism through which the state can
take part in the actual
its most basic level

direction or management of the society.

this is the government itself.

At

The third—the

finance sector—provides the mechanism for developing and organizing
the necessary resources to sponsor any kind of development in

erialistic sense.

a

mat-

The fourth— what is called social overhead capital

sector— consists of those structures which provide society with the
necessary material environment within which development can take
place.

It

is

within this sector that the state

in

Latin America has

assumed its most activist posture with respect to development.
Perhaps the principal lesson learned from the structural

functionalist school has been that most social structures are
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invariably multi-functional.

In this context,

the governmental

structures which have emerged in any of the sectors noted above
may perform in ways which satisfy parts of many functions.

The

structures which have emerged in the above sectors are no exception.
In contrast to

specifically executive functions as outlined above,

in Latin America the role of the state in actual

to be somewhat more activist or "managerial."

practice appears

At the broadest level

this study is concerned with what may be termed managerial

functions

of those governmental structures which may have been developed in-

itially to satisfy executive functions.
The role of the Colombian state in economic development is

marked as much by the transcendence of the executive functions as by
their deliberate cultivation, although, it must be pointed out that

most development policy thrusts have been built upon the same governmental structures which emerged to satisfy the executive functions.
For the purposes here, the precise division between what may be called

executive functions and managerial functions is unimportant.

As a

general principle, the greater the state's active role in the pro-

mulgation of policies which have

a

direct bearing on economic dev-

elopment the greater will be its involvement in what have been termed
managerial functions.

Of the four executive functions outlined above,

the last—social overhead capital --appears to be the most maliable
in terms of the state transcending from an executive to a managerial

function.

As such,

subsequent chapters.

it will

occupy the bulk of the consideration in
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On the other hand, the first of the executive functions out-

lined above--stability--appears to be the least maliable in terms of
the state transcending the executive function.

armed services and

a

The existence of the

national police force, the principal state

structures developed to satisfy the stability function, is undoubtedly an important aspect of the environment under which development

policy is promulgated.

But its relationship to development policy

£ua_ policy is much less clear.

The law and order functions of the

state, more than any other, represent the involvement of the state
in defining the context within which development will

take place.

or will not

But its influence is for the most part indirect with

respect to the state assuming an active or managerial posture vis
vis the development process.

a

Support for these structures may rep-

resent the division of resources which may have been more productively

employed in more specifically "developmental" areas, but there

is

no

way of assessing either the magnitude or the composition that such
alternatives may assume.

The increased "production" of stability by

investments in the military, police, and legal institutions may

ultimately be developmental; but so too might the increased production of morality by investment in religious institutions.
The two remaining sectors

— those

dealing with administration,

and banking and f inance--have both executive as well as managerial

aspects.

Furthermore, the executive functions which a^e satisfied

by government structures in these sectors are directly relevant to

the state's role as an active participant in the formulation and
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execution of development policy.

As they apply specifically to

economic development, these two executive functions cast the state
in the role of facilitator.

Or more precisely, the structures which

have evolved to address these functions in fact define the state as

facilitator of development.
The final

sector—which includes what has been termed social

overhead capital --will be explored in subsequent chapters.

State

actions with respect to the social overhead capital sector undeniably have implications for its role as facilitator of development.
But there is sufficient evidence that in many of its manifestations,

support for the development of social overhead capital represents
not so much the functioning of the state as facilitator of develop-

ment as its functioning as an active agent or creator of development.
To summarize, this chapter will

deal

specifically with two

sets of structures, or sectors, through which the Colombian state
acts as a facilitator of development-- the administrative sector, and
the banking and finance sector.

The former is concerned particularly

with the characteristics and nature of the government in its role as

active agent in the economic development process.

In a sense,

deals with the state as the "director" of development.

this

The latter

sector is concerned particularly with the characteristics and nature
of the banking and financial structures—those structures which provide the wherewithal

(principally financial resources) with which

the state may persue development policy.

This sector, then, deals

with the state as "producer" of development.
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Administration— The Directors of Development
The administration, or direction of the state's
efforts

with respect to development policy,

is

inextricably linked to the

"how" questions of development strategy.

The "how" questions with

which we are concerned at this point refer to both the
scope and

method of state penetration in the economy.

There are three issues

within the administrative sector which have implications for develop-

ment policy.

These issues revolve around questions as to the proper

or most efficient "mix" between:

1) public and private sector con-

tributions to development; 2) centralized versus decentralized ad-

ministrative arrangements; and

3)

planned versus unplanned develop-

ment.
The first of these—the debate as to the best public/private

sector balance— has been considered as perhaps the most basic issue
of the state's role in development, especially in the United States.
The question here is principally one of scope.
omy, the general

In a

capitalist econ-

rule has been that expansion of the public sector

at the expense of the private sector is to be avoided.

Although

this may be qualified somewhat by consideration of the specific areas
into which the public sector may expand, for the most part this has

not been the criterion for judgement.

The concept of development in

this respect is often seen as having the characteristics of a zero-

sum game— one sector can only expand to the extent that the other

sector contracts.

Since the emphasis in capitalist development trad-

itionally has been the enlargement of the private sector, the ideology
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of development has invariably stressed the limits of public
sector

involvement.

In

point of fact, the expansion of the private sector

has usually coincided with the expansion of the public sector.
it was not until
a

But,

Keynes that such a phenomenon was incorporated into

specifically capitalist theory of development.
The growth of Colombia's public and private sectors during

the period under consideration in terms of their contribution to
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

is

traced in Figure

3

below.

As

we can see, the percent of the GDP which has been generated by the

public sector (in terms of both consumption and investment) has re-

mained fairly stable except for
and early 1970s.

a

small

spurt during the late 1960s

During the last year under consideration, however,

the size of the government contribution had practically returned to
the pre-1968 period.
A ratio between the amount of the GDP accounted for by gov-

ernment expenditure and the amount accounted for by private expenditure
can be used as a rough estimate of the balance between the public and

private sectors.

Table

3

compares Liberals and Conservatives with

respect to the average adjusted ratio between public and private components of the GDP.

After accounting for the effects of our covar-

iates, there is some ambiguity as far as differences between Liberals

and Conservatives are concerned.

sociated with

a

Liberal

presidents tend to be as-

larger ratio between public and private expenditures,

that is, public sector expenditures are larger relative to private

sector expenditures.
the Liberal

By itself such a finding would indicate that

Party is more inclined to use the mechanisms of the state
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than is the Conservative Party.

Such

finding would coorborate the

a

contention by Dix that in Colombia, it has been the Liberals who
"have been more prone to look to legislation and government action

and to rely on its effacacy to solve social ills." 62
the data also indicate that Liberal

associated with

a

Unfortunately

finance ministers tend to be

smaller adjusted public/private expenditure ratio

than Conservative finance ministers.

In

other words, Conservative

finance ministers seem to be more inclined to use the state than
Liberal

s

TABLE

3

Adjusted Ratio Between Public/Private Expenditure
on the Gross Domestic Product

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Conservatives

Finance
Minister

9.54

10.74

10.16

9.48

Strength of
Association

R

Liberals

R

.32

Partial Beta

2

=

.944

=

.891

.62

We are left with the question as to whose ideology is more

important here.

The findings here indicate that variations in the

finance ministers' political party are more important in explaining
public sector support, (Beta

=

.62).

Coupled with the finding above

that Liberal finance ministers tend to be associated with

scope for the publ

ic*

a

smaller

sector than Conservatives, this finding provides

evidence that Dix's hypothesis concerning state intervention may not
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have been as cut and dried as assumed during
the Frente

.

Of course,

we must remember that we are using gross public
expenditures as

a

measure of the size and scope of government involvement
in the socMechanisms of state involvement which require relatively
small

ity.

amounts of expenditure are therefore underestimated.

State inter-

vention which assumes the nature of licensing, regulation, and
law
most likely require

a

smaller marginal financial committment on part

of the government than would direct government intervention.

Indeed,

it is conceivable that state intervention via such non-fiscal

routes

may be increasing in scope while the relative contribution of gov-

ernment expenditure to the GDP could be decreasing.

The tendency

for Conservative finance ministers to be associated with greater

public sector scope may indicate not so much that support

extensive but that it is just more direct.
bered that while both parties have supported

is

more

Also it should be remema

strong private sector,

historically it has been the bureaucrats, not Liberals or Conservatives,
that "made up the most important force favoring

a

strong government,

consistent policy, and long-term programs."

Centralization Versus Decentralization

In structural

terms,

a

strong, unitary central government

has existed in Colombia for less than

for

a

central

a

century.

Although the need

government has never seriously been questioned, debate

as to the form that the central

of the perennial

government should take has been one

issues of Colombian politics.

Indeed, McGreevey

asserts that from the time of Bolivar until the War of 1000 Days at
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the turn of the century, this issue dominated political

discourse.

64

What was at issue here was not so much the existence of government
but the relative balance between

mental

(state) governments.

a

national government and depart-

In short,

the issue was one of

tary versus federal structure of political power.

a

uni-

The issue was

settled de jure by the Constitution of 1886 under which Colombia
still

governed.

It provides for a unitary central

is

government with

very little authority and even less power delegated to governmental
units below the central government level, i.e., at the departmental
or municipal

levels.

The governors of the departments are appointed

by the president, and regular party membership in the departmental

assemblies (legislatures) is determined in large part by the respective national

political party directorates.

Therefore the actual

power which may independently be exercised by these sub-national
units probably is even less than the meager constitutional provisions

would allow.

Contemporary debate with respect to this issue in reality
revolves around two separate issues—devolution as well as decentralization.

Decentralization provides

a

structural alternative to cen-

tralized political power in which power
units which, while still

is

delegated to functional

part of the central government, have

substantial amount of independence.

In the

a

Colombian context the

decentralization of political authority has principally assumed the
form of official semi -autonomous agencies and decentralized institutes.

Devolution, on the other hand, refers more strictly to the

actual delegation of power from the central

government to territorial
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units which represent smaller jurisdictions,
such as departments

and municipios.

It is this latter form of the decentralization

issue which has historically divided the Liberal
and Conservative

parties in Colombia.
During the years 1863-1886, Colombia was governed under

a

constitution in which the scope and power of the departmental and
municipal governments was even greater than that of the central

government.

Furthermore, it has been asserted that the period in

which the departments and municipios in actuality exercised

a

sub-

stantial degree of autonomy extended from the Wars of Independence.

Inasmuch as Colombia's political parties were being formed precisely
in the midst of this transition,

it is natural

would reflect it if not dominate it.
Liberal

In this

to assume that they

struggle it was the

Party that came to represent an ideology which favored

a

more limited role for the central government.
The extent to which such an ideological position is rele-

vant in Colombia today is unclear.

One method which may indicate

the extent to which such an issue has relevance in contemporary

Colombia is to examine the extent to which the central government
has relied upon departmental

policies.

and municipal governments to carry out

Table 4 examines the variations between Liberals and

Conservatives with respect to the extent to which investments on
part of the central government have been channeled through the de-

partmental and municipal governments.
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TABLE 4

Adjusted Percent of Central Government Expenditure
Invested by Departments, Municipios, etc.

Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

11 .21

11.54

Liberal

13.93

13.04

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial

Beta

.16

As can be seen, on the average Liberal

=

.212

=

.045

.03

presidents have

channeled almost 25 percent more of central government expenditures
through the departments and municipios than have Conservative presidents.
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Likewise, Liberal finance ministers channeled 13 percent

more through the sub-national units than Conservative finance ministers.

This finding supports the contention that, at least in this

area, rhetorical differences between Liberals and Conservatives based
on historical
a

positions continue to be reflected in actual policy

century later.

Such a contention is mediated somewhat when we con-

sider that less than

5

percent of the variation in support for devo-

economic
lution was explained by reference to both the political and

variables in the study.
referes not only
As noted above, the issue of decentralization
to devolution but actual

decentralization in which governmental author-

while creations of the central
ity for action is given to units which,
more or less
government and ultimately responsible to it, function
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autonoumously.
phenomenal

The growth in this type of decentralization has been

in recent years.

Figure

3

illustrates the trend from

1965 (the first year in which data were available) in the percentage
of consolidated public sector expenditures which have been spent by
the decentralized agencies and semi -autonomous institutes of the

central government.

Inasmuch as these units are formally associated

with an existing ministry or administrative department, decentralized institutes, autonomous and semi -autonomous agencies are tech-

nically part of the central government.

Specific arrangements with

respect to ties with the central government vary from agency to
agency, but all are characterized by the fact that:

1)

they are

more or less functionally specific, that is, the range of their

activities is defined in functional rather than territorial terms;
2)

they have their own separate budgets and sources of revenue

(although it may be supplemented by additional appropriations from
the central

government); and

3)

they are administered or directed

by juntas di recti vas or boards which include both government officials as well as non-government personnel.

Since the first one

established in 1936 (the Instituto de Fome nto Industrial --IFI

v/as

,

an

agency designed to promote industrial development), their number
has grown until

by 1976 there were over 125.

No one is quite sure who or what is responsible for this

phenomenal growth.

Fals Borda notes that during the administration

of President Eduardo Santos (1938-1942), "the Minister of Finance,
Dr.

Carlos Lleras Restrepo, promoted

a

policy of state intervention

and state capitalism with the creation of various decentralized

58

to

tn

<A
CD
i~
=5

—

"i

'

•i-

"O
cr

to
CU

CO

*i—

3
+->
*

i

CD +->
to
sz

Ol

X
UJ

t—i

s-

-a

+->

fC

O

C\J

£=

(J
CU
CU

o o
•i-

CU
S-

3
o>

c

i— CD
,Q CD
r> <c

o
a>

o

cu

n

o i—
f0

•i-

1—

ra
S-

+->

o c
to CD
c u
o a)

CTi

tO

OQ
o

>>
.a
oo
to

4-> 4->

cu

U
scu

uj
>-

+> T-

cu

CL
oo

to

to
to

LO
to

cu

o
scu

o

00

o

o
to

o
LO

O

o

o

CM

59

official

institutes."
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In the view of Mejia G6mez,

the tendency to

decentralize administratively was the inevitable result of deficiencies in the sub-national or territorial decentralization. 67

Re-

gardless of the ultimate cause, the relationship between these de-

centralized agencies and the central government is

a

fascinating

yet largely unexplored issue in Colombian politics.
As noted above, although decentralized institutes have fiscal

autonomy as well as their own sources of income (principally user
fees, special

taxes, and other special

does utilize them for its own ends.

levies) the central

government

Indeed, in 1976, over 80 percent

of the central government's own investments were undertaken by these

decentralized agencies.

They are by far the more important of the

two methods of decentralization discussed in this section.

However, as can be seen in Table

5

below, the evidence as to

whether their support can be explained in terms of political party
is ambiguous.

On one hand, Liberal presidents clearly tend to support

this method of decentralization more than Conservative presidents,

but on the other hand, it is the Conservative finance ministers which
are associated with the greater decentralized agency support.

Since

variations in the party affiliation of both the president and finance

minister are about equal in their contribution to explaining the
level

of support (Betas = .29 and .30 respectively), judgement as to

which conclusion

is

more valid

is

problematic.

However, it should be

remembered that the same Carlos Lleras who was particularly responsible for the first decentralized institutes in the late 1930s was
consideration.
also president during four of the sixteen years under
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Furthermore, during his presidency, at least
agencies and institutes were established.

31

new decentralized

It might be argued that

central government support for decentralized agencies was to

a

great

extent the reflection of this one individual's strong preference
rather than an ideological characteristic of the party.

TABLE

5

Adjusted Percent of Central Government Expenditure Invested
By Decentralized Agencies and Institutes

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

53.30

66.46

Liberal

63.78

54.94

Strength of
Association

R
R

Partial Beta

2

=

.323

=

.104

.30

.29

One means of clarifying this ambiguity is to examine the variation between support of the central
via territorial

units

government for decentralization

(devolution) relative to decentralization via

functional units (decentralization).

Table

6

presents variations

between the parties in the adjusted ratio between central government

support for decentralized agencies and support for departments and
muni ci pi os

.

The amount of support of the central government for

decentralized agencies relative to departments and municipios
clearly higher among the Conservatives.

decentralization appears to be

a

In

is

other words, functional

much more popular route among both

Conservative presidents and finance ministers than among Liberals.
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TABLE

6

Adjusted Ratio between Central Government Support of DeCentralized Agencies to Departments & Municipios

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Finance
Minister

President

Conservatives

9.85

12.02

Liberals

7.71

7.31

Strength of
Associ ation

R

R

Partial Beta

.13

2

=

.348

=

.121

.27

This finding tends to modify somewhat Dix's contention that
"[t]he Liberals as a party have emphasized the decentralization of

political and administrative authority."
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Whereas the evidence

demonstrates that during the period of the Frente

,

the Liberals

have tended to favor devolution or the decentralization of political

authority, the situation is not as neat with respect to decentralization of administrative authority.

The decentralization of admin-

istrative authority, or decentralization by function, in one sense
still

preserves the integrity of the central government.

The extent

and semi-autonto which such decentralized institutes and autonomous

omous agencies are able to really act

government is unknown.

independently of the central

But a functional decentralization of power

to
clearly represents an attempt on part of the central government

administrative
gain the purported advantages of more specialized

arrangements without giving up ultimate political authority.

Be-

outside of the narrow
cause no one agency or. institute is able to act
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range of its charge, coordination and political direction must

originate at another level --the central government.

coordination and direction
government

is

a

is

Whether such

actually forthcoming from the central

matter of debate.
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Nevertheless, the fact that an

increased role for the state in the management of economic develop-

ment policy necessitates
American government.
being

a

a

change from the traditional mode of Latin

Especially inasmuch as development is seen as

technical exercise rather than political, there

is

a

need for

administrative structures which can accomodate the state's demands
for specialized knowledge embodied in the tfecm'cos without compro-

mising the effective overall management of development policy.

Planning and Program Evaluation

State intervention in the economy has seldom been accidental.

Especially in the case of Colombia, the intervention of the state
has been deliberate, intentional, and purposeful.

This is not to

say that intervention has always been directed toward achieving

a

particular goal, or that intervention has not sometimes been contradictory in terms of its aims and its effects.

With the change in

development strategy in the Latin American region precipitated by
the world capital

crisis in 1929, both the tenor and the scope of

state intervention changed.

Not only did orientation of development

change from hacia afuera to hacia adentro

,

but also the nature of

state involvement in the development process began to become more

"rational."

In

the words of Furtado, "The need to rebuild and

exercise
broaden economic infrastructures and the determination to

63

some control over the external sector prompted the first
economic

programming experiments in the immediate post-war period. 70

From

these initial attempts on part of the state to direct more rationally
the conditions for economic development have emerged a
contemporary

feature of all development strategies in Latin America--an emphasis
on planning.

There are basically two concepts which generally come under
this rubric—planning and program evaluation.
del

deal

Este in 1969, to which Colombia was

a

The Charter of Punta

signatory, put

a

great

of emphasis on planning and program evaluation as indespensibl

elements in fostering economic development.
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The former, which

deals more with long range macro-economic planning and forecasting,
will be dealt with later in the chapter.

The latter is more specific-

ally related to particular development projects which are either con-

templated or actually in progress.
The basic idea of programming for development was popularized
by the United Nations and in particular the Economic Commission for

Latin America (ECLA) under the directorship of Raul Prebisch.

Al-

though the entire spectrum of planning and programming activities

is

quite broad and complex, as it is used in this section, the concept
is comparable to what the

International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (IBRD, or World Bank) has called "preinvestment studies."
Briefly, program evaluation:

comprises the studies that are considered necessary to establish investment priorities, determine the feasibility of
individual projects, and define such changes in governmental
operations or institutions as may be required to insure the
successful implementation and functioning of investment projects.
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[They] cover the full range, from basic resource inventories, sector surveys on a country wide scale, and
studies of alternative development patterns on a regional scale, to the functional design, preliminary
engineering and financial or economic analyses required for specific projects. 72

The crucial element in program evaluation involves attempting
to incorporate as many elements of economic rationality into the

decision making process with respect to development as possible.
This involves at least two things

— information

and coordination.

The first of these refers to the central government, or an agency

of the central government, becoming aware of the particular projects which have been formulated to aid in economic development.

It

has been observed that even at the ministerial level often there

exists no systematic inventory of possible development projects.
Such an inventory would not only include
jects.

a
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list of proposed pro-

More importantly specific information is needed as to antic-

ipated costs and benefits of such projects as well as realistic

assessment of the feasibil

i

ty— both

economic and pol i tical--of the

projects
The second element--coordination--refers to the balancing,

at least at the ministerial level, of competing projects.
many projects are designed to accopmlish
ment objectives.

another to

a

limited number of develop-

Since projects may overlap and duplicate one

large extent, there

cation of effort.

a

Often

is

need to eliminate such dupli-

Also projects are often designed which embody

contradictory objectives.

Of course, such contradictions may be

characteristic of the nature of the development process itself.

But
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program evaluation at least provides decision makers with the

opportunity to become aware of such contradictions and to assess
their possible impact on both the project itself and the develop-

ment effort in general.
Evidence of the variation in political party support for

program evaluation

is

somewhat ambiguous.

As shown in Table 7,

the average adjusted expenditure for program evaluation is slightly

higher under Conservative presidential administrations than under
Liberal administrations.

At the same time, Liberal

finance min-

isters have clearly favored the channeling of national resources to

program evaluation than their Conservative counterparts.

The rel-

ative contribution of the finance ministers' party affiliation in

explaining the variations observed are substantially greater than
that of the presidents' party affiliation (partial Betas of
.10 respectively).

.51

and

On the basis of this evidence, we are inclined

to give more weight to the contention that the Liberals have tended
to favor the use of program evaluation in the persuit of economic

development than the Conservatives.
Such an interpretation will have further support when we

examine variations in industrialization and infrastructure policies
in later chapters.

This is because the patterns of resource allo-

cation to program evaluation tend to be highly contingent upon the

specific nature of the projects being evaluated.

Program evaluation

as
has most typically been applied to industrial projects as well

certain types of infrastructure projects such as power generating
plants.

Inasmuch as such concerns may be related to party affiliation,
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the committment of national resources to evaluating them may be

expected to vary likewise.

TABLE

7

Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Project Evaluation

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Finance
Minister

President

Conservatives

1.67

.48

Liberals

1

.39

2.01

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial Beta

.10

=

.496

=

.417

.51

Whereas program evaluation refers to the technical rationality
involved in deciding whether

a

given development project or program

makes "economic sense," the idea of planning is much broader.
(as contrasted with project evaluation)

is

Planning,

concerned more generally

with long-range macroeconomic planning or forecasting.

It is,

in

fact, this sense of the concept which one has in mind when it is

asserted that planning produces the overall designs for sets of projects which not only are not actually implemented but also are not
even intended for implementation.

What will be argued here is that

it
planning is indispensible for the development effort not because

require
guides that effort but because international funding agencies
it.

the
This speculation is bourne out somewhat when we consider

development plan
fact that Colombia had the first social and economic
in Latin

America-the 10 Year Plan of December 1961; it was also among
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the first to share in the fiscal

Progress.

7 41

fruits of Kennedy's Alliance for

In addition to this plan,

there have been three other

development plans in Colombia during the Frente and immediately

thereafter—one promulgated by President

LI

eras P.estrepo in effect

from 1969-1972, the "Cuatro Estrategias " of the Pastrana Borrero

administration, and another proposed by President Lopez Michelsen

Throughout the period of the Frente

in 1975.

,

therefore, Colombian

development has ostensibly proceeded under the umbrella of

a

national

plan.

Of course this does not mean that Colombian developemnt has

necessarily been overly effected by such an umbrella.

In

particular,

long-range economic planning in Colombia has been subject to
structural

a

problem characteristic of many export oriented countries-

acute instability in export earnings.

Coupled with the fact that

most development planning at the operational level (see above section
on programming) has emerged from the impetus of industrialization via

import substitution and international pressure, planning in Colombia
has tended to be both vague and inaccurate.

Indeed, Griffin and

Enos argue that:

Where
Colombia and Chile epitomize planning in Latin America.
plans exist, they are frequently prepared by foreign technicians
The plans are essentially
working with a few local advisors.
technocratic exercises. The general public does not participate in choosing the plans' objectives, and as a consequence,
The plans are not
the plans enjoy little general support.
They
implemented; nor are they intended to be implemented.
76
foreigners.
for
foreigners,
largely
by
are documents prepared

Regardless whether one views planning as important for actually

guiding state intervention in the development effort, the presence of
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a

planning effort has been indispensi ble for obtaining
international

credit for the financing of development projects.

Furthermore,

planning has had an actual positive effect in the
rationalization of
pbulic investment as well as in the orientation of private
industrial

investment.
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While such benefits may not be the same as those which

would ideally accrue to

a

serious planning effort they underscore the

fact that something called planning has occupied an important part
in Colombian efforts to develop.

The costs of planning in Colombia have never been substantial;
on the average it has 'consumed no more than .2 percent of the govern-

ment's budget.

Within the administrative sector of the budget, plan-

ning and analysis together generally account for less than

During the period of the Frente
spent

a

,

the Liberal

percent.

5

Party has generally

larger proportion of the administrative sector budget on

planning.

However, as Table 8 demonstrates, after the effects of

the covariates has been accounted for, it is the Conservative Party

which has tended to give greater support to national planning.
TABLE 8

Adjusted Percent of Administrative Sector Expenditures
for Planning and Statistical Analysis

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

5.59

5.86

Liberal

4.37

4.58

Strength of
Associ ation

R
2

R

Partial

Beta

.35

.35

=

.694

=

.482
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Considering the adjusted percent of administrative expenditures devoted to planning, we see that both Conservative presidents and finance ministers have devoted almost 28 percent more
of
the central

than Liberal

government's administrative expenditures to planning
presidents or finance ministers.

Especially given the

Valencia administration's (1962-1966) antipathy to planning in
general, as well as

LI

eras Restrepo's vocal

this is somewhat surprising. 78

support for the same,

But when we palce the concept of

planning into the Colombian context, several points must be kept

in

mind.

First, planning as described does not include what we have

termed project evaluation or programming.

As such,

it is not as

tied to the development and feasibility analysis of particular pro-

jects which may be persued by the government.

Instead, planning

here refers to central government efforts to provide forecasts of

probable future economic environments and national coordination of
sectoral

plans which would optimize growth given the constraints

and opportunities illuminated by such forecasts.

may be more of
control.

a

vehicle for

a

As such,

planning

particular type of administrative

The efficacy of such a control mechanism has been seriously

questioned in the general Latin American context.

But the fact that

plans and forecasts which are developed may have little resemblance
to the situation as

it actually prevails may not necessarily mean

that planning is unimportant— only that it is inaccurate.
real

Given the

constraints to accurate forecasting even in the developed coun-

tries, it should not surprise us that the plans developed for

a
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country which has even less control over crucial elements in the

forecasting model

(for example, the amount of government revenue

which may be anticipated in

a

given year) should be somewhat incon-

gruous with later emerging reality.

Such incongruities should not

obscure the fact that the agency or agencies which are responsible
for formulating a national plan may in fact be important in spite of
the fact that the plan itself is weak.

the Departamento Nacional

de_

For example, in Colombia,

Planeacion in 1969 not only suspended

the approval of new investments in the financial sector but also

discouraged the classification of such things as technical assistance, raw materials, and intermediate goods for Colombian industries
as capital--all

because failure to do so could compromise policy

goals expressed in the national

plan.

In brief, planning does not

have to bo accurate in order for it to affect development policy.
A second aspect of planning should not be ignored when try-

ing to explain Conservative Party support.
the principal

It was noted above that

impetus for planning in both its programatic as well

as long-range aspects was not domestic but foreign.

Much of this

impetus was not in the form of the logic or persuasiveness of the

arguement, but the logic and persuasiveness of the "bottom line."
International

financing of domestic development programs has been

increasingly contingent upon the existence of
effort.

a

national

planning

Both the Agency for International Development and the various

United Nations agencies have required demonstration that development
projects which seek funding from them be part of
plan.

a

Support for planning, therefore, may reflect

larger development
a

desire to "tap"
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international sources of financing development projects.

At the

very least, nonsupport of planning may result in increasing diffi-

culties in obtaining international financial support, especially
from multi -lateral or

bi

-lateral

loans and grants.

Banking and Finance

Throughout the period of the

F rente,

political and economic

leaders viewed the pursuit of economic growth as conditioned pri-

marily by

a

pursuit for capital.

They saw the main obstacle to

development as lying in the inadequate supply of capital available
for development; this inadequate supply, in turn, was largely the

function of too low

a

rate of savings and investment (the two terms

were seen as largely one and the same).

Furthermore, in those

sectors where the supply of capital was not seen as

a

problem, its

effective demand and use was viewed as inadequate for self-sustained
economic growth.
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Regardless of the alleged cause, the solution was seen as an

improvement in the growth as well as allocation of capital through
both the public and private sectors.

The position of the public

sector in attaining this improvement is by no means clear.

The

public sector, or more specifically the state, has always assumed
unto itself the responsibility of financing those investments which
are seen as necessary to further growth but are either too large, too

risky, or too unprofitable to be financed by the private sector.

Definitions of programs which would fit into any of these categories
is a

matter of continuing debate and the choices which are made have
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have developmental

implications, not only for the public sector

itself, but also the private sector.

But regardless of the cri-

teria used, there has always been the assumption that the state,
at some point or another, would become involved in the creation of

capital via active sponsorship of development projects and programs.

This sponsorship can assume many forms in terms of organizational

structure, degree of involvement of organized or unorganized private

sector groups and so forth.

But regardless of particular form,

virtually all policies involving active state involvement require
on

i

the mobilization of resources for their attainment.

There are three ways in which the state can finance development projects (or any other activity, for that matter):

1)

through

current receipts and treasury balances; 2) through government
borrowing; and

3)

through expansion of the money supply. ^

relationship between the two latter techniques

is

The

quite complex and

has given rise to the long standing dispute between the monitarists

and the structuralists with regard to the causes and solutions for

chronic inflation.

While it

is

not in the scope of this paper to

come to some resolution regarding this debate, it is the structuralist position which is more compatible in theoretical

analysis in this study.

terms with the
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The extent to which the credit activities of the Colombian

government have assumed the character of "fiscal fission" of the
money supply is uncertain.

For instance, Sheehan contends that the

Valencia government (1962-1966) financed its budget deficit by
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direct recourse to this method and "thereby helped increase the

money supply by 27 percent in the last three months of 1962. "° 3
The principal data base of this study does not differentiate

between credit financing which has come about through normal state

involvement in capital markets and financial institutions, on the
one hand, and credit financing which has come about through involventent in working the government printing presses overtime, on the

other.

Therefore the extent to which credit has been "legitimate"

in the financing of state development efforts in Colombia cannot be

determined.

What can be determined is the extent to which the state

has relied on equity type financing as opposed to credit type fin-

ancing for development.

Furthermore,

a

distinction can be made be-

tween reliance upon domestic or internal credit sources as opposed
to foreign or external

credit sources.

The remainder of this chapter,

then, will be devoted to Colombian party variations with respect to
the type of financing actually employed during the period 1961-1976.
The oldest, and in the long run most important, method for

the state to finance its development policies has been the tax system.

Contrary to popular image, on the whole government expenditures in
Latin America have been financed on

a

"pay as you go" basis to

greater extent than even in the United States.
a

a

The extent to which

nation is able to finance its expenditures without

a

deficit

function of both its fiscal capacity and its tax effort.

is

In Colombia,

some
the fiscal capacity, or resources which can be taxed, are in

ways atypical of Latin America as

a

whole.

a

Of particular note is

duties)
that while indirect taxes (such as sales taxes and customs
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remain

a

principal source of government revenue, they are not as

important in Colombia as elsewhere in Latin America.

direct taxes are used (albeit of
sively in Colombia.
Brazil

in which

individual

In fact,

a

it is

Instead,

regressive nature) quite extenthe only country other than

the corporate income tax is less important than the

income tax.
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But while the structure of the fiscal

capacity of Colombia may appear to be relatively better grounded
than many nations in Latin America, the amount of revenue that can
be generated is extremely limited due to the low per capita income

of the country.

Furthermore, the Colombian tax effort in tapping its

fiscal capacity has been somewhat lax.

In spite of such character-

istics it has been observed that in comparison to other Latin American

countries Colombia has been quite fiscally orthodox and has not resorted to deficit financing to the extent as has her neighbors.

87

The average adjusted variation between Liberals and Conservatives in the percent of government income which has been raised

through taxation, as opposed to either domestic or foreign credit,
is

presented in Table

9.

From 1961 to 1976, Liberal presidents on

the average have relied on taxation based sources of government in-

come only slightly more than Conservatives (less than

percent),

.3

while Liberal finance ministers have relied on taxation for almost
5

In

percent more government income than their Conservative counterparts.

other words, the Liberal party has tended to finance

a

greater

proportion of its development policy from taxation; the Conservative
party, on the other h'and, has tended to rely more on credit.
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TABLE 9

Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Taxation

Pol i tical Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

79.69

77.25

Liberals

79.87

80.93

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial

=

.679

=

.462

3eta

This variation in part may be explained by changes in tax

effort and fiscal capacity.

Two of the Liberal presidencies during

the period under consideration have been noted for their positions

with respect to the taxation issue.

In

addressing itself to President

Lleras Restrepo's economic policy, the U.S. Senate observed that "one

of Lleras' major points of emphasis was
And the next Liberal

a

bill

to curb tax evasion."
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president, Lo'pez, was responsible for one of the

most far reaching tax reform bills in Colombian history— a tax reform
which, at least as it was promulgated, implied
fiscal capacity of the tax structure.

a

major shift in the

However, it should be noted

that the actual regressive nature of the Colombian tax system noted
by Currie (as opposed to its mildly progressive theoretical strucutre

noted by Musgrave) has probably exacerbated by some of the changes

promulgated by Lopez, that is,

a

much greater reliance on sales taxes.

Not all development programs sponsored by the government are

financed through current receipts and treasury surpluses.

The most
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common mechanism to finance the remainder of the government's policies
fs through credi

t— from

either domestic or international channels.

Both of these channels will have an effect on the public debt structure, and the latter will have direct implications for the balance

of payments.

The principal

channel

for domestic credit is the central

bank, although other institutions are becoming

a

more important source

of investment funds for both the public and private sectors—commercial

banks, special

purpose banks, and financieras

.

Other sources of

investment finance which may be important in other Latin American
countries, such as an organized securities market, insurance companies,
qn

Through

and social security, are fairly unimportant in Colombia.

the requirement that commercial and special purpose banks as well as

financieras hold varying amounts of their reserves in the form of
economic development bonds issued by the government, the state has
ready access to

a

reliable source of domestic credit.

institutions as

a

whole may be often less

ment capital than

a

Indeed, banking

source of private invest91

a

source for government credit.'

The use of internal sources of credit to finance economic

development has long been encouraged by the United States.

Indeed,

United States policy in Colombia has consistently "viewed the domestic credit system of the country as the key tool with which to

channel development assistance into private sector production."
To the extent that domestic credit institutions are used as conduits
befor bilateral or multilateral foreign assistance, the distinction

tween internal and external sources of credit can become

a

bit cloudy.

Furthermore, as Martin. has noted, in the context of multinational
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investments in Latin America the recent trend has been toward
greater
and greater reliance upon domestic sources of credit.
Finally, it should be noted that who controls the domestic

credit institutions

is

by no means uncontested.

of the fact that in 1975

a

This is in spite

decree was issued which converted all

foreign owned banks to mixed status with
held by Colombian nationals.

Lombard, in

percent of the stock

51

a

study of Colombian banks,

has noted that while foreign banks represent only about 10 percent

of all commercial banks in Colombia they actually control close to
35 percent of its banking sector.
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Furthermore, it has been esti-

mated by the National Statistical Office, for example, that 45 per,

cent of the Corporation Financiera Col ombi ana is foreign capital
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Foreign participation in domestic credit institutions, how-

ever, perhaps has its more important ramifications for private sector
financing.

The extent to which the central government relies on

domestic financial institutions which may be highly influenced by
international concerns

is

quite complex and outside the scope of

Since the central government relies not only on the

this research.

central bank, but also on other financial

credit, such

institutions for internal

determination would be highly instructive in inter-

a

preting the findings presented in Table 10.
As can be seen, evidence as to systematic party variation in

reliance upon domestic credit for financing central government develop-

ment policies

mixed.

is

associated with

a

On the one hand, Liberal

presidencies are

higher reliance upon domestic sources of credit than

Conservative presidencies, but on the other hand, Conservative finance
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ministers are associated with
cing.

a

preference for domestic credit finan-

Since the relative contribution of the finance ministers'

party affiliation in explaining the variation
ter (Beta

=

.33) than the presidents'

substantially grea-

is

party (Beta

=

.11), we are

inclined to say that other things being equal, the Conservative party
tends to rely more on domestic credit resources than the Liberals to

finance development policies.

TABLE 10

Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Domestic Credit Sources

Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

10.68

15.30

Conservatives

Strength of
Association

R

12.42

Liberals

9.84

.11

.678

=

.460

2

R

Partial Beta

=

.33

This interpretation must be qualified by two points, however

The first is that since the finance minister is legally responsible
for matters concerning domestic finance (and all government finance
for that matter) we might expect that variations observed in prefer-

ences for finance source may be due less to ideological tendencies
than to demands of the office.

A second qualification is that domes

tic credit financing has a direct impact (albeit at an unclear level

and extent) on domestic inflation.

Especially in the latter half of

increasingly
the period under consideration, this issue has become
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important.

It was noted above that the data

in this study cannot

distinguish between domestic credit resources which represent the

mobilization of actual private domestic savings for investment in
public projects from those which only expand the money supply.

Therefore, to assert categorically that the Conservative Party tends
to prefer domestic credit resources to finance developemnt may be
a

bit misleading.

Colombian banks and credit institutions have never been the

exclusive source of non-treasury based financing of economic development policies.

The principal substitutes for the perceived shortage

of national capital

for development have been private foreign invest-

ment and foreign credit.

Historically the former has been more im-

portant, although compared to other Latin American countries there
has been "a history of relatively small

of foreign private investors."

interest in Colombia on part

Nevertheless, it has been estimated

that by 1966, United States based corporations were transferring four
.

dollars to the United States for each dollar invested in Colombia.
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In spite of both of these facts the Colombian government has

only recently taken an active role
ment.

in

the regulation of foreign invest-

Beginning in the mid 1960s the Colombian government has steadily

increased its formal role, which culminated in the adoption of Decision
24, the "Statute on Foreign Capital," of the Andean Pact in 1976.

Prior to the adoption of

a

modified version of this convention in

Decree Law 444 of 1967, "there were practically no controls in Colombia over foreign investment as such."
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The controls introduced

established administrative criteria by which foreign investment
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would be judged—the most important involving
assessment of the

investment's impact on the balance of payments.

We can see the

gross effect on the rate of foreign investment
proposals in Table
11

below.

Of these proposals, $57,685,309 (U.S.) were approved
in

the years 1967-70.
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Considering the fact that this figure for

four years represents

a

14 percent increase in the total

amount of

foreign investment in the entire period 1917-1966, one may wonder

whether in fact foreign investment
domestic economy as

is

is

as

insignificant to Colombia's

customarily assumed.

Furthermore, Furtado

has noted that the "influence of foreign owned companies [in the

domestic economy]

is

no longer measured in terms of registered for-

eign owned capital but in terms of the volume of their sales." 100
This being the case, even regulations such as those now in effect

mandating

51

percent ownership of foreign enterprises by Colombian

nationals will not negate the fact that increased foreign financing
of development may increase "dependency" by

TABLE

a

multiplier.

11

Foreign Investment Proposals in Colombia,
1967-1974, Current U.S. Millions

Year

Proposals

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

18,4

20,2

27,4

38-9

32,9

16,3

60,9

120,0

Amadeo Armendariz, Monopolios y miseria en Colombia (Bogota:
SOURCE:
Ediciones Los Comuneros, 1 973)
pp. 37-38.
,
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This dependency aspect of direct foreign financing
of economic

development is not popular in Colombia.

Yet, Colombian decision

makers continue to feel the need for foreign capital in order to
pursue those policies which are deemed necessary for further economic
growth.

The principal mechanism that has evolved to take care of the

need for foreign capital, yet not increase the type of dependency

implied with private foreign investment, has been public foreign

assistance and credit--or "aid."
Economic assistance of this type can be distinguished from
other forms of foreign exchange flows such as private foreign invest-

ment in that "aid
through

a

is

essentially governmental ly provided either

bilateral arrangement between provider and recipient or

through some multilateral agency such as the World Bank or the IADB."^
Both the bilateral

and multilateral

forms of assistance are alike

in that they are used to finance particular development projects but

do not represent foreign "ownership" of whatever was constructed

using the funds.

In

other words, foreign assistance (as opposed to

foreign investment) is seen as being less onerous and dependency producing.

Indeed, this has been given as one of the important reasons

that President Lleras Restrepo had

a

clear preference for foreign

loans over foreign investment, especially for industrial development.

1

But, as Currie notes, "Colombians are inclined to overlook the process

of repayment of debt and to exaggerate the benefits received from

foreign borrowing.

1

03

The first such economic assistance mechanisms to be used on
a

significant scale were bilateral aid programs—largely the result
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of Cold War policies on part of the United States. 104
for bilateral aid as

a

The preference

mechanism for escaping the dependency assoc-

iated with foreign investment may be somewhat misplaced.

Since the

end of the 1950s until the middle of the Nixon administration, almost
all

U.S. aid to Latin America has been tied to paying for imports

from the United States that otherwise might not have been imported.
This "tie-in," known as the criterion of additionally

,

significantly

reduces the actual aid component of this type of external financing.

1

Hunter and Foley estimate that about 75 percent of all bilateral
assistance is tied in some fashion, and the U.S. Senate note that
"the issue of additional ity was destined to become one of the most

vexing and complicated in the entire aid program to Colombia."
In recent years multilateral

financial

10 ^

institutions have

steadily increased in their importance as providers of external
This is in part due to U.S. policy and in part

development credit.

to preferences of local

policy makers.

Indeed, this is cited by

Furtado as one of the two major recent trends in international

finance for development in Latin America.
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A major attraction of

multilateral as opposed to bilateral aid lies in its allegedly

greater "independence."

However, the extent to which multilateral

aid is more independent may easily be overstated.
It is true that the criterion of additional ity is no longer

an issue in multilateral aid, and that development capital

purchased from non-U.

S.

suppliers.

can be

However, that does not mean that

deindigenous local suppliers will necessarily be able to satisfy

mands.

Martins, for instance, argues that the "domestic" supplier

'
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which can most often step in to fill the demands are domestic sub-

sidiaries of multi national corporations. 108
will

be a shift in dependency from U.S.

not be affiliated with

a

The result of this

suppliers which may or may

multinational enterprise to domestic

suppliers which are often affiliated with or are subsidaries of

either U.S. or non-U.

S.

multinational corporations.

What may be

preserved in foreign exchange by buying "domestic" can easily be
lost through both repatriation of profits to, and purchases of

production inputs from, parents of subsidiaries.
difficulties involved in measuring such

a

Because of the

flow, as well as the

seemingly more domestic character of development capital, the
effects of such
,.

.

a

ficult to assess.

shift are definitely more subtle and more dif109

One final point about both bilateral and multilateral

economic assistance is their penetration into the domestic private
capital market.

It was noted above that foreign banks in Colombia

control a significant amount of the domestically available capital

for use by the private sector.

Bilateral and multilateral

insti-

tutions have also participated in the provision of financing to the

private sector in Colombia.

The participation of U.S. bilateral

assistance in private sector lending in Colombia has been principally
through the Private Investment Fund.
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The IBRD and the IADB, on

the other hand, have participated in private sector lending through

their support for private corporaciones financieras

1 1
-

Regardless

of the particular institution, however, we must be wary of the claim
multithat the use of economic assistance provided by bilateral and
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lateral

institutions necessarily "frees up" domestic financial
insti-

tutions to sponsor other development projects.

The observed trend

for increased reliance on domestic sources of
capital, particularly
by multinational corporations, may be partially the
result of such

"laundering.

Evidence in this study as to whether Conservatives or Liberals
have been more sympathetic to foreign sources of credit

is

ambiguous.

Table 12 gives us the average adjusted variation in reliance upon

foreign credit as

a

source of development finance.

The percentage

of foreign credit resources received by the central government is
25 percent higher among Conservative presidents than Liberal, while
it is about

7

percent lower among Conservative finance ministers.

Since the relative contribution of each in explaining the variation
is
=

about the same for both the president and finance minister (Beta
.17 and

.15 respectively) we cannot judge using this criterion.

TABLE 12

Average Adjusted Percent of Central Government
Income from Foreign Credit Sources

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Conservatives

President

Finance
Minister

9.64

7.44

7.70

8.00

Strength of
Association

R

Liberals

2

R

Partial Beta

.17

.15

-

.875

=

.766
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Secondary evidence

is

also ambiguous.

and the Conservative newspaper

El

Siglo

,

Boyce and Lombard,

have observed that the

Conservative Party is generally more favorable to foreign investmerit that the Liberal

Party.

11?
Mt

This does not, however, distinguish

between foreign investment and foreign assistance.

To the extent that

Conservative support for the former implies support for the latter,
we would be inclined to give more weight to the variation shown in
the presidential party affiliation.

On the other hand, it should

not be forgotten that the U.S. Senate has noted that Liberals, especially under Carlos Lleras, have had
loans over foreign investment.

a

clear preference for foreign

But while this speaks to the distin-

ction made between the two principal types of foreign financing of

development, it does not address the question of whether such foreign
loans and credits are to be preferred to domestic credit or taxation,

or whether the preference for foreign credit is also shared by Conservatives.

In

brief, there is not enough evidence either way to assert

that either the Liberals or the Conservatives have tended to favor

systematically the use of foreign sources of credit to finance Colombian development policies during the Frente period.

Conclusions

It is clear that the issues which characterize what we have

called the executive functions of the state have not been settled in
Colombia.

Within what we have called the administrative sector,

evidence indicates that with respect to the broadest issue--the

delimitation of public and private sectors— there may be broad
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agreement that the scope of the public sector should be substantial,
albeit in different ways.
state in

a

The Liberals seem to prefer to use the

more managerial or activist sense, almost as an instru-

ment to attain specific economic and social goals.

The Conservatives

also use the state, but perhaps prefer to emphasize more of its executive nature, relying on the bureaucracy and government to better enable

those Colombians who are in

a

position to affect change ostensibly to

do so.

The second issue within the administrative sector—decentral

-

ization--al so evokes varying responses on part of the Liberals and

Conservatives.

After distinguishing between decentralization by

territorial units (devolution) and functional units (decentralization),
we note that Liberals continue to support the former than the Conservatives.

Evidence as to support for functional decentralization was

mixed, although additional evidence supports the contention that

Conservatives are not as disinclined to use decentralization via this
route.

Finally, the third issue within the administrative sectorpi

anning--has been shown to be generally favored by Conservatives

more than Liberals.

Variations between the two parties with respect to the issues
in the banking and finance subsector of administration are not as

clear.

The Liberal

Party showed

a

tendency to rely more upon taxation

and use of current treasury resources for development finance.

The

Conservatives, on the other hand, have been more ameniable to the
use of credit.

But, variations with respect to the source of credit
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financing is much more ambiguous.

Conservatives seem to favor domes-

tic sources of credit more than Liberals.

But this support may be

modified by the possibility that these sources of credit may overstate
not only the "internal" component of the concept but the "credit" com-

ponent as well.

Likewise, apparent Liberal preference for external

credit must be mediated by the fact that Conservatives seem to prefer
direct foreign investment as
All

a

source of development capital.

of the executive functions of the state, especially those

discussed above, have serious implications for the role that Colombia's

government may assume with respect to economic development.

But this

should not obscure the fact that their contours have come about

through political decisions .which have never been made "once and for
all."

Such decisions define the context within which development

will or will

not occur, as well as to whom the benefits and burdens

of development will accrue.

However, they do not necessarily imply

what kind of material changes in the lives of Colombian citizens may
be brought about by state intervention.

In a

sense, we have set up

the characteristics of the state in the organizational

aspects of its

capacity of "director" of development and its capacity of "producer"
of development.

But economic development itself is more than just

matter of state structure and process; it
substance.

is also a

matter of policy

Up to this point we have not systematically examined what

"sectors" have been targeted by the Colombian political leadership
for the state's economic development efforts.
real

a

In

other words, the

flavor of Colombia's development policy cannot be determined
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until we have examined not only the
"how" questions of development

policy, but the "what" questions as
well.

of questions to which we turn our
attention

It is to this
in the

latter set

remaining chapters

CHAPTER

III

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The most distinguishing characteristics of human lifestyle
in the final quarter of the twentieth century are due directly or

indirectly to the industrial revolution.

Colombia's position in

both a geographic and an analytic sense with respect to the industrial

revolution has been on its periphery.

But whether at the

center or the periphery, the process of industrialization has come
to define the terms of both economic growth and economic development.

However, taken at the level of an individual state such as Colombia,
this has not always been the case.

The concept of industrialization

may be accepted as essential for defining economic development, but
that does not necessarily imply that the process of industrialization

itself must be embraced within any one nation.

The process of world

industrialization may affect both center and periphery but there

is

no compelling reason why industrialization in the former must be

accompanied by industrialization in the latter.

Indeed, the con-

comitant concepts of the international division of labor and comparative advantage would mitigate against such an occurrence.

It

would be highly inefficient, at least from the perspective of those
in the center, for industrialization to proceed too far in those

areas which could serve as potential markets for the surplus produced
in the center.
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The position of Colombia is not atypical of Latin America in
this respect.

Neither

is

the sentiment expressed by Finance Minister

Florentino Gonzalez in 1848:
The law [in Colombia] should not attempt to encourage industries that detract the inhabitants from the agricultural
and mining occupations.
Europe with an intellegent
population, and with the possession of steam power and its
applications, educated in the art of manufacturing, fulfills
its mission in the industrial world by giving various forms
We should offer Europe raw materials
to raw materials.
and open our doors to her manufactures, to facilitate trade
and the profit it brings, and to provide the consumer, at a
reasonable price, with the products of the manufacturing
industry J
.

.

.

.

^

What caused the change in sentiment from what must be admitted
an extreme conception of the international division of labor?

The

picture painted by Minister Gonzalez was not atypical of the time.
But the consequences of the very patterns of trade which were estab-

lished according to this concept of development, as well as the evolving nature of the industrialization process itself, were to result
in pressures which Colombia could not resist.

Sources of Industrialization

The pressures to industrialize derived from at least four

sources:
a

real

1)

free trade and the international division of labor; 2)

increase in national income and its distribution;

3)

an increas

ing rate of urbanization; and 4) deliberate state policy.

of
The dynamics of free trade and the international division

which have come to
labor led to the creation of certain structures

American countries
define the particular economic systems of all Latin
an alleged efficiency
The international division of labor is based on
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inherent in such

a

scheme; it simply makes more economic sense to

order the productive capacities of
this efficiency.

a

given nation-state to maximize

But this efficiency is based not only upon the im-

partial and invisible hand of the free market.

It is also based on

the advantages and precedents accruing to the very structure of the

international division of labor itself.

Minister Gonzalez did have
technological

a

The sentiments expressed by

basis in fact.

The increasing pace of

improvement in the center (principally Great Britain)

led to the economic growth of not only the center but also those

nations at the periphery which made use of their natural resources to

supply the center with raw materials.

Especially in these latter

nations, economic growth heretofore had been both irregular and quite
slow.
The process of industrialization in the center led to marked

improvements in productivity per capita and real income.
to one source, "the accumulation of technical

dynamic force in economic progress.'

1 1

According

knowledge is the greatest

There can be no doubt that

the application of technological breakthroughs and improvements to

productive enterprises brought reductions in cost and even improvements in quality.

This application of science through technology to

productive processes has been at the cutting edge of improvements
productivity.

But this does not necessarily mean that nations out-

side of the industrialization process itself will enjoy the same

benefits.
It was not until

the industrial

in

the technological

improvements wrought by

revolution in manufacturing industries were applied
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to transportation that the industrial

revolution had its most lasting

impacts with respect to the structure of Latin American economies. 116

The first of these impacts was in the realm of international trade.
Up to this point, the laws of comparative advantage reflected prin-

cipally endowments of natural resources.

Nations which, because of

climate, geographical, or other factors, could more economically

exploit

a

given natural resource stood to gain by doing so.

But

with improvements in international shipping brought about by the

invention of the propeller and introduction of the iron hull around
the middle of the nineteenth century, the concepts of comparative

advantage and international division of labor both assumed new dimensions.
It was at this point that international

being

a

mechanism affecting only

ulation to

a

a

trade changed from

tiny portion of

a

country's pop-

mechanism which would structurally alter entire pro-

ductive sectors of the peripheral countries.

1

^

The extent to which

this increasing integration into world trade networks had an effect

on local economies varied from country to country, depending largely
upon the type of product produced for export.

Generally the exports

of products which were either unrenewable, such as guano in Peru, or

produced within enclaves such as mining in Chile or bananas in Colombia, produced fewer structural changes in the economy than those re-

quiring annual attention such as agricultural crops.
The cultivation and exportation of coffee substantially altered the export production structure in Colombia:
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We may estimate that in the half century from the 1870s
to the early 1930s a fifth to a quarter of Colombia's
rural population was brought out of subsistence cultivation and into the market by coffee.
No other substantive

economic change in Colombian economic history can have
been of such overriding social importance.''*
There are two implications in this shift.

The first is that the

type of commodity produced for export did make a difference in

Colombia.

Previous export commodities, most notably tobacco, had

failed to transform the structure of that sector.

The second, and

possibly more important implication was that the transform of part
of the agricultural sector from

base represented

a

real

subsistence base to

a

increase in national income.

a

market

It did not

merely represent the shifting of existing production from an internal

to an external market.

In this

sense the entry of persons

previously outside the market into the market generated demands
The impact on the initial

which previously were unknown.

indus-

trialization efforts by their entry into the market proceeds from
both the structure of demands generated by such individuals as well
as the increasing ability of local

satisfy such demands.

resources to at least partially

The key here is the concept of linkages, and

will be dealt with in further detail below when considering the

particulars of actual development strategy in the periphery.

Comparative advantage
process.

is

both

a

cumulative and

a

relative

Improvements in technology are mostly built upon techno-

logical advances made at an earlier time.

The improvements in pro-

ductivity built upon previous breakthroughs are real, but they are
not necessarily reflective of

a

natural superiority of one particular
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process over another.
is

The more that a comparative advantage structure

built upon technological progress, the more that
elements of in-

ertia, luck, timing, and historical accident are important in
explaining it.

The nature of technological

ally, the technology itself

is

progress is such that, theoretic-

largely transferable.

Indeed, it is

this aspect of modern technology which gives it its preeminent role
in explaining economic development.

The treatment of modern tech-

nology as another commodity which may be bought, sold, traded, or

stolen

is

ment.

And it is the tendency to overestimate the flexibility in this

an important but often neglected aspect of economic develop-

"commodity" which has led to the increasing questioning of the ability
to achieve economic growth predominantly through technology transfer.^
It is

important that the transfer of technology applicable

to production has come to occupy

a

tegies of economic development.

This importance derives partially

prominent position in most stra-

from the fact that the export product of the center
technological

in nature.

is

increasingly

This has not only comparative cost impli-

cations but also affects the entire structure of international trade,

particularly between the center and periphery.

In simple terms,

this

reflects the long term trend by which it takes an increasing quanta

of exports from the periphery to purchase
1

ports from the center.

?0

a

decreasing quanta of im-

This is commonly referred to as the

"Prebisch Thesis" for Professor Raul Prebisch, the former Executive

Secretary of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA).

The Prebisch Thesis concerns the trend by which "the price
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relation turned steadily against primary production from the 1870s
the Second World War." 121

until

Both allegations and evidence con-

cerning the declining terms of trade have circulated since the develop-

ment of Lenin's concept of economic imperialism, and have been applied

specifically to the Latin American context by both Haya de la Torre
and Jose Carlos Mariategui long before Prebisch. 122
until

But it was not

the prestige and weight of the ECLA was brought to bear upon

the problem that such an interpretation became "respectable."

Such an idea is contrary to the expectations of classical or

traditional economics and has been criticized from those quarters as
being somewhat less than accurate.

One critic, for example, has

claimed that the Prebisch Thesis
is based on grossly insufficient empirical evidence, that
it has misinterpreted the facts on which it is based, that
the attempted explanation of the alleged facts is fallacious,
and that there is no presumption at all that the alleged unfavorable tendency of the terms of trade will continue in

the future

J 2^

Although the issue is still unresolved, it appears as though the evidence supporting the Prebisch Thesis at present is not as "insuf-

ficient" nor is its interpretation as "fallacious" as the above econ-

omist wishes to believe.
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In fact,

the perception that the Prebisch

Thesis is at least partially true has been at the core of many of
the industrialization policies which have been pursued in Latin America for the past quarter century.
As an impetus to industrialization efforts, the effect of a

perception of declining terms of trade should not be underestimated.
of
But neither should we underestimate the effects which the terms
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trade, even if deteriorating over the long run, have had on the

national

income of the countries in the periphery.

This provides

the second principal source of industrialization pressures in Latin

America—a
in national

real

increase in national

income.

It is through a rise

income brought about by trade patterns established in

the late nineteenth century that permitted the first industrialization

efforts in Latin America to take root.

According to Furtado the first phase of industrial growth in
every Latin American country except Mexico was based almost exclu1

sively on the growth of

a

or

dynamic export sector.

Income has

accrued in every Latin American republic from the export of raw

materials and agricultural products.

On one level this was the

essential characteristic of international trade involving Latin

America for centuries.

But there are three crucial differences

which must be considered.
The first of these, already discussed above, involves the

extent to which structural changes in both the import and export
sectors of the periphery were brought about by the very dynamics of
The second

world trade and the international division of labor.

difference was the fact that incomes accruing from the export of
raw materials represented

a

real

income and not

increase in national

necessarily the transference of income from sectors previously
engaged in production for

a

domestic market.

In other words, the

export products of the periphery were able to tap into
productive capacity which was previously unused.

1

2g

a

surplus

Both of these

phenomena—structural changes in the export production sector and
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the tapping of surplus production capacity for the
purpose of expor-

tation—are applicable

to Colombia.

As noted above, the shift in

export production to coffee during the last quarter of the
nineteenth

century not only generated substantial changes in the structure of
the Colombian economy but also represented

national
ful

product.

Colombia

is

exploitation for export of

ignored.

All

a

real

net increase to the

not unique with respect to the successa

product which previously had been

of Latin America, and in particular Brazil, has experi-

enced periods when previously untapped resources have been suddenly

subject to demand on the world market.
The reasons why such resources were previously unused are

numerous.

Principal among them would be the fact that the changes in

manufacturing technology brought about by the industrial revolution
required raw materials of
known.

a

type and scope which previously were un-

Also the reduction of transport costs brought about by the

application of technology to that sector brought about economies

whereby the costs of raw materials to the manufacturer could dramatically decline without
producer.

a

decline in the price paid to the peripheral

Ultimately much of the emphasis upon exporting such pro-

ducts to the manufacturing center stemmed from an almost complete
lack of domestic demand for these products in the countries where
they were exploited.
It is perhaps somewhat specious to argue that the dramatic

increase in the periphery's exports

v/as

based on the fact that many

production factors for the extraction and preliminary processing of
the export commodity came from abroad.

It has been noted that,

for
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instance, at the same time that North American investors were investing in Chilean copper mines, native Chilean investors were purchasing

lands in Argentina.

Not all of this can be explained by reference

to some inherent Latin proclivity to use scarce capital

to engage in

speculative ventures in real estate rather than productive enterprises.

Similar occurences were rather common in Latin America during this
period.

But in the words of one observer:

Availability of capital is not sufficient.
It is necessary
also to have potential access to other factors by a particular sector of production, which means knowledge and
the absence of certain monoplies on knowledge, whether,
7
these be in technology or in channels of distribution.
The existence of such monoplies or quasi -monopl ies on knowledge does
not detract from the fact that incomes did increase in the periphery
as a result of the emerging trade patterns.
a

crucial

But it does illuminate

point as to the productive possibilities (or lack thereof)

to which this increased income may have been directed.

The case of Colombia gives evidence to support at least part

of this arguement.

Foreign investment played

a

relatively small part

in the development of what proved to be Colombia's major export corn-

modi ty--cof fee.
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However in the Department of Antioquia, where

much of the impetus for the cultivation of coffee as an export crop

came from, there were direct state efforts not only to promote research
in coffee cultivation and to subsidize initial

experimental plantings,

but also to provide roads and promote railroad expansion.
this state action was indirect,

1

29

Some of

including the establishment and grant-

foreign capital.
ing of concessions such as for railroad construction to
the nineteenth
The extent to which the expansion of coffee exports during
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century was due to foreign capital investments in transportation

important but unclear.

is

The relative influences of foreign investment,

state support, and private initiative in both the direct stimulation

of coffee exports as well as indirect stimulation via the transportation sector would have to be examined in order to arrive at

a

precise conclusion.
Thus, the infusion of capital

foreign as with Chile's copper, or

into the export sector--ei ther

mixture as with Colombia's

a

coffee--does not necessarily determine where the increased income
from that sector will be directed.

This leads us to

a

basic dif-

ference between income generated from exports from the latter part
of the nineteenth century onwards and export income during earlier
periods.

This is the fact that much (although perhaps not most) of

the export generated income was now settling in the nations of Latin

America themselves.

Stability was coming to the area as the various

wars of independence receded further into the past and the nations had

begun to consolidate into sovereign if not viable states.
Income accrued not only to the states involved but also to

individuals involved in the trade.

The issue of the distribution of

income resulting both directly and indirectly from international trade
becomes even more important when examining later industrialization
policies.

At the time of the initial

ever, this issue was

a

bit simpler.

industrialization efforts, howThere were basically two classes

of actors who directly benefited from these emerging patterns—the
state bureaucrats and the exporters.

Tariff revenues continued to be

the most important source of governmental

income.

This was especially
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true after the abolishment of many special government
monopolies and

concessions.

In Colombia,

from 50 to 65 percent of the national gov-

ernment's income from 1871 came from tariffs. 130

Although the Colom-

bian government itself did not actively become involved in the marketing of exports it was a direct beneficiary of the export trade.

This

seems generally to have been the case throughout Latin America.

What

the government did with its share of the export generated income was

usually to support the state bureaucracy and provide some infrastructure.

The mix between these two varied from country to country, and

indeed from period to period in Latin America.

The Colombian state

put relatively more stress upon the former than did, say, Brazil.

1

This may have been due to the relatively weaker position of the Brazilian national

government.

Nevertheless, the point is that the state

qua state in no country used its share of income from the export trade
to actively establish and operate enterprises for industrial

pro-

duction within its boundaries.
The merchants and those actively involved in supplying the

products for export also benefited directly from expanding income due
Just who made up these classes varies from country to

to trade.

country, depending upon the structure of the agrarian sector, the

degree of urbanization, and even the type of primary products produced
for export.
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This distribution is important inasmuch as most

classical treatments of industrialization are built upon the assumption of

a

fundamental conflict between industrial izers and exporters.

Hirschman hypothesizes that when industrialization

is

spurred by an

increase in income and -market due to export expansion, the leadership
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of industrialization efforts has tended to be
"domestic entrepreneurs

who were in no way tied to the importing interests." 133
thesis gives rise to a potential

This hypo-

conflict of interest between those

involved in trade and those involved in industrialization.

This con-

flict manifests itself principally over issues involving the tariff.

Generally both exporters and importers benefit from
and industrialists benefit from
logical

from

a

a

higher one.

a

lower tariff

But what may appear

profit maximization point of view often does not

obtain in situations where the latter is not the only function being
maximized.
Colombia appears to be precisely such

a

case.

It is

generally

recognized that industrialization in Colombia had its beginnings in
the Department of Antioquia in general and the city of Medell'n in

particular.

McGreevey notes, however, that the industrial expansion

in Antioquia was often in the hands of the same individuals who were

prominent in coffee exportation.

1

34

The social network of family,

relations, and compradrazcos provides several outlets for productive

enterprises.

That several of these outlets may appear to be in

objective contradiction does not necessarily lead to objective conflict.

At least with respect to coffee merchants and industrialists,

the Colombian situation was not one of two hostile classes in opposition, but two factions of the same class in cooperation.

This cooper-

ation, McGreevey suggests, was one of the reasons that industrialization was able to proceed during this period of expanding coffee

exports where it had been unable to gain
period of expanding tobacco exports.

1
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a

foothold during an earlier
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The third factor leading to pressures for
industrialization

was increasing urbanization.
national

Reflective partially of increasing

income as well as structural changes brought about by pro-

cuction for export, the phenomena of urbanization and industrialization are almost inseparable.

There have been great cities in the

past which have existed without industrialization, but industrialization without urbanization is almost impossible.

This may lead

one to conclude that it is the process of industrialization which
spurs urban growth rather than the other way around.

cially true once the industrialization process

is

This is espe-

underway.

But,

this arguement does not negate the importance of urban centers which

initially provided not only the labor but also

a

concentrated market

for the product of that labor.
The artisan sector in the periphery has been the principal

victim of the international division of labor.

On the basis of 1870

census reports, McGreevey estimates that over 20 percent of the labor

force in Colombia were involved in artisan activities.

Not only

did the drive to promote exports of agricultural materials and im-

prots of manufactures which characterized the late nineteentn cen-

tury lower the income of such groups, but also it substantially altered
the trends toward urban growth manifest in that period.

1
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But

although urban growth in Colombia was slower than most nations during
this period it was nevertheless significant.

Between 1870 and 1884

the population of Bogota more than doubled and the population of

Medellfn increased over 25 percent.

It is

undoubtable that the

growth would have been even greater if official policy had not been
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to discourage industrialization.

But the existence of increasing

numbers of people in urban areas led to initial pressures
to foster
some type of industrialization.

The size of the market, supply of

labor, and ability to "import" technology soon made it more economical

to produce domestically some manufactures which had previously

been imported.
The fourth impetus to industrialization is as much political
as it is economic.

The sovereignty of the nation state requires

certain amount of independence not only in
in an economic sense.

factures

is

a

political

sense but also

Dependence upon the world market for all manu-

dangerous route to take if

constant supply.

a

a

a

nation wishes to insure

a

Wars, disturbances, and depressions both in the

center and the periphery tend to disrupt normal trade flows.

In

cases

of war or depression in the center, the supply of manufactures for
the periphery may be drastically reduced or even cut off completely.

And this is assuming that the periphery would be able to pay for
such manufactures in the first place--a rather optimistic assumption

under the circumstances.

Most likely such occurences in the center

would not only disrupt the flow of manufactures from the center but
also disrupt the ability of the periphery to export its raw materials.
This inability to export would have the same effect upon the supply

of manufactures in the periphery that an inability to import would-And, if such disturbances occur in the periphery

a

sharp reduction.

a

similar outcome is likely.
This does not even consider the normal fluctuations in prices

for both manufactures and raw materials.

But it is especially the
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latter which is more important.

Much more than the market for manu-

factures, the market for most raw materials and
agricultural products exported from the periphery is variable at best.

Wide yearly

fluctuations in the prices paid for such commodities, and the
con-

comitant rise and fall
exports makes even
ation.

a

Coupled with

in the periphery's

income generated by such

modicum of stability an extremely unusual situa

secular decline in the relative terms of trade,

this condition makes both the short term and long term ability to

maintain

a

constant or increasing level of manufactured imports (not

to mention sustaining an acceptable rate of economic growth) almost

impossible.
Much of this may be implied from

a

tendency noted by Furtado

as being characteristic of the beginning stages of export oriented

growth

[R]ising productivity is accompanied by a simplification
in the supply structure of home-produced goods and diversification in the overall composition of demand. '39
Both of these tendencies are probably to the disadvantage of the

periphery.

A simplification in the supply structure of home-pro-

duced goods generally means increased specialization in the export of
one commodity—the commodity in which the country in question has the

greatest "comparative advantage."

The diversification in the compos-

ition of the demand schedule generally means that the demand for

manufactures in the periphery will

increase disproportionately to

the centers' demand for raw materials.

As

incomes increase, both

the quantity and variety of possible imported manufactures will expand.

The ability to service this increasing demand depends, for the
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most part, on the ability to expand foreign exchange earnings — an

ability which, because of the evolving nature of the periphery's
exports, may become increasingly difficult.
In this

way there is both

a

theoretical and actual lack of

control over external events which regularly have
on the peripheral economy.

bated by

a

a

profound impact

Furthermore, this condition

is

exacer-

structural tendency built into the growth model itself

which would increasingly limit the options available to the nation to

satisfy internal economic demands.
by such conditions is naturally
in the region.

a

To have the policy options limited

cause of concern for most nations

Given not only the traditional power of the state

itself but also nationalistic sentiments which may be particularly
strong in circumstances of actual or perceived threats to indepen-

dence there is an impulse to try to bring under control as many of
these exigencies as possible.
All

four of the sources of industrialization discussed above

are applicable to the Colombian experience.

The evolving structures

of an international division of labor (including changing conditions
of comparative advantage and terms of trade) and the rise in actual

income in the periphery are probably the two most powerful factors.
The tendencies toward urbanization and independence, while important
in specific instances, are probably less important for the initiation

of industrialization efforts as for their maintenance and evolution.

Nevertheless, the structure of the industrialization effort in Colombia during the Frente period has drawn from all sources.

Now that we
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have given an answer to the question of "why" to
industrialize, there
still

remains the question of "how" (or how much) to
industrialize.

Strategies of Industrialization

The four phenomena described above, individually and in com-

bination, have dramatically changed the life styles of Latin Americans in the past century.

The processes of industrialization that

they have engendered mark one of the key axis around which economic

development policy, especially in the last half century, has irresistably revolved.

Most authorities date the beginnings of industrial-

ization in Latin America about the First World War or the Great De-

pression

a

little more than

a

decade later.

The spurt of domestic

industrial activity at this time often has been labeled "Import Sub-

stituting Industrialization"

( I

SI

)

in order to distinguish

it from

other forms of indigenous industrialization efforts which have been
in evidence in Latin America since at least the end of the nineteenth

century.

Other authorities prefer to use the term ISI in

a

much

broader sense to encompass the particular nature of industrialization

prevelant throughout Latin American history.

Implications of this

distinction will be discussed in more detail below.
ISI

In general

terms,

refers to the process by which industrial goods and manufactures

which were previously imported by the nations in the periphery are

increasingly produced within the periphery itself.
ISI

in Latin America are

above.

The sources of

to be found in the four phenomena described
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Regardless whether one uses

of the concept there

a

broad or narrow interpretation

general agreement that in the most immediate

is

sense the pressures responsible for ISI have come from wars and depressions.
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World War

of the 1930s had

a

I

and especially the world-wide depression

lasting impact on the character of industriali-

zation in Latin America.

As will

be discussed below, prior to that

time most industrialization in Latin America had at its source the

expansion of national income from its trade on the world market.
With the collapse of that market during World War

I

and especially

after 1930, the nations of Latin America could no longer sell as much
of their export production to the center.

The First World War sub-

stantially disrupted international trade through blockades of certain
nations in the center—particularly Germany.

from the center were also disrupted.

Exports of manufactures

Unable to import, some manu-

facturers in the periphery were able to reorient existing industrial

structures to provide some of the goods previously produced in the
center.

The war did not last long enough and did not disrupt Latin

American trade seriously enough to cause
productive capacities.
at least some countries

a

wholesale reorientation of

But it did serve to spur industrialists in at

— notably

Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—to

expand their production for the domestic market.
The world-wide depression which began in 1929 markes the

turning point in Latin American industrialization.

The collapse of

the world market sharply curtailed the capacity for all nations to

import.

In

economies where trade was one of the main pillars of the
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domestic economy this event had tremendous implications.

Industrial-

ization engendered by an inadequate capacity to import--ISI—
was

a

major response.
In

its early stages,

ISI was largely a more or less sponta-

neous reaction to the trade conditions extant after 1929.
be noted that not all

It must

countries in Latin America responded to the

crisis in the same way.

The full impact of ISI was felt only in

those countries which had already possessed

a

significant nucleus

of non-durable consumer goods industries. 142
three countries—Argentina

,

Brazil, and Mexico— had achieved this

state; Colombia was affected to
ence is relative, however.

Furtado notes that only

a

much smaller degree.

The differ-

While the crisis of 1929 and subsequent

pressures for ISI may not have had the impact on the structure of

Colombian industry as it did in Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, it was
Currie noted in 1950 that in Colombia, "the

not without effect.

scarcities attendent upon World War
1

industrialization."
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I

gave the first real

impetus to

At the turn of the century Colombia already

had such non-durable consumer industries as textiles, food and bev-

erages, and building materials.

Currie notes further that "by 1934,

most of the present [1950] basic Colombian industries had been launched;" after that period most of the industrialization effort was con-

centrated in expansion and diversification.
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But in the same year that this statement came from the IBRD

mission headed by Lauchlin Currie to study economic development in
Colombia, another international agency, the United Nations' ECLA
headed by Dr. Raul Prebisch, published the following statement:
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Formerly, before the great depression, development in the
Latin American countries was stimulated from abroad by the
constant increase of exports.
These countries no
longer have an alternative between vigorous growth along
those lines and internal expansion through industrialization.
Industrialization has become the most important means of
expansion. '45
.

What had begun as

.

.

spontaneous response to

a

a

temporary supply

shortage engendered by war and depression became transformed into

consciously directed response to

a

a

long term balance of payments

trend engendered by the structure of the international division of
labor.

Citing evidence of

a

secular long term trend in the deterior-

ation of the terms of trade between the nations of the periphery and
the center, the ECLA proposed that the only solution to the chronic

underdevelopment of Latin America was for the conscious development
of public policies which would rectify this problem through state
action.

Specifically, "the need is for the promotion of industrial-

ization through systematic interference with the balance of payments,
i.e., through protection and import controls."

1

46

This development marks a profound transition for IS I
this time ISI had been seen primarily as literally

a

Before

.

substitute for

imports which were temporarily cut off by scarcities in foreign exchange.

Such scarcities and the export contraction which caused them

would, it was assumed, be alleviated by
sumption of trade.

a

return to peace and

This assumption proved to be false.

a

re-

Indigenous

industrial expansion did not simply contract along with the depression.

Hirschman has noted that the leadership fo the spontaneous

industrialization efforts which were based on these balance of pay-

110
merits

considerations tended to be "local importers and foreign
ex-

porting firms."
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In

other words, industrialization was being led

by precisely those elements which were suffering most because of
the

decline in trade.

The commonly hypothesized conflict between those

involved in industrialization and those involved in commercial activities becomes somewhat blurred at this point.

This fact, and the

fact that early ISI efforts were largely the result of spontaneous

reaction, may not only help explain why industrialization failed to
"whither" but also another characteristic of the industrialization

experience in Latin America:

the fact that it appears to be "grafted

on" to the existing power configuration— the "living museum" metaphor

of Charles Anderson.

1
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The extent to which the industrialization of Latin America
has actually changed the fundamental

no means clear.

nature of society there is by

Obviously the fruits of industrialization are in

evidence in every corner of the continent.
bad, Latin America is definitely part of

a

Whether it

is

good or

productive system which,

while ultimately consumer oriented, is geared to the reproduction
and growth of capital.

The effect upon society of this committment

cannot help but to ultimately transform that society.
of Robert Heilbroner, "the final

In the

words

impact of all technology is to be

found in the social organization which it calls forth."
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ticular technology embodied in the industrialization process

The paris

per-

haps the most important determinant of the structure of all modern

societies.

It certainly has been for the United States; and, at least

Ill

since World War

II

most structural changes which have taken place

in Latin America have been due to the manufacturing industry. 150

The question then becomes, how much has the museum really

changed with the introduction of this new exhibit?
of industrial

Has the addition

interests—both within the private sector and among

government leaders—substantially (and permanently) altered either
the structure of Latin American society or the balance among power

contenders within those societies?

The answers to these questions

would most likely be in the affirmative, but with the qualification
that the changes have not been of

a

nature which may have been pre-

dicted on the basis of prior experience with industrialization.

Un-

doubtedly the very structure of society was altered by industrialization among both the earliest group fo industrial izers (e.g., Great

Britain and the United States) and those industrializing in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (e.g., Germany and France).
The evidence with respect to even later industrial izers--the Third

World in general and Latin America in particular—seems to indicate
that this occurence has not been repeated there.

1
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The most likely reasons why the introduction of manufacturing
in Latin America has not achieved the significant structural

trans-

formations of society expected on the basis of past experience else-

where are:

1)

the political, economic, and social context within

which industrialization occured; and

industrialization process

(

IS

I )

2)

itself.

the nature of the particular

The structure of Latin Amer-

hierarchical,
ican society has been characterized as corporative,
and patrimonial "to the core."
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The entire basis of human inter-
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relationships is colored by this fact.
do not occur in

The processes of development

vacuum, and industrialization in Latin America has

a

had to contend with alternative political as well as socio-economic

structures which have existed for almost half

a

millenium.

The key

word here is alternative; it is not just that the structures engen-

dered by industrialization may "transcend" or modify previous arrangements, but they must replace them.

And when existing structures re-

fuse to be replaced but rather evolve according to their own particular dynamic, the resulting structures may look little like they are

"supposed to."
a

In

other words, when speaking of structural evolution,

distinction should be made between change "from" and change "to."

Most interpretations of contemporary economic structures in Latin

America focus on the latter while the former is somehow considered
"unscientific" and the preserve of historians.
ISI as a

strategy of industrialization could only occur

context of the international division of labor.

in a

That the process of

industrialization on one side of this division should be different
than on the other is almost tautological.

The context within which

Latin American industrialization occurred is that of the periphery

exchanging primary products produced domestically for foreign exchange
which could be used to import from the center the capital goods necessary for industrialization.

This context is substantially different

from that of earlier industrial izers

difference

is

.

Perhaps the most important

the fact that the sectors in the economy responsible

for providing the resources needed for industrialization are different.
In the Latin

American case industrialization has invariably been

a
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function of the capacity to import.

This, in turn, has always been

contingent upon the ability to produce and export primary
products.
This latter capacity has always been in the hands of land-owning
and certain merchant interests.

These interests themselves have

had little to gain and much to lose by the progressive industrial-

ization of their societies.

One would expect that if industrializa-

tion is to be a function of the foreign exchange generated by the

activities of land-owners and merchants, these latter would remain
not only important but indispensible for industrialization efforts.
In the case of Colombia,

industrialists as

a

group have been

closely associated with the emergence of exporting interests.^ 53
Their impact as an autonomous group, however, is not so clear.
is no

There

doubt that the relative size of this group increased drama-

tically after the beginnings of ISI and the political emergence of
the Colombian labor movement after 1930.

neither autonomy nor strength.

1
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But size alone implies

The largest gremio or interest asso-

ciation which represents their interests, the National Association
of Industrialists

(

Asociacio'n Nacional de Industriales— ANDI)

is

cited by Dix as being one of the three most powerful interest associations in contemporary Colombia, along with the Federation of Coffee

Growers

(

Federacion de Cafete ros de Co1ombia --FEDECAFE) and the Na-

tional Federation of Merchants

FENALCO).
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(

Federacidn Nacional de Comerciantes- -

Another source has stated that by 1950, "the merchants

and industrialists were on their way to becoming the nation's strong-

est power contenders," and that by the 1960s these groups had evolved
into a quasi-confl ict relationship with landed elites.

1
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While
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political disagreements between and among such interests may indeed

emerge it is doubtful that they would be of such

seriously threaten any one of them.

a

nature that would

To the extent that the interests

of both the industrialists and the merchants depend upon the agrarian

export sector for foreign exchange,

a

relationship has developed which

is more symbiotic and complementary than exploitative.

Furthermore,

linkages between members in all of these sectors created and reinforced through both social organizations and political parties (not to

mention family and patrimonial linkages) makes it most difficult even
to disentangle the practical

interests of one over the other.

Taken

together, both the strengths and interests of Colombian industrialists
are incredibly mixed with other important sectors in society.

overall

The

implications of this are well expressed by Dix:

The new industrialists have not found it necessary to chalIn
lenge [old political] patterns to achieve their ends.
sum, the very facility with which the Colombian elite has
integrated the modern with the traditional has probably
helped to postpone or mitigate the need for more farreaching changes in social, economic, and political relationships.' 5 '
If the nature of the industrialization process in Latin Amer-

ica has not substantively altered the structural

balances of society

as a whole, there is a sense in which it has had an important

the creation of

a

dualistic manufacturing sector.

impact—

This characteristic

of ISI has been given particular prominence in explaining the nature
of industrialization in Colombia.
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Within this conception, Colom-

manubia has developed two types of firms for most industries in the

facturing sector:

1)

a

modern subsector which

is

composed of firms

which are more or less, similar to typical firms in the same industry
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in more developed countries, especially with regard
to technology

use, but somewhat smaller, and with lower value added per worker. 159

The existence of

implications.

a

dualistic structure within industry has several

For example, Prebisch implies that part of the de-

clining terms of trade

is

attributable to the existence of

a

sec-

toral dualism which transfers part of the increases in productivity
in the "modern" sector of the periphery to the center. 160

To the

extent that labor unions have emerged predominantly in the modern
subsector, increases in productivity in that sector have sometimes

been passed on to employees in terms of wages.

As can be seen in

Table 21, the rise in wages in the modern subsector have far outstripped wage increases in the craft subsector (as well as an "inter-

mediate" subsector).

Nelson notes further that after 1958, the wage

gap between the modern and craft subsectors has increased signifi-

cantly.
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It is

no wonder, then, that Nelson has asserted that the

intrasector dualism between modern and craft subsectors "lies at the

heart of the income distribution dynamics of urban Colombia."
A second implication of a dual structure in Colombian manu-

facturing concerns employment.

Both the modern and the craft sub-

sectors' ability to absorb labor has been relatively low—lower than
the rate of population growth.
in the national

Yet, the share of manufacturing

income has increased substantially.

where this "excess labor"

is

going is far from over.

The debate as to
To the ex-

tent that manufacturing employment cannot keep pace with population
growth, the growth

of.

manufacturing itself will be more difficult.

The expansion of industrialization

is

a

function of real demand—
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upon which both wage rates and unemployment have

a

very real

impact.

The changes introduced into Colombian society by industrialization

may not have produced major structural realignments of power within
society, but they have resulted in substantive change.

The degree

to which these changes may result in the type of structural

mation that Furtado speaks of will be as much

a

transfor-

function of the nature

of the industrialization process itself as the fruits of its develop-

ment discussed above.

TABLE 13

Patterns of Real Wage Chanqes in
Colombian Industry, 1951-1 964

% of Labor Force

Sector

% Annual

Change in Real Wages

Craft

50

+ 0

Intermediate

15

+

2-3

%

Modern

35

+

5

%

-

.5 %

Richard R. Nelson; T. Paul Schultz; and Robert L. Slighton,
SOURCE:
Structural Change in a Developing Economy: Colombia's Problems and
Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 139.
Prospects (Princeton:

Much of the apparent contradiction between Furtado

's

assertion

that industrialization has been responsible for major transformations
in Latin American economic structures and the evidence presented above

indicating the limited nature of these changes (at least in Colombia)
is

due to

a

confusion of terminology.

in Latin America

is

For Hirschman, industrialization

Import Substituting Industrialization; for Furtado,
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ISI is only one stage in the industrialization
process.

Furtado

himself admits that the ability of ISI to transform
society substantively is minimal unless it "becomes sufficiently diversified
to

generate its own demand."

1

65
In

other words, the nature of indus-

trialization has to change if it is to be used to evoke structural
transformations in the economy.
does not do this.

industrial

It does

ISI, in the Furtado formulation,

not change the structure of demand for

products; ISI, according to Furtado, merely accepts

existing demand structures as given and then proceeds to supply such
demands domestically.
In the

Hirschman formulation, ISI does seek to change the

structure of demand.

The mechanisms by which changes in the struc-

ture of demand are encouraged within this framework of ISI are back-

ward and forward linkages.

Forward linkages represent the extent

to which outputs from a particular industry are used as

another economic activity other than final demand.

inputs for

Backward linkages

represent the derived demand, or degree of input requirements which
are generated by the establishment of a particular industry.

Al-

though both are important, it is the establishment of backward linkages which most affects the structure of demand within the peripheral

nation.

The concern with linkages as the specific vehicle by which
ISI can transform a peripheral

economy

is

due to the particular

nature of the industrialization process among what Hirschman calls
the "late-late industrial izers" or simply the Third World.

Perhaps

the most distinguishing characteristic of the industrialization
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in

the Third

World-ISI-is that

tightly, staged affair." 168

it is

"a highly sequential

It is highly sequential

,

or

in that the

first industries which appear within an ISI framework
are those in-

volved in the manufacture of light or non-durable consumer
goods.

The next industries which appear, in order, are those involved

in the

manufacture of intermediate and heavy or capital goods, and last consumer durables.

In the

center (the First and Second Worlds) the

emergence of these subsectors of industry was much more interdependent and simultaneous.

This has important implications for the struc-

ture of the industrial process.

Linkages, both backward and forward,

are indispensible to successful industrialization.

Whereas in the

industrialization process followed by the center these linkages arose
in a more or less

spontaneous manner, the linkages within ISI must

be deliberately and carefully forged.
ISI its

It is this quality which gives

"tightly staged" nature.
The forging of linkages (especially backward linkages) are

indispensible for realizing the potential that the industrialization
process has for transforming society.

1

CO

The forces and counter

forces affecting the establishment of backward linkages
the main factor in explaining why ISI appears to stall

tries while continue in others.
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is

most likely

in some coun-

Two of the principal obstacles

in establishing such linkages concern tariff and exchange restrictions

Tariffs on imported inputs for domestic industries are frequently low-

certainly much lower than those on goods which could compete with the

output of those domes-tic industries.

This only makes sense if one

wishes to keep the cost of the output of domestic industries as low
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as possible.

In order to

establish domestic industries which would

supply other domestic industries with these same imported inputs, protective measures would have to be established in much the same manner
that they were established to protect the original domestic industry.

Because such measures would most definitely increase the price (and
perhaps even decrease the quality) of inputs for the original domestic industry, industrialists representing the latter would most

certainly stand to lose in the short run.

Therefore backward linkages

of ISI industries often must be instituted over the protest of ISI
industries themselves.
The degree of difficulty in overcoming these protests depends
in large part on the power configurations in the state at that time.

Ironically, it appears as though the stronger the industrialists (which

were created by ISI protection in the first place) the greater will be
the resistance to broadening the ISI protective umbrella to cover

backward linkage industries.

But debate over the correct commercial

policy to be pursued in this regard involves most directly established

domestic industrialists versus those representing "emerging" or linkage
industries which wish to supply them.
Interestingly enough, the latter are often aided in their

struggle by the existence of periodic balance of payments difficulties.
Because of shortages in foreign exchange, imported inputs required by

existing ISI industries may be unobtainable even with
tariff structure.

a

favorable

Such constraints on the capacity to import are

often cited as being one of the major problems with industrialization
in the region.

The extent to which balance of payments difficulties
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inhibit the capacity of ISI industries to import needed inputs
serves
to lessen their resistence to the establishment of domestic backward

linkage industries.
A second and perhaps even greater contradiction appears in

conjunction with exchange rates.

In the effort to maximize the

capacity to import, countries in the periphery often have over-valued

exchange rates.

Not only do over-valued exchange rates serve to lower

the costs (in domestic currency) of imported inputs for existing ISI

industries, they also serve as

a

mechanism for transferring to the

industrial sector wealth generated by the export of traditional products.

sector.

On one level

this is good for the growth of the industrial

But on another level

it not only inhibits the establishment

of domestic backward linkages industries but also inhibits the ability
of the entire industrial sector to expand via exports of manufactures.
This latter result is particularly important for nations such as

Colombia which have recently expressed as one of the aims of economic

development policy the expansion of "non-traditional" (i.e., manufactured) exports

J7

^

Unfortunately for development policy makers in Colombia, the

existing structure of Colombian industry is dependent upon imports for
not only operation (intermediate goods) but also expansion (capital
goods).

172

Precisely those commercial and exchange policies which act

to facilitate the operation of its

industrial sector act at the same

time to inhibit its expansion via exports.

enlargement of the domestic market

is

Furthermore, expansion via

inhibited not only by structural

considerations such as the maldistribution of income but also by the
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related failure to diversify the domestic demand schedule via encour-

agement of backward linkage industries.
The automobile industry in Colombia serves as
of this.

a

good example

One of the principal obstacles encountered in attempts to

establish an automobile industry for the Colombian domestic market has
been the reluctance on part of multinational corporations to allow

any kind of domestic linkages to be established.

While President

Lleras Restrepo devoted considerable attention and resources to the
auto industry (in particular the auto parts industry), neither of his

immediate successors, Pastrana or Lopez, has been similarly inclined.
The automobile industry which has recently been established in Colombia largely consists of an assembly operation for components which

must be imported from the Renault, Fiat, and Chrysler Corporations.
Attempts to vertically integrate, or establish backward linkages in
this case, this assembly operation by using locally produced parts for

autos sold on the local market have been vigorously resisted.

As a

consequence, while Colombia now produces automobiles, in realtiy, only
the labor (and a small

proportion of that) is "Made in Colombia."

This example underlines an important characteristic of Latin

American economic development in general and Colombian industrialization in particular— the use of commercial policy as an active instru-

ment in the fostering of economic growth.

Commercial policy, or

policies regarding the import and export trade, has been indispensible
for

I

SI

.

Since the beginnings of

I

SI

,

Colombian policy makers have

always
proceeded under the assumption that demands for imports would

outstrip the foreign exchange available to finance them.
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ISI

as

a
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strategy of economic development was partially based on this assumption.

Industrialization, it was thought, was to be

preserving strategy--at least

in

the independence invisioned using

of goods

— those

the short run.
I

SI

,

In

a

foreign exchange

order to achieve

imports of particular classes

goods which were to be domestically produced—had to

be curtailed.
In

Colombia, this curtailment of selected imports has been

achieved by at least four policy instruments—the tariff, prior import
deposits, the exchange rate applicable to imports, and import licensing.

The particular details of each of these strategies is not as

important for understanding Colombian industrialization policy as
the fact that they have seldom been systematically applied.

1

75

is

In

particular, fluctuations in the actual availability of foreign exchange has been at least as important in explaining commercial policies with respect to imports as has been deliberate attempts on part

of the state to direct industrialization.
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This makes it exceedingly

difficult to use fluctuations in these policies as indicative of
systematic policy shifts.
This is especially true with respect to policies affecting
IS

I

.

As the composition of imports has changed from finished goods

to intermediate and capital

have had to be adjusted.

goods, the above commercial instruments

On the grossest level, the restriction of

imports has had the effect of encouraging domestic production.

With

might comISI, the idea has been to restrict imports of goods which
imports
pete with the ISI industry while at the same time encouraging

of goods which serve as inputs for that industry.

Thus by examining
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just import restrictions we have little indication as to the ultimate
effect on the industrialization process itself.

encouragement of ISI may result in

a

Paradoxically, the

greater dependence upon imports.

This is precisely why linkage effects are so important in ISI, and

perhaps goes

a

long way in helping explain the subsequent demise of

ISI as a viable strategy of economic development.
It also may go a long way in helping explain the revival
a

of

road to industrialization which had been largely eclipsed since the

Great Depression— industrial ization based on expanding national income.
As a method of industrialization, the contemporary version is slightly

different from that which generated the first stirrings of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century.

As noted above, the

expansion of national income due directly or indirectly to the expansion of world trade resulted in pressures for the domestic production

of certain industrial products.

Industries producing processed food

and beverages, building materials, and textiles came about in Colombia

decades before the expansion of industrialization in other fields.
This was largely due to the increased ability of Colombians effectively

demand such products

— in

other words, the expansion of the market.

In-

creases in the size of the market have been held to be the crucial deter-

mainant not only of investment in industrialization, but all phenomena
associated with the general concept of economic progress.
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It must

be remembered, however, that market does not refer to a geographical

area of distribution so much as real purchasing power.

Inasmuch as

brought
the latter is a function of productivity, we are once again

back to the issue of declining terms of trade.

The "export" to the
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center of gains in productivity in the periphery is one of
the characteristics of the decline analyzed by Prebisch.

As has been noted by

Furtado, however, the industrialization process stimulated by the

expansion of exports was already showing clear symptoms of exhaustion
before the 1929 Crisis.

1

7R
°

After this time, gains in productivity

in the periphery were no longer able to support the expansion of

industrialization there.
As it is conceived currently, the expansion of industrial-

ization via the expansion of national income could just as easily be

expressed as industrialization via expansion of the capacity to import.
While an increase in the national income implies an expansion in the

capacity to import, the reverse is not necessarily true.

Transfers

of income from the center to the periphery, for example, often expand
the capacity of the latter to import, but they reflect little real

increase in national

income--at least not in the sense of expansion

of the market via productivity increases.

Where the expansion in the

capacity to import does impact upon national
sector.

income is in the export

Most of the periphery's ability to import goods is based upon

foreign exchange earnings of the export sector, not capital transfers.
A development strategy based upon real

increases in the capacity to

export, i.e., increases in the productivity of the export sector, will

probably increase national income; but its principal function in the
final quarter of the twentieth century is to earn foreign exchange.
As a mode of industrialization, the strategy of increasing the

capacity to import has more in common with ISI than with earlier indus-

trialization via national income expansion.

The latter strategy, which

125

Hirschman has called "Import Swallowing
Industrialization," is based
on national

incomes and productivity reaching the threshold whereby

domestic production of certain industrial goods becomes
179
profitable.
The former strategy, on the other hand, is based on foreign
exchange

earnings reaching the point whereby the industrial sector is not

strangled by an inability to obtain either raw materials or intermediate
industrial inputs.

Furthermore, as industrialization induced by ISI

begins to reach levels which bump against domestic market constraints,
the possible export of manufactures provides an attractive means of

using foreign exchange' to expand the market.

about as

a

consequense of ISI.

In the final

All

of this has come

analysis, the substitution

of local production for previous imports did not make imports less
important, it merely changed the composition of demand for imports.

And so another contradiction emerges.
industrial

In their pursuit of

independence via ISI, nations such as Colombia have achieved

part of their goal.

The domestic production of manufactures currently

exceeds levels which were previously imported; imports have been sub-

stituted.

Unfortunately, much of the substitution has been at the

expense of previous imports only in the most literal sense.

As noted

in a previous example, Colombia may no longer have to import automo-

biles, but it will be forced to use the foreign exchange thus saved
in order to import the "components"

— industrial

equipment, raw mate-

rials, production technol ogy--for the domestically produced Carro

Colombiano.
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In short,

Colombian industrialization based on ISI has

shifted the dependence on imports from finished goods to intermediate
goods
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One unfortunate by-product of this shift is that imports
have

become even more crucial to the economic well being of the nation
than

ever before.
final

A decline in the capacity to import before 1SI affected

consumers of imported products, the importers of those products,

and the government.

A decline in the capacity to import after ISI also

affects these sectors.

But the consumers of the imported products are

no longer just individuals but the industrial

sector itself.

Exchange

engendered shortages of imports no longer imply breakdowns in the commercial and export sectors exclusively; the very foundations of the

peripheral industrial sector are affected.
The increased concern with industrial izaton via the promotion

of exports, then, expresses both

a

confidence in the consequences of

increased national income as well as

difficulties.

a

reaction to balance of payments

But it must be kept in mind that both of these are based

ultimately upon developments engendered by ISI.
ports has not merely meant
ducts for export.

In

a

The expansion of ex-

return to the production of primary pro-

Colombia, the drive to expand foreign exchange

earnings has been based on the promotion of "non-traditional" exports.
Non- traditional exports in Colombia include anything other than coffee

and petroleum; government policy, especially since the middle of 1967,
has been to promote the export of manufactures.

1

g2

But the role that

manufactures play in the generation of foreign exchange
tively small.

Exports account for only about

2

is

still

rela-

percent of domestic

manufacturing output, but in the words of one authority, "On the whole,
it appears that Colombia has just begun to tap foreign market possibil-

ities for her manufactures both inside and outside the LAFTA region."

1

g
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The fact that Colombia is currently in

a

position which ties

manufacturing expansion to manufacturing export should not be overestimated.

In one sense,

the promotion of exports provides the in-

creased market which is necessary for industrial expansion.

But it

does not realistically consider the fact that its success overwhelmingly

depends upon the trade policies of the developed (as well as other

underdeveloped) nations which would serve as its market. 184

Further-

more, industrial expansion via the promotion of manufacturing exports
still

ignores the issues related to forward and backward linkages

discussed above; it does not necessarily reduce the dependence of
Colombian manufacturing upon imported inputs to produce and expand.
Indeed, by systematically ignoring such concerns, the overall depen-

dence of Colombia's industrial sector may well be exacerbated.
Policy instruments designed by the Colombian government to

promote exports are varied.

Since 1967, the four most important have

been tax benefits, drawbacks and similar arrangements, export credits,

and the Export Promotion Fund

PROEXPO).

All

(

Fondo de Promocion de Exportaciones --

except the last are operated outside the regular struc-

ture of the central government.

The last, PROEXPO, is

decentralized

a

agency of the government which functions principally as

a

coordinating
While it

agency, although it can provide some credit for exporters.

sometimes receives support from the central government, it is financed

principally by

a

tax on the c.i.f. value of all

instruments are principally fiscal

in nature,

imports.

and provide

The other
a

variety of

arrangements whereby exporters may receive negotiable tax credits,
interest
duty breaks on imported components (the Vallejo Plans), and low
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loans to finance exports

(

reintegros anticipad os)

.

One important

similarity among them is that while all of the above provisions

mark tangivle initiatives on part of the state, the central government itself provides little
promotion.

in the way of direct support for export

The data upon which assessments of variations in party

policy are based in this study consist of actual central government
expenditures.

Therefore, the findings presented in Table 14 most

likely underestimate actual state involvement in the question of

promotion of industrial growth via export expansion.

TABLE 14

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development Expenditures
For Promotion of Industrial Exports

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Conservatives

President

Finance
Minister

.06

Strength of
Association

.02
R

Liberals

.08

.09

2

R

Partial Beta

.07

=

.805

=

.704

.16

The party affiliation of neither the president nor the finance

minister contributes much to explaining the variance in central government support for the promotion of industrial exports from 1961 to
1976.

Nevertheless, overall, Liberals tend to support the promotion

of industrial exports more than Conservatives.

The extent to which

this
such support can be traced to either one of the dual sources of

industrialization strategy cannot be determined from the data.

Con-
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sidering the findings presented below that the Liberal Party
has
tended to embrace the concept of industrialization more fully than
the Conservatives, however, one is tempted to assert that industrial-

ization via export promotion has its roots more in balance of payments difficulties than in increased national income concerns.

How-

ever, due to the tiny proportion of the central government expenditures

which are targeted for industrial export promotion, differences ob-

served between Liberals and Conservatives can easily be overstated.
Especially considering the fact that while state intervention
in this field is extensive, almost all

of it is mediated by both

public and quasi-public structures and institutions outside the direct

purview of the central government.

Any conclusions regarding even

the scope, much less the variation in that scope, must be treated

with care.

But one conclusion which does appear justified is that,

at least with respect to the central

government, the impact of ideology

on decisions to support directly the promotion of manufactured ex-

ports has been less important than other factors.

When we turn to the question of overall support for industrial-

ization in the years under consideration the tenor changes slightly.
An inspection of Table 15 provides us with an interesting parallels.
It demonstrates that the Liberal

the central

Party has tended to devote more of

government's resources to industrialization than has the

Conservative Party.

While still relatively small compared to other

sectors of expenditure, central government support of industry in
general

exports.

is

much greater than support for the promotion of manufactured
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TABLE 15

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Industrialization

Party and
Strength of Association
Pol itical

Finance
Minister

President

Conservati ves

5.49

3.25

Liberal

5.99

6.87

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial

Beta

.04

=

.559

=

.312

.27

Considering the fact that about 98 percent of the market for
Colombian manufactures
prising.

is

domestic, this finding should not be sur-

Neither should the fact that the Liberals have been more

sympathetic to the industrial sector than the Conservatives.

The

Liberals established the first organized labor federation in Colombia
and have been the initiators of many innovations in the field of

labor relations.

In the words of one authority:

In view of the crucial role of labor in the presidential
election [of 1930], it was in the interest of the Liberal
Party to foster industrialization and the growth of a
But, in addition, the Liberals were
labor movement.
The support of
ideologically committed to labor.
labor by the Liberals was therefore both tactically important and sincere.
.

.

.

This committment to the industrial sector has been
in Liberal

political thought since.

a

consistent theme

Indeed, Liberal President Carlos

Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) has asserted that the future development
of Colombia lies principally in the extension of industrial manufac-

turing.

186
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Given the intensity of both historical and verbal commitment
on part of the Liberals for industrialization, what is perhaps most

surprising

is

that in terms of actual central government support,

differences between the Liberals and the Conservatives (especially
when considering the presidency) were so small.

Much of this most

likely is due to the points made above concerning the nature of state

involvement in industrialization.

Colombia, central government

In

support and state support can be very different.
for the industrial

Government support

sector through the creation and support of such

decentralized agencies as the Institute for Industrial Development
(

Institut o de Fomento Industrial -IFI

)

as well

as various public and

private financieros or finance corporations established to foster
industrial development would have to be taken into account in order
to assess accurately the total

industrial

commitment of the Liberal Party to the

sector.

Agriculture, Mining, and Export Promotion

Industrialization efforts in Colombia have historically depended upon its agricultural and mining development, most visibly through
the promotion of rural

based exports.

Of all central government expen-

ditures for economic development, about 25 percent have been devoted
to the development of the agriculture sector, and another
to mining and the promotion of exports.

5

percent

We can see from Table 16

that the Conservative Party has generally tended to favor the systematic

development of the agricultural sector more than the Liberals.
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TABLE 16

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Agricultural Sector

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Conservatives

President

Finance
Minister

25.30

24.48

Strength of
Association

R

Liberals

23.05

21 .70

2

R

Partial Beta

.29

=

.534

=

.285

.11

Historically, both parties in Colombia have had strong support
at the rural leval, and studies have demonstrated that differences in

electoral support cannot be well explained by reference to
1

urban factor.

07

a

rural/

Although the Liberal Party took the lead in mobilizing

the growing strength of urban workers during the 1930s, the Conservative

Party was not far behind in its development of party mechanisms to tap
urban support.

Such

response on part of the Conservative Party,

a

however, did not mean that there was

previous bases of support.

a

fundamental shift away from its

Findings provided in Table 16 above provide

evidence that the Conservatives have perhaps not gone as far as the
Liberals in directing government expenditures toward non-agrarian
sectors.

Government support for the agricultural sector is quite varied.
subdivided into fourIts expenditures in this area are functionally
have been channeled
teen different areas, but the bulk of resources

into two-agricultural

'

reform and what have been termed "studies and
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investigations."

The Agricul tural Reform of 1961 was one of the first

major policy innovations of the Frente

.

Originally presented as

a

mechanism to help alleviate the extremely skewed distribution of land,
the efforts at agrarian reform have since shifted.

the latter part of the Frente

emphasized improvements

in

,

Especially during

agricultural reform has increasingly

agricultural productivity within the exist-

ing structure of land distribution rather than

tribution of the land itself.

a

more equitable dis-
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Table 17 below illustrates the average adjusted percentage of

government expenditure directed toward its agrarian reform programs.
As it has been defined here, agrarian reform includes not only the

central

government support component of programs under the auspices

of the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute

(

Instituto Colombiano de

Reform a Agraria- -INCORA) but also support for those programs coming
under the heading of community development or Accion Communal

.

To-

gether these programs receive over one third of the central government's expenditures targeted for the agrarian sector; this figure
does not include sizable expenditures by INCORA which have not come

from the central government itself.
As we can see, it provides conflicting evidence as to vari-

ations in party support of agrarian reform; Conservative presidents
have been associated with greater support than Liberal presidents,

but Liberal
vatives.

finance ministers have been more supportive than Conser-

The respective partial betas indicate that variations in

both the presidents' and finance ministers' party affiliation contri-

bute approximately equally to the explained variation.

In short,

the
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evidence indicates that differences in support for agrarian reform
are not systematically related to political party.

TABLE 17

Adjusted Percent of Agricultural Development
Expenditures for Agrarian Reform

Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservati ves

48.31

27.08

Liberal

30.27

44.84

Strength of
Association

R

R

Partial

Beta

.810

=

.656

.38

.41

This finding tends to confirm Dix

political

2

=

s

contention that "all

factions and parties, and all sectors of the press, give

at least lip service to the idea of an agrarian reform."

1

89

In

this study, we examine more than just "lip service" commitment of

policy, and find that it varys--but not systematically according to
political party.
But, to say that most of the Colombian political elite

policies
supports agrarian reform ignores the real differences in the

which may be subsumed under such

a

rubric.

For example, both land

redistribution for landless peasants and increased credit for large
agricultural enterprises are considered agrarian "reform."
more, the central government contributes only

a

Further-

fraction of the re-

sources utilized by INCORA pursuant to its charge.

Both of these

distinctions which might
factors would tend to blur any ideological
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exist, or prevent them from being determined from the data.

The data,

unfortunately, do not distinguish between types of program support

within what has been called agrarian reform.
The other major category of expenditures within the agricultural

sector has

beer,

termed "studies and investigations."

This

category includes not only agrarian research and development, but
agricultural extension services as well.

Table 18 shows that for

both presidents and finance ministers the Liberal
to devote a greater proportion of agricultural

Party has tended

development expen-

ditures for studies, investigations, and extension.

TABLE 18

Adjusted Percent of Agricultural Development
Expenditures for Agricultural Research,
Investigation, and Extension

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

24.33

21 .29

Liberals

25.45

26.53

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial Beta

.06

=

.294

=

.086

.25

The interpretation of fable 18 depends greatly upon the

nature of agricultural research.

While it generally concentrates on

increasing agricultural productivity, such research may take numerous
forms such as the development of improved seed varieties, fertilizers,

insecticides, and harvesting techniques as well as research into the
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applicability to
of crops.

a

tropical

context of new or non-tradi tional

types

Furthermore, research may be targeted at agricultural

products for either the export market or for domestic consumption.

Finally, research may be focused on increasing the productivity of
small -holders or large agricultural enterprises.

Emphasis directed

toward any one of these areas at the expense of others will greatly

affect who in the agrarian sector benefits.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Liberals have shown

a

greater

level of support for a technological or "scientific" approach to the

question of agricultural productivity can be inferred from their support for agricultural research activities.

Such support may tend to

undercut the traditional agricultural sector and that faction of the
elite which it represents, even though the latter probably is not

coterminous with the Conservative Party as

whole.

a

More importantly,

it indicates support for that sector of agriculture which is least

subject to the influences of traditional power bases.
represents

a

basis for

a

In a sense,

it

"modern" if not elitist restructuring of the

agricultural sector according to principles which may be incompatible
with existing productive relationships.
It was noted earlier that the rural

sector in Latin America

has traditionally made its greatest contribution to economic develop-

ment (at least in terms of foreign exchange earnings) via the mining
and extractive enterprises.

Colombia has been an exception to this

phenomenon, with mining (exclusive of petroleum) generally accounting
for about one half of one percent of the GDP.
has the largest known coal

Even though Colombia

reserves in Latin America, and is by far
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the world's largest producer of emeralds, it still remains a net im-

porter of mineral products.

1

on
u

Only recently has government atten-

tion been directed toward alleviating the slow development of the

mining sector.

The extent that such

a

commitment has included the

allocation of central government resources

is

demonstrated in Table

19.

TABLE 19

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Mining Development

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

-.16

2.71

Liberal

2.84

.72

Strength of
Association

R

Beta

1

.18

.878

=

.772

2

R

Partial

=

.73

The data presented here provide conflicting evidence with

respect to variations in central government allocations to the mining

sector attributable to differences in political party administration.
Relative central government support for the mining sector

is

greatest

among Liberal presidents and Conservative finance ministers.

The

extent to which party variations in each of these positions can explain the variance in expenditures is greater among the presidents
than the finance ministers, but both are relatively important.

Finally,

associated with a
it seems as though Conservative presidents are

negative allocation for the mining sector.

This can be somewhat mis-
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leading unless we recall that the percentage distribution of expenditures have been adjusted for our covariate variables.

In

other

words, the figures represent proportional expenditures after the

effects of the relative size of the government contribution to the
GDP, official

capital

imports from abroad, projected budget receipts,

and the previous year's budget deficit have been statistically control led. for.

Although it cannot be discerned from the data, one possible

explanation for the ambiguous nature of the above findings lies in
several structural changes instituted by the government in the late

1960s and early 1970s.

These include

a

reorganization of the Minis-

try of Mines and Energy, the creation of several affiliated decen-

tralized institutes, and the reorganization of others.^
during this period there was

a

1

Also

policy shift toward the active develop-

ment of export production potential for several minerals which were

previously either unexploited or geared toward domestic production.

1

9?

The latter shift has been characteristic of not only the

mining sector but the agricultural sector as well.

The exportation

of agricultural products has been one of the key components of Colombian economic development policy since the middle of the last century.

What is relatively recent is the active and direct mobilization of
state resources in this quest.

within

a

All

modes of economic development

dependent capitalist economic structure have placed particular

emphasis on the trade arrangements which have come to characterize the
commercial

relations between the developed capitalist center and the

underdeveloped capitalist periphery.

Such trade arrangements have for
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the most part consisted of the production and exportation
of mining

and agricultural

products by the periphery for consumption and/or

further processing by the center.
The foreign exchange earned by the peripheral economy from
all

of these arrangements have been used to import first manufactures

and later the capital equipment needed for the domestic production of
such manufactures.

By skillful use of the "laws" of comparative ad-

vantage it has been alleged that the maximum economic benefit could
accrue to both the parties in the exchange process.

In short,

active

participation in the international trade of primary products has been
assumed to be the sine qua non of any kind of further economic develop-

ment in the nations of the periphery.

It is,

therefore, more than

apparent that the issues of an active export sector are inextricably
linked to industrialization policy, although it is only recently that
this linkage has become readily apparent.

Table 20 demonstrates the adjusted variation in central gov-

ernment support for the promotion of exports.
as well

as

Conservative presidents

finance ministers have been more inclined to use central

government resources to promote rural exports than Liberals.
tendency

is

This

especially strong among the finance ministers, where the

Conservatives are associated with an adjusted central government outlay of almost 220 percent greater than that of the Liberals.

These findings could be indicative of several things.

We

noted above that the Conservative Party has generally favored the

agricultural sector more than the Liberals.

The finding that the

Conservatives also favor the active promotion of exports from that
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sector may just be another aspect of this general concern.

But, if

this is the case, we are left with explaining why support for agri-

cultural

research, development, and extension were not also part of

such a general Conservative Party concern for agriculture.

TABLE 20

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditures for Promotion
of Agricultural Exports

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

4.94

Conservatives

Strength of
Association

9.12
=

R

2.87

4.74

Liberals

2

R =

Partial Beta

.474
.225

.38

.01

An alternate explanation would be that the Conservatives more

than the Liberals are inclined to favor development via the integration of the Colombian domestic economy into the international economy.
A policy of active promotion of agricultural

exports would place Colom-

bia squarely in the middle of the developmental mainstream.
A third possible explanation lies in the fact that the pro-

duction for export in today's world requries

a

much more extensive if

domestic
not sophisticated marketing mechanism than production for

consumption.

While the overall distribution of benefits accruing from

the export of agricultural

products

is

unknown, we might expect that

of other benefits.
it would not differ greatly from the distribution
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In this case, those

individuals and groups at the nexus of the agri-

cultural production and marketing for export may be the most direct

beneficiaries of such

a

policy.

Cone! usions

To be a viable instrument of economic development policy,

benefits from agricultural development must accrue to more than just

merchants and exporters.

In recent decades, however, development

and industrialization have been treated almost synonymously.

In

their efforts to industrialize, the nations of Latin America have

repeatedly come against

a

foreign exchange constraint.

Perhaps the

greatest indirect benefits from the increase in agricultural exports
(or more precisely, from the increased foreign exchange earned) have

accrued to the industrial sector.

Much depends upon whether the

increased exchange earnings have been employed in industrial investment as distinct from further investment in agriculture or such non-

productive uses as real estate or currency speculation, or the importation of sophisticated "defense" equipment.

The extent to which

support for export promotion has been linked to industrialization has
been

a

consistent theme in Colombian economic development strategy,

although industrialization itself has come from several sources.
The effects of a free trade policy and the international division of labor, a real

increase in national

income and its distribution,

an increaseing rate of urbanization, and deliberate state policy have
all made their mark on industrialization strategies

pursued in Colombia.

For more than a century, however, it has been the rural sector which
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which most significant efforts have ultimately depended.

The crucial

role of the agrarian sector in development policy is exacerbated
by
the demands of development in the context of a dependent
capitalist

framework.

In this

setting, the rural sector has been called upon

not only to support the urban areas in terms of food and resources,

but also to provide the bulk of the foreign exchange necessary to

finance much of the industrialization effort.

Within the agricultural sector itself we have found con-

flicting evidence with respect to variation in levels of party support
for agrarian reform, although due to the evolution of the concept of

agrarian reform in the Colombian context, differences may still lie
beneath the surface.

The second major target of central

government

support in the agrarian sector--agricul tural research, development,
and extension—does evince systematic differences between the parties.

Liberals more than Conservatives have tended to support this particular

component of agricultural development policy.
The second sector within rural development policy concerned

Although sharp variations in policy were found in this sector,

mining.

the nature and sources of these variations remain unexplained.
is little

There

evidence that there have been systematic differences between

the Liberals and Conservatives with respect to levels of support given

mining development.
The final component of industrialization via the development of
the rural sector concerned export promotion.

We found that the Conser-

vative Party has tended to favor central government support for export

promotion during the period of the Frente.

This sector is the least
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ambiguous in terms of the dual nature of the rural
sector's contri-

bution to economic development.
above, this sector

exchange.

is

Unlike the other areas described

specifically geared to the earning of foreign

As such it represents a self-conscious effort at increased

integration into the world market.

The consequences (both positive

and negative) of this integration are particularly important when

considering not only industrialization, as was seen above, but also
infrastructure development, as will be shown in the following chapter.
Industrialization policy in Colombia has been the function of
both Liberal and Conservative Party support.

However, it has been the

Liberal Party which has been most directly involved in the mobilization

of state resources to specifically encourage industrialization.
Liberal
trial

The

Party has also been more concerned with the promotion of indus-

exports as

a

means of developing the domestic industrial sector.

In both of these areas then,

systematic Liberal Party support has com-

plemented patterns of Conservative Party support

in the

rural

sector.

The interrelationship between industrialization and rural sector dev-

elopment in economic growth, in Colombia, has more systematically
focused on the former than the latter.
in the rural

sector has principally been seen as

industrialization.
principal

That is to say, economic growth

In this

a

vehicle for further

process, the Liberal Party has been the

initiator of state action.

Whether it has been the principal

initiator of state action in the other major component of expenditure
for economic development--infrastructure--is the subject of the next

chapter.

CHAPTER

IV

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Economic development at the national level is an extremely

interrelated process between the agricultural and the urba^ or industrial

sectors.

The previous chapters have examined the role of these

two major components and the effects of the political structure in
the development of each.
the structural

The final

linkage to be forged involves

interrelationship between agriculture and industry,

and the state's role in its development.

The economic structure which

serves as this facilitator of economic interchange at the national
level

is

the social

overhead or infrastructure sector.

The concept

of social overhead capital can be quite broad, and the term is often
used to refer to all

basic services which permit all other types of

productive activities in the primary, secondary, and tertiary spheres
to occur.

According to Hirschman, such

a

definition would include:

public services from law and order through education
and public health to transportation, communications, power
and water supply, as well as such agricultural overhead
capital as irrigation and drainage systems J 93
all

As it is used in this study, the concept of infrastructure follows

the more restricted definition of Kindelberger, and includes only

transportation networks, power sources, and communications networks,
or those sectors which are "needed to enable other production for the

market to take place."

1

94
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Infrastructure

is

fundamentally different from our other two

components of economic development in that the returns to it are

generally spread far outside of its direct production.

In

other

words, the externalities generated by infrastructure investment tend
to be far greater than those generated by either agricultural or

industrial production.

Not only do the benefits derived from invest-

ments in infrastructure tend to be spread to society in general

rather than either the industrial or agricultural sectors in particular (or firms within them), they also tend to be extremely expensive.

In addition, many types of infrastructure facilities, par-

ticularly in the transportation and communications areas tend to

assume the characteristics of natural monopolies.
three reasons, even within
can be looked upon as

a

a

Because of these

capitalist economic system, the state

legitimate producer of such services.

This is particularly true of less economically developed

countries where the development process has been such that many infra-

structure facilities did not develop concomitantly with the agricultural

and industrial sectors.

Indeed, in the past, each of these

two sectors often developed their own separate facilities to perform
the functions that

society as

a

whole.

a

well developed infrastructure would provide to
For example, roads and highways have been devel-

oped to service the export agriculture sector, and private power

generating plants have been constructed for particular industrial
firms.

Although such facilities perform the function of infrastructure

other productive
they remain specifically geared to service one or the
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sector and often cannot be easily converted to benefit the
society
as a whole.
In previous

sections we indicated the crucial role that

economic linkages play in the development process.

Such linkages

refer not only to the industrialization process, although that is

where much of the emphasis has been placed.

True economic develop-

ment means that linkages must be obtained not only within the industrial

sector itself, but between the industrial sector and other parts

of society.

Economic integration of this sort will most likely not

arise through the efforts of either sector alone.
larly true in

a

This is particu-

dependent capitalist context where both the agri-

cultural and industrial sectors are already strongly linked to

a

pro-

ductive matrix largely outside of the boundaries of the nation itself.
In short,

the economic development of Colombia, as contrasted with

the development of either its agricultural sector or industrial sector,

requires that there be an infrastructure which integrates these sectors

within the nation itself.
Of the three sectors which comprise the "targets" of economic

development pol icy--industrial

,

agricultural, and infrastructure—the

development of an infrastructure has been the most consistent priority
of the national government in terms of actual outlay in any given year.
As can be seen in Figure 5 below,

by the national

the emphasis placed on this sector

government has varied from over 80 percent of its

economic development expenditures to about 50 percent.
During the period of the Frente

,

the Liberals have generally

favored the direction of more national resources to infrastructure
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development than have the Conservatives.
to which this

is

Table

21

shows the extent

the case for both the party affiliation of the

president and the finance minister.

Even after the effects of pre-

sidential party affiliation, official capital

imports for infra-

structure development, and the other independent variables are
controlled for, on the average over

5

percent more economic development

expenditures have been channeled into infrastructure when there has
been

Liberal finance minister than when there has been a Conservativ

a

in that position.
is

The figure for the president, while not as dramatic

consistent with this finding.

Frente

,

the Liberal

In short, during the period of the

Party has tended to favor infrastructure develop-

ment more than the Conservative Party in terms of resource allocation
for economic development.

TABLE

21

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Infrastructure

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Conservatives

President

66.34

Finance
Minister

Strength of
Association

62.72
R

66.22

Liberal

66.46

.11

.756

=

.571

2

R

Partial Beta

=

.20

Transportation

The infrastructure component of economic development is com-

posed of three sectors

— transportation,

energy, and communications.
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Of these three, it

the transportation sector which is, perhaps,

is

the major recognized prerequisite for continuing growth in all

sectors of economic development.

In

most economically underdeveloped

nations the transportation system is clearly inadequate for the
developmental demands which are placed upon it.

The inadequacy of

the Colombian transportation system has stemmed from two sources-

one natural and the other created.
The topography of Colombia is one of the most difficult in the

Western world.

Although there are areas more rugged, Colombia shares

with her neighbors to the
1

south

— Ecuador

and Peru—the characteristic

that there are major centers of population nestled among the three-mile
high Andes mountain range.

Colombia is different from these neighbors

in that it alone has its major administrative as well

as commercial

centers located in inter-mountain basins in these mountains.

Both

Bogota and Medellfn are located in areas that makes contact both

between each other and between these cities and other domestic urban
centers most difficult at best.

Indeed, even Bogota and Medellm

themselves were not connected by

a

railway until 1960, and Bogota and

the Atlantic coast were not connected until

The technical

1961.

1

95

skills involved in building highways and rail-

road networks around and between three parallel cordilleras that make
up the Andes in Colombia are often not available.

are very young geologically speaking.

The Andes themselves

It has been estimated that the

Andes are among the most recently formed mountains in the world.
As such,

they are still

196

in an extremely active condition which means

that any kind of construction work undertaken in these regions will
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be confronted with the effects of incessant erosion
and leveling.
No sooner is a road built than the geologic forces
over which there
is

no control

begin to destroy it.

common occurence.

In 197/,

Earthquakes and landslides are

for example,

a

landslide took out

a

a

section

of the highway between Bogota and Vil lavicencio taking hundreds
of
lives in the process.

What is more, this event essentially cut off

the entire two thirds of the nation lying east of Bogota' for over

week.

a

Conditions which have caused such occurences are not likely to

change substantially for another few million years or so, so Colombians must resign themselves to the fact that if

a

transportation

system is to be constructed it will be very expensive.
It is this extraordinarily high cost of constructing any

kind of land transportation which is partially responsible for the

second characteristic of Colombia's inadequate transportation system.

Those transportation lines which do exist have one very common element-they tend to connect agricultural areas with either river or ocean
ports.

In

other words, the internal transportation system was con-

structed largely to service the export sector of the economy.

This

characteristic is principally the result of what Fals Borda calls the
"Liberal Subversion" of the mid-nineteenth century which, economically

speaking, actively sought the integration of Colombia into the capitalist world market system.

197

What was most necessary from this perspective was

a

transpor-

tation system which could deliver to ports of egress those products

which could earn foreign exchange for the nation.
late nineteenth century that product was coffee.

Beginning in the
As more and more
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internal

improvements were made to the transportation system,
the

balance between internal and external commerce became increasingly
skewed in favor of the latter. 198

Of course, not every road or rail-

road built since the nineteenth century has been exclusively designed
to service the export sector.

even creating,

a

national

not be underestimated.

But the neglect of servicing, indeed

internal market during these years must

The fact that it was often less expensive to

import goods from Europe than to manufacture and transport them in-

ternally cannot help but to have had serious consequences for the

subsequent development of economic policy in Colombia.
The development of the national

way has had

a

transportation network in this

tremendous impact not only on the Colombian economy but

also on the political system.

In the words of one scholar:

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century when railroad building began, the improvements in the transportation
system exacerbated the regionalism of the country by improving
each region's tie to the external market while roads for internal travel went into decay. 199
Thus, the increasing linkages between Colombia and the rest of the

world were purchased at

a

price.

The development of a strong central

government depends in part upon the ability to forge strong internal
linkages.

Indeed, most of the literature on nation building stresses

the need to strengthen, or even create if necessary, those bonds which
will make the system more interdependent.

The effect of tying Colom-

bian regions to the rest of the world rather than to other Colombian

regions was indeed "subversive" as Fals Borda terms it.

why regionalism

is

still

One reason

so strong in Colombia today most definitely
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stems in part from the nature of the transportation network, espec-

ially as it developed from the middle of the nineteenth century.
But whether the cause is primarily geographic, economic, or
a

combination of both, the particular development the transportation

network in Colombia has implications which transcend economic development.

It is,

perhaps, for this reason that the development of the

transportation system in Colombia has dominated not only priorities
of the national governments of the Frente with respect to infra-

structure but also has consumed

a

major portion of the national re-

sources devoted to economic development as

a

whole.

As

Figure 6

demonstrates, only twice has the percentage of transportation expenditures fallen below three quarters the total expenditure for infra-

structure, and it has never consumed less than 40 percent of the
central

government's entire economic development outlay.

its overwhelming dominance, it is essential

importance of transportation in two ways:

Because of

to look at the relative

within the context of

national priorities with respect to other sectors within infrastructure

itself, and also with respect to all sectors which comprise economic

development.

Evidence as to which of the two parties has systematically
favored transportation relative to other types of infrastructure

presented in Table 22 below.
during the years of the Frente

is

The table clearly demonstrates that
,

the Conservative Party has tended to

support the transportation sector more than the Liberal Party.

Further-

more, this pattern of partisan support for transportation was fairly
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strong for both presidents and finance ministers, although the
variability was stronger among the latter.

TABLE 22

Adjusted Percent of Infrastructure
Expenditure for Transportation

Pol i tical Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

81.59

83.86

Liberals

78.57

78.36

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial Beta

.19

=

.639

=

.408

.33

Because transportation dominates the infrastructure sector to
the extent that it does, it would be valuable to examine its impor-

tance to the entire economic development effort.

There are many

other possible sectors within economic development with which the
transportation sector must compete, although it dominates these as
well.

As we can see from Figure 6 above, the transportation sector

on the average comprises over 50 percent of the total national gov-

ernment support for economic development.

Given the findings above

that the Conservative Party has tended to favor transportation

relative to other infrastructure choices, does this pattern also
hold relative to other economic development choices?

below provides

us

Table 23

with an answer to this question.

As we can see, there was almost no difference between Liberal

of economic
and Conservative presidencies in the adjusted proportion
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development expenditures devoted to transportation.

On the other

hand, Conservative finance ministeres devoted an average of 10.5

percent more than Liberals to economic development expenditures for
transportation.

TABLE 23

Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Transportation

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

52.87

56.56

Liberals

52.85

51.18

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial Beta

.00

=

.744

=

.554

.25

These findings essentially corroborate those above which

indicated Conservative support relative to the infrastructure sector
As with those findings, it is the finance minister who manifests a

more substantial degree of systematic variability than the president
Indeed, when examining the partisan patterns of support for transpor

tation relative to all other economic development sectors, we note
that there is essentially no difference between Liberal and Conser-

vative presidents.

The fact that party affiliation of both the pres

ident and the finance minister explain less of the variance in trans

portation support relative to the entire economic development effort
as opposed to just infrastructure development is to be expected.

Transportation must compete only with the communications and energy

156

sectors within the infrastructure component of economic developemnt,

whereas it must compete additionally with policy developing both
industry and agriculture when examining economic development as
whole.

a

Nevertheless, the conclusion that the Conservative Party

has tended to be more supportive of the transportation sector than

the Liberal Party remains valid.
This finding tends to complement the traditional ideological

position of the Conservative Party with respect to land.

Historically,

the Conservative Party has been represented as the more supportive of

the interests of large land owners and agricultural interests.

In

terms of rural economic development policy, the issue of transporThis is especially true if the road to develop-

tation is important.

ment is perceived as being one of stimulating the export economy,
which in Colombia means principally the agrarian sector.

One of the

principal costs of any product produced in Colombia and destined for
sale either internally or externally is transportation.

The more

efficiently that the transportation network serves to facilitate the
entry of goods on the market results in

a

lowering of costs and

subsequently higher rates of return on other factors of production.
An efficient transportation network serves to lower the final

costs of imports as well.

The extent to which the Colombian economy,

particularly in the capital goods sector, depends upon imports

is

The allocation of national resources to trans-

high and increasing.

portation serves economic development in this area also.

But the

nature of industrial production is such that large comittments of
-

national resources is not as crucial to serve it.

The concentration
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of industries

In

certain geographical locations makes the matter of

linking them with sources of both raw materials and essential imported

components relatively simple.
It is not in the need to lower costs of both imported and

domestically produced inputs into the manufacturing process that
the transportation system as

bian industry.

a

whole plays its biggest role in Colom-

It is rather in the distribution of the output of

Colombian manufacturing to both the domestic and perhaps even the
international market that the transportation sector qua system has
its greatest long term impact.

Of course, any improvement in the

national transportation network will benefit international manufacas domestic producers.

turers as

v/ell

ment of

transportation system which would increase the accessibility

a

But in one sense, the develop-

of the internal market would benefit domestic producers more.

It

would permit inter-regional and internal trade to be carried on more
directly and without the need to route goods destined for the internal
markets along arteries designed to facilitate access to an international market.

The preceeding discussion of the lowering of costs to service
the internal market applies not only to manufactures, of course.

Colombia always has been and still
As the agricultural

is

a

predominantly rural country.

sector is responsible for most of the domesti-

cally produced product, its importance in the Colombian economy cannot be taken for granted.

As noted earlier,

the agricultural

sector

serves not only to produce for export, it also serves as one of the
for
principal sources of internal savings and economic surplus needed
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industrialization.

Much of this is derived from the exchange of

agricultural products on the internal market.

Any mechanism which

would facilitate economic transactions in the internal market must
benefit this sector as well.
While it is clearly important for the urban sector that

Colombia have

a well

developed transportation network, there are

other sectors in the economy, for example energy, which are at
least as important.
a

But, for the development of the rural

viable transportation system is paramount.

sector,

The Conservative Party

has been shown to support the development of the transportation

sector relative to not only other infrastructure sectors but also
all

economic development sectors in general.

The extent to which

this support can be traced to the Conservative Party's traditional

concern with issues of rural development is problematic.

In

order

to successfully arrive at an answer, one would have to examine in

closer detail the particulars of the transportation system being
favored.

Are transportation lines being developed principally which

tie the agricultural

hinterlands to river or ocean ports?

Are they

being developed to increase inter-regional and other internal contact?
These and similar questions which would have to be explored before
one could arrive at a more definite answer cannot easily be answered

using the data in this study.

But, an examination of the "types" of

transportation being developed in Colombia may provide some clue.
The contribution of transportation to economic development
is mul tifaceted.

On. the one hand, transportation systems may be

developed which facilitate the exchange of goods and services within
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the world market.

It has been noted that active involvement of
the

state in transportation in Colombia was initially

export sector.

a

response to the

It was developed in order to more easily bring Colom-

bian exports onto the world market.

On the other hand,

transportation

systems may also be developed which encourage the exchange of goods

and services within the domestic market.

The development of such

a

transportation system would increase the size and scope of the distribution of all products of

a

modern economy.

Transportation barriers

to marketing are important whether products are imported or produced

domestically.

Finally, the transportation system can contribute to

the economic and political

integration of the country.

Related in

large part to questions of domestic production and distribution, this

aspect of the transportation system would be closely allied with the

development of communications networks.
The functional aspects of

a

transportation system as outlined

above only partially parallel the sectoral approach used in this study.
The data used here describe the types of transportation which the

government may encourage, that is, between such options as railroads,
highways, airports, river ports, and so forth.

However, they do not

distinguish between, for example, highways or railroads which exist
primarily to transport coffee or cotton to places where they may be
exported, from lines which are purely domestic in function.

We may

overcome this problem only partially by noting the sectors within
the transportation system and paralleling them with the appropriate

function.
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Wa ter transportation

.

Perhaps the most obvious parallel between

type and function would be the case of sea and river transportation.

The nature of this transportation type is such that emphasis given
to it would be considered as fairly indicative of sentiment toward

international trade.

transportation.

It is

The situation is clearest with respect to ocean

unlikely that all but an extremely small per-

centage of the trade to and from Colombia's ocean ports involve intranational rather than international arrangements.

In addition,

support

for ocean transportation also includes government support for the Flota
ffercante Gran Colombiana

.

This corporate merchant marine, operated

jointly by Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, has been the principal
vehicle to export Colombian products, especially coffee, since 1946.
The situation with respect to river transportation is also

likely to incorporate the international dimension to
Currently, the inland water system

is

a

great extent.

used mainly to transport petroleum

general cargo transport (except for bulk cargo) has declined both

absolutely and relatively since the early 1960s.
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Also, given the

fact that major population centers are not located on, or often even

near navigable rivers, most of the goods coming into or going from

river ports must be transported further using non-maritime transportation.

Except for those localities directly on the coast or navig-

able river systems, the primary beneficiaries

of improvements here

would be those involved in moving trade through these arteries.
Historically, the development of water transportation in Colombia has preceeded improvements in overland transportation.

Given

Colombia's topography it should not be surprising that improvements
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in the former were one of the first priorities
of nineteenth century

governments.

The emphasis given water transportation systems early

in Colombian history preceeded improvements

in overland

by perhaps as much as a half a century. 201

Currently, however, only

about

3

transportation

percent of the central government's investment in transpor-

tation goes to maritime systems.
In spite

of its rather insignificant size with respect to

other transportation alternatives water transportation gives us the

purest example of a transportation system which is functionally

oriented toward international rather than domestic aspects of economic
development.

As such, party variations in emphasis given river and

ocean transportation gives an excellent indication of ideological

tendencies with respect ot domestic versus international trade.
In

Colombia during the period of the Frente

,

the Conservative

Party systematically supported the development of water transportation

more than the Liberal Party.

As can be seen in Table 24 below, the

adjusted annual direct investment in water transportation has been

over 260 percent greater during the periods of Conservative presidential

administrations than under Liberal administrations; during periods

when there was

a

Conservative finance minister, investment

in

water

transportation was over 410 percent greater than during periods when
Liberals held the same post.
The patterns within the components of water transportation

support this finding with additional evidence.

The party variation

with respect to emphasis on river transportation as opposed to ocean

transportation

is

inconclusive.

But, as can be seen in Table 25 below,

political party variation with respect to ocean transportation is

even clearer than water transportation as

a

whole.

TABLE 24

Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Water Transportation

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

5.31

7.60

Liberals

1.47

1.48

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial

Beta

.21

=

.494

=

.244

.31

Table 25

Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Ocean Transportation

Pol itical Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

4.76

7.30

Liberals

1.10

0.94

Strength of
Association

R
2

R

Partial Beta

.20

-

.465

=

.216

.33

The average adjusted percentage of central government direct

investment in ocean transportation has been over 330 percent greater
under Conservative presidents than Liberal presidents, and over 675

percent greater under Coservative finance ministers than Liberal
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finance ministers.

Of course, the magnitude of these changes in

percentage terms

due to the relatively insignificant portion of

is

the transportation expenditures which are spent on water transpor-

tation in general.

But there can be no mistaking the fact that

there are definite ideological differences between the Liberals and

Conservatives with respect to this aspect of economic development in
general

,

and infrastructure development in particular.

Land Transportation

Other emphases within the transportation sector

.

are less obviously tied to

a

particular mode of economic development.

Land transportation, for example, is necessary whether one favors

development hacia afuera or hacia adentro
domestically requires

a

.

The production of goods

transportation system which can deliver raw

materials to the site of production.

And, the distribution of goods,

regardless of whether produced domestically or imported from abroad,
is

accomplished by the same overland transportation network.
The lack of

a

viable overland transportation system has been

one of the principal obstacles to economic development in Colombia.

Historically, the part of the price of

a

product bought in Colombia

which was due to transportation costs has been extremely high.

All

throughout the nineteenth century it was probably cheaper to import

many goods from Europe and transport these goods to Colombian river
towns, than just transport them from the interior of Colombia to the

same river towns.
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Not only did this have the effect of orienting

entire sections of Colombia to Europe more than the interior of their
ov/n

country, but also of orienting internal economic development
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policy to the international stage more than the domestic.

The

development of land transportation, then, has never responded solely
to domestic pressures.

One should not be surprised that land transportation in

Colombia developed initially as
trade policy.

a

response to an existing foreign

The need to pay for imports necessitated improvements

which would lower the costs of Colombian exports.

It has been

argued that the expansion of coffee cultivation and exports in Colombia around the turn of the century was principally due to the expan,

sion of the railroad network.

pen

Nevertheless, relative to most

other Latin American countries, Colombia was slow to develop railroads.

And, the railroads which were constructed were geared prin-

cipally to servicing external trade requirements.
Bogota was connected by

a

rail

As noted earlier,

line neither to the coast nor to

Colombia's second city, Medellin, before 1960.

But the rather

limited nature of internal linkages provided by the railroad system
in Colombia should not obscure the importance that the development

of railroads has had for its economic development.

In the words of

one authority, "Colombian railways were as important to that counrty's

development as were the railways of North America to the United
*
States.
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The support provided to the international trade aspect of

economic development

is

less clear when considering the other major

type of land transportation— roads and highways.

In order to achieve

an accurate picture of the contribution of roads and highways to the

lowering of costs of international trade one would have to examine
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the particular nature of the roads under consideration.

Depending

upon routes and sizes, as well as facilities at either end of a

given highway line, the construction of roads and highways may

contribute not only to international trade but also domestic trade.
Indeed, given the historical development of Colombia's railroads,

the bulk of international trade may be expected to depend upon roads
and highways.

There is evidence to indicate that the Colombian

government has made a conscious effort to make the railroad and highway systems complementary with each other rather than competitive.
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To the extent that this policy has been successful, we might expect

that the highway system is much less oriented to the external market
than has been the case with the railroads.

If that is the case, then

the highway system would have a greater impact on national
and internal

trade than would the railroad system.

integration

But again, in

order to assess directly such an impact, information would be needed
concerning the types of highways being constructed.
The relative emphasis given to roads and highways as contrasted

with railways is difficult to ascertain.

Although the central govern-

ment budget does provide some support for Colombian railroads, most

of the expenses and investments in railroad lines since 1954 have
been under the jurisdiction of

semi -autonomous agency—the Ferro-

a

carrilles Nacionales de Colombia

.

While some of the responsibility

for highways is given to various semi -autonomous agencies, on the

other hand, the bulk of national policy emanates from the Ministry
of Public Works.

Indeed, 90 percent of the Ministry's activities

national highway
include planning, constructing, and maintaining the
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network.
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Since decentralized agencies' budgets are maintained

separately from that of the central government, examination of
the
latter provides little clue as to the magnitude or composition of
the former.

The examination of land transportation policy during

the Frente period, then, will

be limited to a consideration of high-

ways and roads.
The acknowledged father of the Colombian national highway

system was German Uribe Hoyos, Liberal Minister of Public Works under
the Santos administration (1930-1934).

Under the auspices of the

Liberal Party, in 1931 the transportation policy of the Colombian

government undertook

a

dramatic shift toward an emphasis on highways

and away from railroads.

Liberal
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During the period of the Frente

Party has continued to stress the development of

system more than the Conservative Party.

As

is

a

,

the

highway

demonstrated in Table

26, the adjusted average investment expenditure on highways under

the auspices of Liberals has been over 100 percent greater than under

Conservatives when speaking of finance ministers, and 18 percent
greater when speaking of presidents.

TABLE 26

Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Roads and Highways

Party and
Strength of Association
Pol itical

President

Finance
Minister

Conservatives

50.00

31.84

Liberals

59.00

64.80

.10

.33

Partial Beta

Strength of
Association

R

=

.722

R

2 =

.521
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It was observed earlier that the Conservative
Party has

tended to support the transportation sector more than the
Liberal
Party.

A possible explanation for this finding was that transportation

policy had

a

great bearing on the production for export, especially

for agricultural

products.

It appears a contradiction to find that

the Liberal Party, much more than the Conservative Party, supports
the creation and maintenance of roads and highways.

This is even

more surprising when one considers the fact that the government

ministry primarily responsible for highways has been almost exclusively
a

Conservative preserve during the Frente period.

How, then, can we

resolve this apparent anomaly?
One possible explanation would be that the bulk of highway

expenditures are directed toward routes which do not directly benefit
the export sector.

The transportation system in general

ways in particular are multifunctional phenomena.
been established that the initial

It has already

interventions of the state into

the transportation sector were to facilitate external
is

and the high-

trade.

It

possible that most of the routes which would achieve this goal

have already been established.

A point of diminishing returns may

have been reached as far as establishing lines which could economically

connect those regions producing export products to points where they
could be marketed.

If this

is

the case,

a

greater proportion of new

highway projects may be directed toward establishing and strengthening
trunk lines and inter-city links.
for internal

While such links are indespensible

commerce they are less crucial for production for the

external market.

The validity of such an explanation would depend,
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of course, on an analysis of the types of roads which make
up the
Colombian comittment to roads and highways.
Indirect evidence
In 1961

is

available to support this contention.

the government created the Fondo Nacional de taminos Veci^-

ales— CAVECINALES.

This decentralized institute was established

primarily to construct feeder roads as part of
of agricultural

improvement.

a

more general program

The extent to which CAVECINALES or

other agencies have superceeded the Ministry of Public Works in
certain types of road construction, particularly in agricultural areas,

cannot be determined using the data in this study.

But,

a

structural

shift in the highway activities of the Ministry of Public Works away

from agricultural and rural projects may help explain the apparent
relative lack of interest on part of the Conservative Party to this

particular component of the transportation sector.
Finally, it also must be remembered that the Conservative

Party has supported ocean and river transportation more than the

Liberals.

Inasmuch as this type of transportation is more specific-

ally geared to the international scene, further investments in road

construction could conceivably be seen as at the expense of other
sectors which may be viewed as being more beneficial to economic

development as

a

whole.

This explanation is strengthened when we

note the findings presented below with respect to air transportation.

Air transportation

.

The final

subsector of transportation concerns

the development of air transportation.

Given the extraordinary topo-

graphy of Colombia, the potential for air transport is enormous.
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This fact has not been lost in the development of
network.

a

transportation

Organized in 1919, Colombia has the oldest commercial

airline in the Americas.

Even as early as 1950, the Colombian air-

lines made up "a very important part of the transportation
system
for both passengers and freight."

The role of air transportation

in economic development is difficult to assess.

economic development has been conceptualized as
istic phenomenon.

a

basically material-

As such, the production and distribution of material

goods has been the basic concern.
general

One reason is that

The role that transportation in

plays in this process is basically one of facilitating this

production and distribution.
The particular contribution that air transportation plays in
this process is highly dependent upon what is being produced and

distributed.

Such a formulation radically downplays the importance

of the transportation system for human "distribution."

And, it is

in the realm of passenger transport that air transportation in

pnq

Colombia has seen its most steady growth.

However, most of the

growth in this area has been due to increased average length of
trips; the grov/th of domestic air passenger traffic has been slowed

dramatically by improved highway connections.

As far as the trans-

portation of objects rather than people, the position of air transportation

is

less clear.

As a rule agricultural

products, which make

up the bulk of Colombia's exports, can more cheaply be transported

using other means of transportation.

Of course some agricultural

products, such as orchids which in the past have constituted

a

sizable percentage of Colombia's non-traditional exports, must be
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transported by air.

For most non-bulk products,

including many manu-

factures, the savings realized using air
transportation is variable.
The growth of air cargo in Colombia since 1960
has been most

evident in the international portion rather than
the domestic portion.
The IBRD estimates that while the average compounded
growth rate between 1960 and 1968 for domestic air cargo showed an increase
of 2.5

percent, the growth rate of international cargo increased
13.5 percent.

21

The development of transportation alternatives and increase

in the use of trucking are most likely the main reasons for the
rela-

tively slow growth in 'the domestic sphere.

The increase in the use

of air transportation in international cargo transactions most likely
reflects the changing composition of Colombian imports as well as

improvements in cargo handling facilities.
It is, perhaps,

the "international" aspect which best accounts

for the findings presented in Table 28 below.

TABLE 27

Average Adjusted Percent of Transportation
Expenditure for Air Transportation

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Conservatives

.

,

.

p
^resident

42.53

Finance
Minister

Strength of
Association

62.08
R

Liberal

40.23

31.97

2
R

Partial Beta

.02

.30

=

.544

=

.296
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We can see above that the Conservative Party has tended to

favor the development of air transportation more than the Liberal
Party.

There seems little in the expressed ideological positions

assumed by either party to explain why this should be so.

Evident

variations in developmental strategies also do not really help to

understand such

a

finding.

this finding is evidence of

Unless one is willing to assert that
a

more general faith on part of the

Conservative Party in outward oriented growth, it
explain in

a

is

difficult to

theoretically meaningful fashion the relative support

differences observed.

Cone! us ions

.

Taken together, the subsectors of transportation policy

present us with
in Colombia.

clearer understanding of economic development policy

a

Given the crucial

economic development strategy it
is evidence that the Liberal

systematic differences.

importance of transportation in any
is

interesting to note that there

and Conservative Parties indeed manifest

While the Conservative Party has been shown

to give relatively more support to the development of the transpor-

tation sector as

a

whole than has the Liberal Party, there are definite

party differences in priorities between the transportation subsectors.
The Conservative Party has tended to support those aspects of

transportation which would facilitate the integration of the Colombian

economy with the world market.

This is clearly shown with respect to

its relative support of maritime transportation, and also with its

support of air transportation.

The Liberal Party, on the other hand,

has tended to support those aspects of transportation which would
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facilitate the internal production and distribution of
goods, that
is, the internal

integration of the Colombian economy.

The national

highway system, which for all practical purposes was the result
of
Liberal Party initiatives during the early 1930s, has been shown to
still be an actual concern of the Liberals

a

third of

a

century later.

Nevertheless, it also has been shown that choices within the

transportation sector are seldom associated with one particular

development strategy.

Given the multi-functional character and mixed

nature of most transportation alternatives it
more than

a

is

difficult to catch

glimpse of actual variations in economic development

strategy in its broadest outlines.
at the subsectoral

level

Variations in transportation policy

provides only

a

part, albeit

a

substantial

part, of that larger picture.

Energy

It was argued above that in one sense the development of the

transportation sector of the infrastructure would especially benefit
the agricultural sector.

It is even more obvious that the development

of the energy sector of infrastructure would principally tend

to

benefit the urban sector generally and the industrialization process
The critical need to develop adequate sources of

in particular.

energy for Colombian economic growth has been recognized at least
since the 1950s.
types of power

is

Indeed, the provision of electric and other
the sine qua non of industrialization efforts

wherever they may occur.

And, with increasing urbanization the need

to provide electricity to non-industrial consumers also increases
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dramatically.

Both industrialization and urbanization, then,
require

that there be available from some source an adequate supply of
both

electric and non-electric power.
The provision of power in Colombia is primarily

responsibility.

government

a

As such, much of the pace of economic development

dependent upon electric power utilization

government action.

is also a

function of

There has been an overall increase in power

generating capacity in recent years, but Colombia still remains below
the average per capita in Latin America.

Frente

,

During the period of the

the installed generating capacity of Colombian power plants

has increased from 2500 to 7200 MGW (the latter figure for 1970). 212
But, this increase has not been steady or constant.

Part of the problem lies with the fact that jurisdiction for
the provision of power is fragmented among the central

government,

various decentralized institutes and agencies, regional development

corporations, and municipal bodies.

This is further exacerbated by

the fact that most emphasis during the past has been on the develop-

ment of generation and transmission facilities and not to distribu21 ?

tion.

.

This has left almost one fourth of the population without

electric service.

But,

it is not the provision of power to rural

communities which is viewed as

a

priority for economic growth.

Most

gains to be derived from more and cheaper sources of power are in

industry, manufacturing, and commerce.

Regardless of whether one is referring to the president or
the finance minister,- the Liberal

Party in Colombia has tended to

support the development of the energy sector more than the Conservative
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Party.

When controlling for all other independent variables, Table

28 demonstrates that the average adjusted investment by Liberal

finance ministers was 62.8 percent greater than that of Conservatives.

TABLE 28

Average Adjusted Percent of Economic Development
Expenditure for Energy Sector

Political Party and
Strength of Association

Conservatives

President

Finance
Minister

12.05

8.77

12.55

13.90

Strength of
Association

R

Liberals

2

R
.05

Partial Beta

a

.522

=

.272

.48

These findings can be indicative of several things.
noted above,

=

As

significant number of Colombians live in areas which

do not have electric power.

Indeed, it was estimated that in 1970,

fully 70 percent of the rural population did not have any electricity
214

service at all.

Of course, much of this is due to impractical-

geographical
ities involved in a wider distribution effort given the

populations.
conditions and the scattered nature of Colombian rural
in the actual
But not all of the rural /urban differences observed

distribution of power resources are the result of topography and

settlement patterns.

Much of the difference may be attributed to

developmental process.
the function that energy resources assume in the
the
Increased productivity has usually come about with

for human labor.
substitution of mechanical devices or technology
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This substitution can take place in

tant characteristic of them all

is

a

number of ways, but one impor-

the requirement for energy--ei ther

to drive the device directly or for use in the device's creation.

The fact that electric energy cannot be efficiently stored,

only transmitted, leads to
returns to energy use.

Economies of scale and other factors contri-

bute to the contention that

of energy requires

a

host of problems in terms of economic

a

a

maximization of efficiency

concentration in terms of users.

tration implies two things:

1)

in

the use

This concen-

urban areas are more "efficient" in

terms of power utilization than rural areas; and

2)

industrial uses

are more "efficient" than residential and perhaps even commercial uses
Party in Colombia has been the beneficiary on both

The Liberal

of these counts.
the Liberal

In

other words, the greater electoral support for

Party in urban areas, as well as its early lead in the

mobilization of the industrial workforce may help explain this finding
Especially in light of the findings presented in the previous chapter
with respect to industrialization policy, it is not unreasonable to
hold that there is

a

link between the systematic support of energy

development and support of manufacturing, commercial, and urban segments in society.

Communications

The communications concerns of the national government in

Colombia are primarily related to establishing radio communications
networks, regulating. telecommunications and postal enterprises, and

granting concessions and licences to public and private telecommuni-

176

cations entities.

Of all

the infrastructure sectors, communications

has received the least amount of attention from the
central

ment.

govern-

On the average, only about one percent of the national

resources

invested in infrastructure development have been targeted for the

communications sector.

Part of the reason for this relatively insig-

nificant figure is due to the fact that communications services, more
than any other infrastructure sector, are primarily the responsibility

of local and regional entities, as well as decentralized agencies of
the central

government.

While the central government provides some

assistance, the majority of communications links, especially telephone
links, are expected to remain fiscally solvent through user charges,
fees, and the like.
In as

far as actual party variation in support for communi-

cations investments, Table 29 below shows that the Liberal Party
tends to favor the communications sector more than the Conservative
Party.

In relative terms,

under Liberal presidents the central gov-

ernment has invested almost 64 percent more on communications systems
than under Conservative presidents, although there was little differ-

ence among finance ministers.
It is unclear how such a finding should be interpreted.

As

far as economic development strategy is concerned, the role that

communications plays is ambiguous.

The larger issues of economic

development policy and variations in that policy have been concerned
with the creation and distribution of goods and services.

Communi-

cations networks are essential for all such transactions.

Perhaps
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the less "concrete" issue of national

integration could better explain

such a finding than could economic development policy in itself.

TABLE 29

Average Adjusted Percent of Infrastructure
Expenditure for Communication Sector

Political Party and
Strength of Association

President

Finance
Minister

Conservati ves

0.57

1

Liberal

1.57

1.08

Strength of
Association

.05
R

R

Partial Beta

.75

2

=

.810

=

.656

.09

The communications system extant in Colombia is somewhat weak.
It was estimated in 1970 that only about half of Colombia's populapic

tion lived in areas with telephone service.

Furthermore, people
The

without telephone service were not exclusively rural residents.
IBRD estimated in the same year that there were about 19 areas in

Colombia with populations greater than 20,000 which had no local
telephone service.
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The lack of local communications facilities

in certain areas may not severely cripple development efforts.

Most

strategies of economic development require investment in communicabusiness.
tions only in so far as they are necessary to conduct

The

Liberal nor
economic development strategies expressed by neither the

question of what kind
the Conservative Parties directly address the
successful implementaof communications sector would be required for
tion.
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Historically, the Conservative Party has expressed

a

greater

interest in issues of integration than has the Liberal Party.

This

interest, however, has not been expressed in terms which would in-

dicate that increased communications networks would be
achieve this end.

a

means to

Stressing hierarchy and authority, integration

of Colombian society in traditional Conservative thought is based on
the maintenance of traditional

conceptions of "la patria

."

patron-client relationships and organic

21

The Liberal Party has traditionally

stressed the contractual nature of society.

Implied in such

a

position would be support of the means necessary to permit such
interpersonal

interactions to occur.

The linkages between this and an ideology of economic devel-

opment are less than clear.

It does seem to suggest that an economic

development strategy which was geared more toward internal dynamics-desarrollo hacia adentro

,

if you will --would be more compatible with

an emphasis on developing communications.

In

other areas of infra-

structure development, the Liberal Party has indicated more of
preference for such

a

strategy than the Conservative Party.

a

The

findings with respect to the development of the communications sector
give evidence to support such an interpretation.

Cone! usions

The development of infrastructure clearly demonstrates the

interrelated nature of the state, industry, and agriculture in the

economic development process.

In this

chapter we have observed that

this interrelationship, has not been defined in Colombia exclusively
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either the Liberal or the Conservative Parties, even though
the
Liberals have shown the most support for aggregate infrastructure
development.

This finding could be misleading, however, if one

ignores the specific nature of infrastructure development policy
in Colombia during the period of the Frent e.

By examining sectoral

variations within the infrastructure

component of economic development, we have seen several trends, particularly in the transportation sector.

While the Conservative Party

has generally tended to favor the development of transportation rela-

tive to other sectors in the entire economic development sphere,
the findings are mixed with respect to support for transportation

relative to other

infrastructure sectors.

This latter finding, in

particular, is most likely the result of the predominance of the
road and highway component within the transportation sector.

This

subsector of transportation development has clearly been favored by
the Liberal Party.
On the other hand, the two other subsectors of transportation
pol icy--water and air transportation

more by the Conservative Party.

development—have been supported

The particular contribution that

each type of transportation could make to the further economic inte-

gration of Colombia into the world market
upon the patterns observed.

is

felt to have some bearing

However, due to the sectoral nature of

the data used in this study, such

a

conclusion can only be inferred.

The energy sector was clearly supported by the Liberal Party

more than the Conservative Party during the period of the Frente

.

Given the findings in the previous chapter with respect to patterns
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of support for the industrial sector, this

is

not surprising.

A

sufficient and reliable source of power is essential for the develop-

ment of an industrial sector.

If the state is serious about encour-

aging industrialization it has no choice but to either provide or

encourage the development of an adequate energy infrastructure, or
provide support for industrial firms to provide their own.
former

is

The

probably to be preferred to the latter not only because

it is more efficient (at least in the long run) but also because of

theoretical considerations concerning the nature of infrastructure
in the entire economic development process.

The final sector of infrastructure development—communi ca-

tions—was also supported more by the Liberals than the Conservatives
during the Frente period.

The relatively urban nature of much com-

munications development as well as this sector's contribution to
national

integration in both social and economic spheres were cited

as possible explanations for this finding.

Government support of infrastructure development
part of economic development policy.

is a crucial

Within the context of

ist mode of development it is the principal

(and only real

a

capital-

legitimate)

entry point for productive government involvement in the development
process.

But infrastructure development is not in itself neutral to

that process.

In other words,

the size, scope, and nature of develop-

ment in the industrial and agricultural sectors will be profoundly
influenced by the types of infrastructure which are supported by the
government.

The nature

of government intervention in the infrastruc-

industrial
ture sector will have an effect not only on policies in the
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and agricultural sectors, but the entire economic development

process.

The overall

implications for economic development policy

of observed variations in the sectoral support of central govern-

ment policy during the Frente are dealt with in the final chapter.

CHAPTER

V

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this study we have been concerned with political
variations in economic development policies as applied to several
sectors of Colombian society.

In particular, we have been concerned

with the impact of political party affiliation upon variations in

politico-administrative arrangements used to structure state involvement in the economic development process, and in the distribution of
central government resources among the three sectors of economic

development—industry

,

agriculture, and infrastructure.

In this

chapter we outline the variations found and discuss the possible
implications of these variations with respect to three areas:
the alignment of internal political

1)

power relations; 2) the impact

upon other sectors of economic development; and 3) the political/

economic relationship between Colombia and the rest of the world.
The first of these derives from the fact that hiscorically
the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia have tended to be

associated with different sources of power.

Some of these sources,

such as specific regional and local identification with one party or

another, probably have little impact upon variations in the substance
of economic development policies.

This is not to say that particular

regions or local caciques may not enjoy (or suffer) fluctuations in
the amount of "developmental" resources available from the central
182
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government on the basis of party affiliation, only that fluctuations
will

vary along functional rather than geographical lines.

More

importantly, sectoral variations in economic development policy will
be examined with the thought in mind of "who benefited" and "who lost"

from the choices that were made.

In other words, we seek to determine

if the variations observed in functional

emphasis give us any clue as

to which sectors in Colombian society have been most directly effected.

The second type of impact derives from the limited nature of
the resources mobilized by the central

elopment purposes.

development is

a

government for economic dev-

It has been emphasized throughout that economic

multi faceted phenomenon, and that equal attention

cannot be afforded to all of its aspects.

Resources channeled toward

one particular sector of economic development necessarily implies
that other possible sectors have not received all that they could.
The balance between the sectoral allocations gives rise to particular

modes of economic growth.

These trade-offs within the area of econ-

omic development have implications not only for the subsequent develop-

ment of these particular sectors but the nature of the entire development effort as well
The final type of impact examined derives from the fact that
the economic development of Colombia has occured (and continues to

occur) in the context of being economically integrated into

wide capitalist system.

a

world-

Specific economic development policies can

be geared to increasing, decreasing, or changing the nature of this

integration.

Pol icy_ choices made with respect to this

issue have

implications not only for the world economic system but the very
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character that economic development is to assume in Colombia.

In

particular, it will affect both the nature and distribution of power

within Colombia as well as the emphasis given to specific types and
sectors of economic developemnt,

Pol itico-Administrati ve Policy

There were several politico-administrative arenas within

which party variation has been examined.

The first of these--

administration—concerned both the scope and method of state penetration in the economy.

On the basis of evidence used in this study

there appeared to be no systematic difference betv/een the Liberal
and

Conservative Parties in terms of scope assumed by the state (or

the public sector)

in the economic development process.

This finding

tends to confirm the suspicion long held concerning the Liberal and

Conservative Parties in Colombia that the alignment of internal
fairly

political power relationships has occurred in the context of

a

stable relationship between the public and private sectors.

Both

parties tend to embrace the concept of
well as a vigorous private sector.

Liberals and Conservatives have

a

a

generally active state as

This implies that both the

commitment to the pursuit of economic

development largely through the activities of

a

strong private sector.

At the same time, both parties tend to mediate involvement in the
domestic economy through the state, and that neither party

is

ideo-

logically adverse to actively mobilizing state influence, prestige,
general
and resources in the- national and international arenas for the

benefit of domestic economic development policy
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This finding indicates only that the Liberals and Conservatives tended to agree on the most general level with the desirability
for (or scope of) active state involvement in the economy.

Evidence

developed in this study indicates that there were differences between
the parties in terms of preferred methods and administrative arrange-

ments within that public sector.

The Conservative Party tended to

favor more centralized administrative arrangements, with deviations

from this ideal usually in the form of administrative (or functional)

decentralization as opposed to territorial decentralization (or devolution).

The Conservatives also tended to favor the use of the state

in the development and support of national

level

planning.

The

Liberal Party tended to favor more decentralized administrative ar-

rangements, particularly those which assumed the character of devolution or territorial decentralization.

They also tended to devote

more state resources to project evaluation, programming, and pre-

investment studies.
The observed variation between Liberal and Conservative policy

with respect to the decentralization issue confirms an historical di-

mension of conflict between the two parties.

It is difficult to say

how much of the current differences between them can be attributed to

differences in their bases of power as opposed to just tradition.

The

type of decentralization favored by the Liberals would tend to actually

delegate power to regional and local levels, and may provide some
patronage which could be distributed among local power elites.

Also,

given the traditional Liberal Party strength in most of Colombia's

cities, such

a

delegation of power could help reinforce the party
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structure at the local and regional levels.

Likewise, the functional

decentralization of power favored by the Conservative Party
offers
a

source of patronage.

However, the patronage resulting from this

type of decentralization does not tend to create local
or regionally

based "competitors" to the national government.

"decentralized" units act with

a

Instead, while the

certain degree of autonomy within

their own areas of specialization they are nevertheless part of
the
central

government and perform functions which are vital to its per-

formance.
The particular type of decentralization used by the govern-

ment in its pursuit of economic development in itself probably has
little effect upon the sectoral distribution of government resources.
The issue seems to be more one of effective control among all sectors

of economic development policy.
to assume a priori

There are few grounds upon which

that the decisions involved in the sectoral dis-

tribution of development resources are influenced by

a

preference of

one administrative arrangement over another.
The type of decentralization used probably has more effect
upon Colombia's relationships with other nations, particularly the

United States.

Decentralization via the functional route creates

the various decentralized agencies, autonomous and semi-autonomous

instituties which have populated the Colombian administrative landscape in recent decades.

Many of these agencies are administered
a

debt in

the name of the Colombian government with various external

funding

under regulations which permit them to directly contract

agencies such as the IADB and the IBRD.

Decentralization via the
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territorial route increases the resources at
the regional and local

levels but does not entail any added capacity
on their part to con-

tract

a

foreign debt.

In

other words, international capital is much

more likely to flow into Colombia via her decentralized
institutes
than through her departments, municipios

,

and national

territories.

To the extent that this is true the policies of the
Conservative Party

have tended to result in the tighter integration of the Colombian

government with those nations and multilateral agencies active in
international finance.

Variations between the Liberals and Conservatives with regard to the planning issue complement the above findings in several
ways.

The Conservative Party has tended to devote more attention

to national

planning during the Frente period; the Liberal Party,

on the other hand, has tended to devote more attention to project

evaluation and programming.

In a sense,

aspects of the same phenomenon.

these are micro- and macro-

The exercise of planning is concerned

principally with the forecasting and analysis of economic opportunities and constraints, and conditions which affect both.

It seeks to

develop appropriate economic development strategies on the basis of
this understanding.

Project evaluation and programming, on the other

hand, is more involved in the detailed (and hopefully realistic) ela-

boration of these strategies.
ject evaluation may give you

In short,
a

good planning but bad pro-

100 meter-wide dam on a 150 meter-

wide river, but good project evaluation without good planning may
give you the same dam where there's no river at all.

during the period of the Frente

,

it appears as

In

Colombia

though it was the
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Conservatives who tended to look for rivers and the Liberals
who

built the dams.
Above, we noted that the Conservatives tended to favor
that
type of decentralization which at least theoretically
permitted the

maximum amount of administrative control.

The planning exercise is

much more important than program evaluation in its contribution to

administrative control.

Because program evaluation tends to look

only at the "pieces" of development it

is

difficult to arrive at

panorama of the entire development process using its focus.

a

On the

other hand, effective planning requires the models upon which it

is

built are both valid and reliable— two criteria which, judging from
the record of past experience, are less than certain.

Furthermore,

planning tends to ignore the "details" which, unfortunately, tend
to make up the real world.

Project evaluation is much more adaptable

for use in the specific development sectors themselves.

One par-

ticular sector in which project evaluation, more than planning,

put to use is industry.

is

The extent to which project evaluation is

used in conjunction with industrial sector development may affect
the relationship between the parties and program evaluation expenditures.

It may be that much of the Liberal

Party commitment to pro-

gram evaluation has been reflective of its commitment to industrialization as much as any ideal of the effecacy of program evaluation
i

tsel f

Both planning and project evaluation are necessary for the

successful attraction of international assistance, especially from

multilateral sources such as the United Nations.

The tendency of
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the Conservatives to favor planning indicates that
they are at least

sensitive to these requirements.

evaluation

is

The Liberal commitment to project

not incompatible with either their end, if it is indus-

trialization, nor their means, if it includes the assistance
of
developmental capital

from abroad.

In short,

the evidence linking

the Conservative Party to a policy of desarrollo hacfa afuera via

attention to planning is stronger than that linking the Liberal

Party via attention to program evaluation, neither party has particularly eschewed the idea of international development assistance.
The final politico-administrative arena within which pol-

itical

variations were found was the banking and finance sector.

Overall, the Liberal Party tended to rely more on taxation to finance

development expenditures.

The use of taxation may imply that the

Liberals are better able to use the tax mechanism to raise enough
to finance its programs.

This may be due to

a

number of factors

including more vigorous enforcement of tax laws under Liberals, un-

controlled windfall shifts in the treasury balances due to variation
in taxes earned on export sales,

or

a

general

bias in the tax struc-

ture away from those sectors where the Liberal Party is most influ-

ential.

It should be remembered here that Colombia is one of the

only two countries in South America in which the corporate income
tax is less important than the individual income tax.

The reliance upon taxation for the financing of development

only indirectly impinges upon Colombia's integration into the world
economy.

The extent to which the tax is based upon receipts from

multinational corporations is unknown.

Given the greater importance
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in Colombia's

as well

tax structure of direct taxes on individual

as sales taxes,

incomes,

indicates that levels of taxation may not

be as dependent upon international considerations
(other than fluc-

tuations in commodity market prices) as other methods of
development

finance such as credit.

Although generally credit financing was preferred by the
Conservatives during the Frente period, variations with respect to

either domestic or international sources was somewhat ambivalent.
The Conservative Party did tend to rely more on domestic credit

institutions than the Liberals, but the record with respect to international credit institutions was ambiguous.

Other evidence has in-

dicated that the Conservative Party has been more receptive to direct foreign investment than the Liberal Party, but such

a

finding

only gives an indirect indication of generalized support for international capital

The nature and control of the Colombian credit and banking

system is not

a

sell

explored area.

This is particularly true if

one is looking for variations in political party control.

The evi-

dence in this study suggests that the Conservative Party stands in

relation to its banking sector in Colombia in much the same way that
the Republican Party stands in relation to the banking sector in the

United States.

Influence within the domestic credit institutions by

the Conservatives may also have effects in the strategies adopted
by the various regimes to combat Colombia's chronic inflation.

In

other words, the Conservative Party may tend to rely more upon monetary instruments to combat inflation while the Liberals may prefer
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to use fiscal

ones.

The influence of the Conservative Party in the domestic

credit sector also may be reflected in the sectoral distribution
of
credit.

The fact that the banking sector in Colombia has been more

tied to financing imports and exports may have an additional

impact.

The most likely bias of such an impact would be toward the agricultural sector and away from the industrial sector.

This has been

found to be generally true at the level of private credit to domestic

producers, and there is no reason to belive that its impact upon the
sectoral distribution of public credit would be different.

The implications of

a

Conservative tendency to prefer domes-

tic credit and a bipartisan tendency to use international credit can
be seen in two ways.

We noted earlier that the distinction between

domestic and international sources of development credit has become
increasingly blurred in recent years.

This blurring has been due to

both the "internationalization" of Colombia's domestic banking sector,
as well

as the "Colombianization" of the previously wholly owned sub-

sidiaries of large international banks.

The fact that there was no

apparent party variation with respect to preference for international
credit does not necessarily mean that party variations do not exist.
Instead, it may mean that the definitions used of domestic and international sources of development credit may not be as mutually exclusive
as would be optimum.

But, the evidence as to no systematic party variation in the

preference for international credit may also imply that both the Liberal and Conservative Parties rely upon international sources of
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finance capital, but then distribute it sectorally
according to

their various priorities.

In

other words, the issue of integration

into the world economy through reliance upon international finance

credit may not really be the principal area distinguishing the
Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia.

Instead, the prefer-

ence for international credit may vary with the particular economic

development sectors for which it is sought.
During the period of the Frente

,

there were three sectors

into which economic development resources were channeled— industry

agriculture, and infrastructure.

But these three sectors did not ex-

haust the set of possible sectoral alternatives for which central

government resources could be spent.

For example, expenditures on

defense, general administration, education, community services, welfare, health, and public buildings, while they undoubtedly have

developmental

implications and consequences, were not included in

the measurement of governmental allocations for economic development.
As may be expected, the distribution of government resources to these

other sectors together make up the majority of central government expenditures

.

During the period of the Frente there were political party

variations with respect to the relative emphasis given to the economic development sectors as
above.
a

a

whole versus the other sectors mentioned

Overall, the Liberal Party was found to be associated with

slightly greater proportion of central government resources directed

to the economic development sectors.

This could be indicative of several things.

First, is that
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the Liberals have tended to view development more in economic terms

whereas the Conservatives have tended to view it more in sociocultural or politico-administrative terms.
is

Such an interpretation

reinforced if one takes seriously the more "organic" conception

of society embodied in the fundamental
Party.

Alternatively,

a

ideology of the Conservative

Conservative preference for utilizing admin-

istrative and regulatory policy rather than direct central government

intervention in the implementation of economic development policy
could also explain the apparent difference.

Finally, it may be that

the particular sectors which make up the economic development com-

ponent of Colombian public policy touch more upon those areas which
the Liberal

Party has traditionally stressed.

The validity of these

explanations may become clearer as we examine the impact of political
party affiliation in the distribution of central government resources
among the three sectors of economic development— industry, agriculture,
and infrastructure.

Industrial Policy

The most visible effects of economic development in Colombia

are in the industrial sector.

This is as much due to the essential

role that industrialization has played in all concepts of development
since
that have been actually considered by policy makers in Colombia

government policy
the 1930s as it is to deliberate modifications in
by either the Liberal or Conservative Parties.

The fact that indus-

development
trialization has come to dominate concepts of economic
implications in
used by both Liberals and Conservatives has great
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terms of their policy responses during the Frente
period.
For one thing, there is

a

much broader array of governmental

options for dealing with the encouragement and
regulation of industrial development than for any other sector.

Compared to the agri-

cultural and infrastructure sectors, the industrial sector
receives
the smallest proportion of actual

the central government.

resource allocations directly from

But this does not mean that the government's

concern for industrialization is proportionately smaller.

most of Colombia's policy of

economic development

is of

a

non-fiscal

Indeed,

nature directly related to

direct concern to the industrial sector.

Almost all international commercial policy, which among other things
includes balance of payments concerns, tariffs, tax credits and rebates, export promotion, credit availability, and exchange rate reg-

ulation is inextricably tied to issues of industrial development
pol icy.

Variations in this type of policy attributable to political
party differences were not discernable from the data used in this
study.

From secondary sources and isolated policy examples it would

appear that much of the Colombian government's policy in this area
is as much determined by situational

variables, most notably balance

of payments considerations, as by any systematic application of ideological

principles.

In other words, although commercial

policy is in

many ways basic to industrialization efforts, the latter are often not

directly considered in the formulation of the former.
The differences manifested by the Liberals and Conservatives
in that part of industrialization policy which does consist of direct
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resource allocation from the central government to the
industrial
sector have been distinct but not extreme.
the Frente the Liberal

During the period of

Party has tended to support the direct allo-

cation of resources both to industrial development itself
as well
as to the promotion of industrial

exports.

In each of these areas,

however, the contribtuion of political party differences in explaining

variations in levels of support was not as great as in most other
areas of economic development.

These findings lend tempered evidence to the assertion that
the Liberal

Party is more representative of the industrial interests

in Colombia than the Conservative Party.

Historically the Liberals

have been quicker than the Conservatives to recognize the political

implications of the industrialization process, as is evidenced by
their specific cultivation of urban labor as

a

source of support.

The Conservatives, while not as self-consciously as the

Liberals, have also sought the support of urban labor.

But perhaps

the most important implication for the internal alignment of power

come not from mass support but rather support from those elements
in Colombian society who are both capable and willing to support the

industrialization process.

In other words, given the extent to which

commercial and other policies have been used during the Frente to

encourage industrialization, it is perhaps more relevant to examine
who in Colombian society has stood to benefit from the types of

industrialization policies which have been promulgated.
It has been noted that industrialization in Colombia has

export
largely resulted not from a conflict between those involved in
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trade and those who wished to industrialize.

Instead, the same

sector which benefited from the development of the coffee exports
initiated the development of the earliest Colombian industries.
This fact has resulted in

system of cooperation (albeit at times

a

quite strained) between portions of the elite primarily interested
in one or the other of these economic activities.

This interrelationship has become especially important with
the maturation of the industrialization process characteristic of

Colombia--ISI

One of the fundamental differences between industrial-

.

ization spurred by real increases in the level and distribution of
national income and ISI has concerned the nature of the linkages gen-

erated by each.

In practice,

ISI

has not developed the crucial

for-

ward and especially backward linkages needed to make industry an

economically viable vehicle of development.

Because of this neglect,

industrialization in Colombia has resulted in the substitution of
the importation of finished manufactures advocated in earlier designs

of economic development, with the importation of intermediate capital
goods and raw materials.

In effect,

the substitution of imports re-

quired in the ISI strategy has resulted in the development of an
industrial sector in Colombia which in many ways is even more depen-

dent upon imports—both financial and material --for its survival.
This dependence has implications for both the development of

other sectors of the Colombian economy as well as Colombia's economic
and political

relationships with the rest of the world.

In

order to

maintain (if not increase) the levels of production achieved in the
industrial sector, an increase in the capacity to import is needed.
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This increase in the capacity to import can
be achieved in several

ways— all

of which have become increasingly important
in recent

years
On the domestic front, the ISI derived need to
increase the

capacity to import has led to an emphasis on increasing
production
in the agrarian sector, especially in those areas
geared to production

for export.

Land redistribution as

a

goal

of agrarian reform has

been all but abandoned not only in practice (where it never really

got off the ground in the first place) but also in rhetoric.

Tax

and credit policies have increasingly been geared toward encouraging
the establishment of export-related enterprise.

Also, given the

highly technical and capital oriented character of the drive to increase agricultural productivity, the agrarian sector stands in in-

creasingly strong competition with the industrial sector for available
domestic and international credit.
The other major domestic response to the need to increase
the capacity to import as well as spur productivity in the industrial

sector itself has been the increased drive to expand "non-traditional"
or industrial exports.

Given the nature of the Colombian industrial

sector, it is easy to see why such

a

strategy would be highly desir-

able, but yet also highly improbable in terms of success.

Because of

constraints in the size of the market coupled with the highly capital
intensive nature of many ISI industries, their productive capacity far

outstrips their absorption capacity.

In

other words, the ability to

market the excess productive capacity of Colombian manufactures through
their export would not only greatly increase the economic efficiency
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of the industrial

sector but also serve as

a

source of foreign

exchange
Such
two reasons.

state of affairs is, however, highly unlikely for

a

The first is that the same exchange rate policies which

benefit the industrial sector through overvaluation of domestic

currency also lowers the real return on exports.

A policy to encour-

age export production of manufactures through exchange rate manipu-

lation would have the effect of

making needed industrial imports

more expensive in terms of local currency.
A related and' possibly more important reason that the promo-

tion of industrial exports as

a

policy option would be extremely

difficult in Colombia concerns the trading policies of the nations
which would ostensibly serve as their market.

Colombian manufactures

would most likely not be very competitive on the world market.
less the Colombian government were to subsidize industrial

Un-

production

to make it more competitive, or unless the nations receiving Colombian

manufactured exports were to allow them entry as

a

sort of "back door"

approach to aid, the expansion of Colombia's industrial sector via

export expansion would be highly problematic no matter whether either
the Liberals or Conservatives encouraged it.

The policies of those elements outside of the national govern-

ment responsible for the development of ISI in Colombia, particularly
the multinational corporations, are just as important as variations

between Liberals and Conservatives for further expansion of the indus-

trial market.

Indistrial expansion in Colombia has proceeded with

substantial direct and indirect infusion of foreign capital.

Although
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formal ownership of new industrial enterprises must be at least

51

percent Colombian, other important elements such as effective control
over patents, trademarks, production processes, and many factor inputs remain with the parent company.
In much the same

trial

way that the expansion of Colombia's indus-

exports depends upon the trade policies of the developed coun-

tries, it also depends upon the internal policies of the multinational

corporations involved in the industrial sector.

The shift from bi-

lateral to multi-lateral sources of official developmental capital

only exacerbates this trend.

Colombian industrial sector

The increasing integration of the
wi.th

the rest of the world economy in

terms of both domestic operations and international expansion only

highlights the interdependency of Liberal efforts to expand indus-

trialization and Conservative efforts to increase agricultural productivity.

In

other words, the nature that the industrialization

process has assumed in Colombia has narrowed the boundaries within
which the Liberals and Conservative Parties can effectively afford
to disagree.

Agricultural Policy

Economic development in Colombia has always hinged upon the

development of the rural sector.

Therefore it has been essential for

both the Liberals and Conservatives to devote

of state resources for its development.

a

substantial proportion

Indeed, along with infra-

resources
structure, the rural sector has absorbed the greatest bulk of

targeted to achieve economic development.

Neither party, therefore,
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could afford to neglect the development of the rural sector.

More

importantly, the sources from which both Liberals and Conservatives

drew their strength and support most often are either well rooted
in or have strong ties to the rural

which has

a

sector.

Even the Liberal Party,

stronger support base in most Colombian cities than the

Conservative Party, has depended upon the development of the countryside.

Within the countryside itself, the implications of the ob-

served patterns of support upon domestic power arrangements
vealing.
tural

is

re-

The more traditional modes of involvement in the agricul-

sector, which include support for such things as agricultural

and ranching improvement, the development of primary materials, and
the conservation of national resources, apparently derive more support

from the Conservative Party.

Those portions of the agriculture sector

which are involved in agricultural research and extension and the

promotion of agricultural exports ahve been supported more by the
Liberal Party.

This pattern of support implies that that part of the agrarian

sector which is more geared to the external market and biased toward
the development of new agricultural technologies may have

a

different

basis of support than the morp traditional subsistence and domestically

oriented part.

In terms of

economic power the part represented by the

former may be most important, but in terms of numbers of people effected
it may be the latter.

Government support for agricultural research

and development is more likely to have

a

direct impact on fewer people

traditional
in the countryside than government support for more

agri-
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cultural concerns.
In this sense, Liberal

support for those particular sectors

of agricultural development may have several results.

First, the

traditional sources of power in the countryside may tend to be
under-

cut in the long run.

Unless most agricultural research and develop-

ment is being devoted to increasing small-holder productivity and/or
techniques which may be used by farmers of modest means, one likely
result would be the relative decrease in the importance of this type
of agriculture.

The introduction of new agricultural techniques and

the integration of the agrarian sector into the world commodity market

both are extremely disruptive of old patterns of social and economic

relationships.
A related point concerns the beneficiaries of a policy of

export promotion.

Unlike most other areas within the rural sector,

resources devoted to export promotion are more likely to be channeled
not to the agrarian sector itself but to the merchants and middlemen

responsible for marketing the commodity.

In other words,

the prin-

cipal beneficiaries of this type of policy are the least likely of
all

the areas in rural development to actually be involved in the

direct production of agricultural products.
Finally, the disrupted network of relationships are more
«

likely to be reformed along lines congruent with "modern" productive

techniques, that is, the "proletarianization" of the countryside.
The Liberal Party most likely has less to lose in the restructuring

of relationships in the countryside than the Conservative Party.
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Not only does the Liberal Party have

a

stronger base of support in

the urban areas, but also the effects of la violencia
were probably

more disruptive of Liberals in the countryside than
Conservatives.

Whether those in the countryside most directly effected by
the changes
in rural

relationships subsequently find their way into Liberal Party

ranks is problematic.

Instead, we are arguing that rural sector

changes implied by this type of support are just as likely to disrupt networks which tend to benefit the Conservative Party, if not

more so.
The finding of little systematic party difference in support
for the mining sector, as well as agrarian reform, has few apparent

implications for the alignment of internal political power relationships.

It was hypothesized that variations

in agrarian reform policy

may be obscured by the change in the definition of the concept during
the Frente period.

The acceptance of this shift from

definition

a

based on land redistribution to one based on unit productivity by
both parties indicates that the rural peasentry is not

force in either party.

a

powerful

The transformation of the countryside im-

plied in this shift would most likely benefit

a

similar strata in-

dependently of party affiliation.
The patterns of party variation described above also have

implications for the other sectors of economic development.

At the

broadest level, support for the rural sector has been at the expense
of the infrastructure sectors.

Most of this is because the central

government contribution to the industrial sector has been relatively
,

small

compared to the two other sectors.

The rural sector is linked
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to the industrial sector largely via infrastructure related
invest-

ments.

The extent to which infrastructure development is sacrificed

to rural

sector development will tend to inhance the relative isolation

of the latter.

The transformation of the rural sector without infra-

structure linkages either to the domestic market or the international

market is extremely unlikely.

The ability of the rural

sector to

complement industrial development is also impeded.
Subsectoral variations in rural sector support

is

to have repercussions in other economic development areas.

also likely

The promo-

tion of both agricultural research and development, and export promotion
tends to complement the development of not only industry but also infra-

structure.

Agricultural research and development, like industry,

geared toward increasing output per unit input.

is

Also, the input unit

most likely stressed in agricultural research, like industry, is

Furthermore, as much agricultural research and development

capital.
is

concerned with the use of various insecticides, fertilizers, new

seed varieties, and the like, there needs to be

products.

These agricultural

a

source for these

inputs are more often than not the

outputs of a particular portion of the industrial sector (or an
industry based outside of Colombia).

Finally, the promotion of

agricultural exports in the long run provides the capital needed to

develop new industry through its earning of foreign exchange and its

contribution to the amount of surplus available for industrial development.
It is through the rural

sector that Colombia has been and

continues to be most linked to the rest of the world.

The over-
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whelming bulk of Colombia's legal and illegal
foreign exchange
earnings have come from her rural sector.

In

many ways, the support

given to it by successive governments has served as
the basis for

further development not only of the agrarian sector
itself but the
industrial and infrastructure sectors as well.
It is

which

interesting to note that that part of the rural sector

most directly linked to the integration of Colombia into

is

the world market—the promotion of agricultural exports

associated with Liberal Party support.

— has

been

It was noted earlier that

the Conservative Party has been more associated with those political

and administrative arrangements which have accomplished precisely
this tie.

The fact that it is the Liberal

Party and not the Con-

servative Party which has tended to support those developments
the rural

in

sector which accomplish the same thing appears at first

glance to be incongruous.
This apparent anomaly can be explained best if we keep in

mind the domestic function which the promotion of agricultural exports fulfills.

Foreign exchange earned from Colombian exports can

be used to do a number of things.

During the period of the Frente

one of the principal uses to which foreign exchange was put was the

importation of capital goods for Colombia's industrialization effort.
In fact, the

development of industrial izaiton has been the consequence

if not the goal

of many of the policies pursued in the rural sector.

The promotion of agricultural research and development, as
well

as more traditipnal

agrarian concerns, may or may not have

direct bearing on Colombia's integration into the world market.

a
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Whether it does or not depends largely upon the nature of the research
being done and the type of agricultural production being encouraged.
If most agricultural

research and development

is

designed to increase

the production of commodities which are destined for the world market,

central government support would be indicative of fostering desarrollo

hacia afuera

.

On the other hand, if research and development efforts

are systematically biased toward increasing self sufficiency or in-

creased production for the domestic market, desarrollo hacia adentro
may be more characteristic.

Unfortunately, the data upon which this

study is based do not distinguish allocations along these dimensions.
But inasmuch as resources for agricultural research and development
are most likely geared to production for

a

market—either domestic

or international —rather than subsistence, increased integration in
a

philosophical and ideological, if not economic sense, is likely to

be the net result.

Infrastructure Pol icy

The infrastructure sectors—transportation

,

power and communi-

cations—have been the major recipient of direct central government
resources for economic development throughout the period of the Frente
This has most likely come about for

a

number of reasons, the most im-

portant being the sel f-percei ved role of the government in the develop
ment process.

Throughout this study we have emphasized that Colombian

context of
economic growth policies have taken place within the

dependent, capitalist mode of development.

a

As such, the government

the agricultural and indus
has had to justify direct intervention into
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trial

sectors, and has for the most part left the
development of

these sectors up to private entrepreneurs.
sectors, on the other hand, represent

a

The infrastructure

legitimate if not crucial

area within which direct government intervention is permitted.
The Liberal

Party was found to have devoted

a

relatively

greater proportion of central government resources to the development
of infrastructure during the period of the Frente

.

They were also

found to have given greater relative support for the development of

highways as well as the energy and communications sectors.

The

Conservative Party has been found to give greater relative support
to the transportation sector in general

and the development of water

and air transportation in particular.

These findings present interesting clues as to the alignments

of internal political power relationships during the Frente period.
It was noted earlier that infrastructure principally serves as a

necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of two

other sectors of economic devel opment--industry and agriculture.
we view infrastructure development as

a

If

whole as being concerned with

the creation and strengthening of internal

linkages between and within

these sectors, the Liberal Party more than the Conservative Party has
been involved.
This may derive in part from the differences in the basis of

support for the two parties.

We have noted that while both parties

have their roots in rural sector support, the Liberals have been

relatively stronger

.in

urban areas.

Liberal support for infrastruc-

ture development may be reflective of their greater concern with
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maintaining this broader support base.

Such a view is strenghtened

when we consider the patterns of internal migration brought
about
by both la violencia and the nature of the urbanization
process.

The maintenance or this broader support base through develop-

ment of the infrastructure also has implications for the other
sectors
of economic development.

Unless it is taken from other areas of

governmental concern, infrastructure support will necessarily be at
the expense of our other sectors of economic development.

way, Liberal support for infrastructure may indicate

a

In this

tendency on

their part to subscribe more faithfully to the tenets of "liberal"

economic development; they may be less willing to utilize the resources of the central government in those sectors which fundamental

party ideology has indicated belong in the realm of private sector
development.

The Conservative Party, on the other hand, may balance

its concern in the infrastructure sectors with more active involve-

ment in the other sectors of economic development, particularly agricul ture.

The general development of infrastructure impinges upon Colom-

bian political and economic relationships to the rest of the world
In one sense,

in an ambiguous fashion.

structure sectors would result in
to deal with the external

isolated economic sectors.

a

development of the infra-

greater capacity for Colombia

world as an integrated unit rather than

Throughout Colombian history, relations

between various regions and cities and the rest of the world often
have been easier to maintain than relations between these regions
and cities themselves.

The strengthening of these internal linkages
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may be indicative of

a

desire for greater relative autonomy, at

least at the national level, in economic dealings.
On the other hand, increased infrastructure development
may

also ultimately aid in the increased integration of Colombia
into
the world-wide economic system.

This is particularly plausible

given the changing nature of that system, especially its reorientation toward aiding domestic production (in the periphery) for the

domestic market rather than importation of finished goods for that
domestic market.

Infrastructure developments aid in the production

and distribution of goods within the entire area affected by the

infrastructure network, irrespective of who is doing the producing
and distributing.

As multinational corporations become integrated

into the domestic productive capacity (largely in the industrial

sector), they stant to benefit at least as much as native domestic

producers in the increase in market size and lowering of factor
costs brought about by infrastructure development.

These general observations can be brought into greater focus

when considering the .particular sectors which make up infrastructure

development.

The alignment of internal political power relationships

as reflected in sectoral distribution of infrastructure investments

indicates that the Liberal Party, with its preferences manifested in
the energy and communications sectors, and the highway component of
the transportation sector, has aimed not only to increase domesitc

economic linkages but to do so within the context of
tic industrial

sector and increasingly urban society.

a

strong domesThis twin

thrust implies that the basis of Liberal Party support may be shifting
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to a broader representation of domestic elites
which would draw

support from all sectors of Colombian society affected by the mod-

ernization process whether in the urban or rural sectors.
The patterns of support manifested by the Liberals and Con-

servatives within and among the various infrastructure sectors also

specifically impacts upon the development of both the urban and
rural

sectors.

The complementary nature of the Liberals' support

for direct central government involvement in the industrialization

sector and their support of the above noted sectors of infrastructure

development implies

a'

relative neglect of the agriculture sector.

More specifically, the Liberal Party's emphasis upon the development
of power facilities, and communications and highway networks would
tend to serve the development of the urban sector more than the rural

sector.

The areas of Conservative Party support among the infra-

structure sectors--mari time and air transportation—do not have visible
implications for their concomitant support for the agricultural sector.
In

other words, Conservative support for the development of these

particular areas of infrastructure most likely draws from

a

motive

other than complementary support of the agricultural sector, and has

relatively less to offer in facilitating overall rural development.
The most likely implications of Conservative Party support
for maritime and air transportation are in Colombia's political and

economic relationship with the rest of the world.

Maritime transpor-

tation particularly would serve to strengthen Colombia's capacity to

participate more economically in world trade, and improved air transportation would facilitate the movement of the people concerned with
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making those decisions.

The crucial

role of agriculture in Colombia's

world trade involvement provides us with the
principal link between

Conservative support for maritime and air transportation
and its
support for agricultural development.

In

other words, the sectors

of infrastructure development supported by the Conservative
Party

principally complement the development of only one part of the
rural

sector--that part concerned with production capable of earning foreign
exchange.
Patterns of Liberal support among sectors of infrastructure

development have less' direct, but perhaps in the long run more important, implications for the integration of Colombia into the world
market.

In the past,

the limited size of the market has served to

limit the penetration of not only domestic but international manu-

factures into Colombia, except for particular regional enclaves and
for certain types of capital and consumer goods.

The creation of

an infrastructure in Colombia which is not only compatible with, but
in many ways geared to, an urban life-style and high technology-

dependent production .processes serves to enlarge and strengthen the
domestic market.

Coupled with the increased internal integration of

of the Colombian market, production and distribution within that

market will become both easier and more economical.

The demands of

this market may be met either domestically or internationally, and if

current trends are an indication of future conditions, even domestic
production (particularly in manufacturing)

creasingly "internationalized."

In short,

is

likely to become in-

the increased internal
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integration of Colombia's domestic economy may also serve as an
incentive to the increased integration between that economy and
the
world.

General

Cone! usions

The relationship between the Liberal and Conservative Parties
in Colombia has been defined over the course of more than a century

of cooperation and conflict.

The issues which have defined this

relationship have changed during this period, with many of the
original political dimensions becoming more relevant as

cooperation than conflict.

a

source of

The institutionalization of political

cooperation through the structure of the Frente Nacional has led

many observers to assume that no slaient differences remain between
the parties except in rhetoric.

Issues of federalism, church-state

relations, and society-state relations, while still important in
the fundamental

ideologies of both parties, have become increasingly

irrelevant in their operation ideology.

Much of the practical trans-

cendence of these issues is attributable to the process of economic
growth

—a

process which has been dependent upon both Liberal and Con-

servative Party initiative.
While many aspects of economic growth are determined by the

inherent dynamic of the process itself, we have seen in Colombia

a

deliberate attempt to structure particular aspects of the process
along ideological lines.

Evidence of political variation in economic

development policies as manifested through the sectoral distribution
of government resources does not necessarily imply that the Liberal
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and Conservative Parties in Colombia respectively
represent alter-

native solutions to the problems of modernization.

Quite the con-

trary, this study has demonstrated that the
policy priorities of
the Liberals and Conservatives have tended to
complement one another
in the achievement of economic growth and a

"modern" society.

At

the most abstract level, many of the variations between
Liberals
and Conservatives in economic development policy represent
different

aspects of the same overall process.

This complementarity can be

seen not only in the domestic sphere of alignments of internal political

power relationships and sectoral distribution of emphases in

economic policy, but also in the international sphere of Colombia's
political and economic relations with the rest of the world.
In the

domestic political sphere, the ideological differ-

ences in economic development policy in Colombia reflect differences in the basis of support for the two political parties.

Both

Liberals and Conservatives have drawn upon all sectors of Colombian

society for political support, but it has been the Liberal Party
which has most actively sought to mobilize the strength of support
based on the transformations brought about by economic growth in

Colombia.

That is to say that the Liberal Party has tended to draw

relatively more support from that sector which represents the increasingly industrialized and "modern" character of Colombia — its
urban sector.

The conservative Party, on the other hand, has tended

to reinforce and expand its ties in the traditional

sector of the economy—the rural sector.

income generating
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The limits to which this cleavage will represent
an important

dimension in the years to come will be dependent not
only on the nature
of growth generated in the urban and industrialized
sectors but also
the nature of growth generated in the increasingly
"modern" rural

sector.

If, as some observers argue, industrialization
in its current

form has for the most part run its course, the future economic
growth
of Colombia may be seen to lie more and more in its rural sector.
But, the development of the rural sector, even if spearheaded by the

Conservative Party, does not obviate the fact that Colombia's industrialized sector is
scene.

a

permanent part of its political and economic

The extent to which these sectors represent an important

part of Liberal Party support would most likely act as

a

real

con-

straint to the development of the rural sector at the expense of the
urban sector.
A perhaps clearer manifestation of the interrrel atedness of

the Liberal

and Conservative Parties lies not in their respective

bases of political support but in the very nature of their economic

development policies themselves.

As in many other countries, the

economic surplus generated in Colombia's rural sector has been used
to foster economic growth outside of that sector.

The principal

target of this redirected economic surplus has been the industrial
sector, and the principal

within the Liberal Party.

political agents responsible have been
But, because the. rural sector has not only

been the source of economic strength but also the basis of further

economic growth via ISI, both parties have manifested
terest in its development.

a

direct in-

This is due to the peculiarities of both
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industrialization via import substitution as well as rural develop-

ment via the expansion of export oriented agriculture.

Both of

these are inseparable when considering the present character
of

Colombian economic development and its potential

in

the future.

The industrialization and infrastructure developments which

generally have been attributed in this study to the systematic support
of the Liberal Party would not have been possible without the develop-

ment of an export-oriented agriculture sector.

Likewise, the rural

sector developments generally attributed to the systematic support
of the Conservative Party make little sense except in the context
of expanding industrialization and urbanization.

Specific Liberal

Party support for those parts of the agricultural sector which would

most directly benefit the industrial sector demonstrates that they,
more than the Conservatives, have recognized the interrel atedness of
these two aspects
But, Colombia is still predominantly an agrarian country.

The transformation of its rural sector exclusively into

a

source of

foreign exchange could be beneficial to economic development only
in the very short run,
in Colombia

is

if at all.

The nature of industrialization

such that its expansion in terms of productivity com-

pletely outstrips its capacity to absorb labor as well as to market

what it has produced.

The extent to which Conservative Party inspired

policy in the rural sector may serve to absorb this supply of labor,
as well

as

provide

a

market for its product, could be of crucial im-

portance in the survival of both the urban and rural sectors.
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This capacity in large part depends upon the
nature and

extent of Colombia's economic integration.

This study has found

that both the Liberal and Conservative Parties have
supported econ-

omic development policies which have encouraged
integration, albeit
in slightly different ways.

As evidenced particularly in the infra-

structure sectors, the Liberal Party has tended to pursue those
policies which have facilitated the integration of Colombia's domestic

market; the Conservative Party's priorities in this area have chiefly
served to strengthen Colombia's integration into the international
market.

This may in part be due to differences in the basis of

economic growth pursued respectively by the parties.
of industrialization in Colombia to

development of

a

a

The expansion

large part depends upon the

domestic market, which in turn can be promoted by

increased internal economic integration.

The development of an ex-

port-oriented agricultural sector, likewise,

is

in part a function of

increased international economic integration.
The interrelatedness of the two especially concerns the for-

mer—domestic integration.

In the past,

Colombian ties to the rest

of the world have largely been limited to the rural export sector
and certain urban areas.

With increased internal economic integration,

Colombia begins to resemble an economic system in itself.

As a con-

sequence, the potential for economic integration into the world economic system becomes greater.

This is because Colombia's more tightly

integrated domestic system represents

a

market which

and deeper than that, which existed before.
(for both domestic as well

is

both broader

The economic incentives

as foreign producers)

for partaking in an
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an integrated Colombian market are greater than those
accruing to
a

more restricted and limited one.

The mushrooming foreign involve-

ment in the industrial izaiton of Colombia via the
multinational corporations represents

a

recognition of this interrelationship.

The

respective policies pursued by the Liberal and Conservative Parties
with respect to integration each represent

a

crucial aspect of this

development; neither's policies alone are responsible.
The final point, perhaps, best captures the developmental
impact of policy variations between Colombia's political parties.

Differences in fundamental

ideology aside, neither party represents

an alternative vision of economic development.

The policy differences

which have been manifested in the operative dimension of their

respective ideologies instead represent differing emphases in what
is

essentially the same mode of development.

Colombia can ignore

neither its past nor its objective place in the world system.
party, at least during the period of the Frente Nacional

attempted to overcome this situation using
or "Conservative" set of policy responses.

a

,

Neither

has really

particularly "Liberal"
Instead, both the Liberal

and Conservative Parties have evolved policy responses which together

represent, in

a

very real

sense, a uniquely "Colombian" solution.
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APPENDIX

I

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The overall

focus of this study was to assess the extent to

which changes in the development policy of the Republic of Colombia

during most of the period of the Frente Nacional and two of the years
immediately thereafter (1961-1976) could be attributed to the operative dimension of the ideologies of the Liberal and Conservative
Parties.

The operational ization of the concept of ideology consisted

of actual

central government support given to various development

policy options, grouped according to the economic function or sector
toward which such support was targeted.

Systematic preference for

one type of policy as opposed to another was taken as indicative of

partisan ideological support for that policy area.

Variabl es

The raw data used in the statistical analysis performed in
this study consisted of both interval and nominal level data.

The

independent or predictive variables used were nominal in nature, and
consisted of political party affiliation of the president and finance
minister.
Liberal

Each independent variable consisted of two categories--

Party membership or Conservative Party membership.
The control

terval

in scale.

218

variables and dependent variables both were in-

There were four control variables-total government

246

247

expenditures in each year, the budget deficit in the previous year,
the anticipated government revenues for

year, and the amount of

the'

official external financing in the form of loans and grants from
the United States' AID Program, the International

Bank of Recon-

struction and Development (IBRD), the Interamerican Development
Bank (IDB), the International Development Association (IDA), and
the International

Finance Corporation (IFC).

219

These raw data

were transformed into percentages for the purpose of analysis.
total

The

government expenditure was expressed as percent of the GDP;

the budget deficit as the proportion of government expenditures

financed the previous year through deficit measures; the anticipated

government revenues as the proportion of anticipated revenues actually
received; and official external financing as proportion of actual

disbursements allocated to

a

particular economic sector.

The dependent variables were interval in nature.

The raw

data consisted of actual expenditures of the central government for
each year from 1961

to 1976.

and grouped according to
all

a

220

The expenditures were classified

functional classification categorizing

government expenditures according to one of over 130 different
221

functions.

These individual

functions were grouped together to

represent various sectors and subsectors of development policy.

In

these
order to facilitate analysis, the absolute expenditures within

categories were then transformed into proportions.
in
the absolute expenditure for agrarian reform

and the absolute expenditure on all

a

For example, if

given year were X,

programs in the agricultural

248

sector in that same year were Y, the proportion
of agricultural expenditures devoted to agrarian reform would be X/Y.

Methodolog y
The statistical methodology employed was

fication Analysis (MCA) based on

a

a

Multiple Classi-

two-way analysis of variance. 222

Conceptually akin to multiple regression using dummy variables,
MCA
is

a

multivariate statistical procedure designed to assess the impact

of one or more categorical or nominal
level -dependent variable.

In

level

variables upon an interval

this study, it was used to assess the

impact of political party affiliation upon the proportion of actual

government expenditures devoted to particular economic development
sectors in Colombia.
In addition,

a

set of interval level covariates, or control

variables was included in the analysis.

The relationship between

party affiliation and .levels of support for various developmental

expenditures was assessed after the effects of the control variables
upon expenditure patters were controlled or "partialed out."

In

other words, analysis was based on the additional contribution of
political party affiliation in explaining expenditure preferences

after accounting for variations in these levels caused by all other
variables included in the study.

Three types of information from this analysis are contained
in each relevant table in the text.

The first consists of the

average adjusted proportion of central government expenditure targeted to

a

particular development sector by presidents and finance

24Q

ministers of each party.

It is

do not represent the actual

important to note that these figures

proportion of expenditures.

For each

case, the actual proportion was adjusted to
account for variations

caused by the four control variables.

These adjusted proportions

were then averaged for each category of the independent
variables

producing the figures shown in the tables.
The second type of information contained in the tables is
the partial beta.

This statistic is analogous to

a

standardized

partial regression coefficient, and is associated with each of the

independent variables.

In

effect, the partial beta provides an

indication of the relative ability of the independent variable
(party affiliation) to explain variation in the dependent variable

(government support for

a

given type of policy) after accounting

for the effects of all other variables.

These variables include

not only the control variables indicated above, but also the inde-

pendent variable not under consideration.

For example, the partial

beta associated with the political party affiliation of the presi-

dent indicates the effect of that variable upon the dependent variable after controlling for not only the control variables but also
the political
tial

party affiliation of the finance minister.

beta is interpreted to be the amount of change in the indepen-

dent variable needed to produce
in

The par-

the dependent variable.

a

change of one standard deviation

Therefore, the larger the partial beta,

the greater the change in the value of the dependent variable assoc-

iated with

a

change in political party.

250

The final type of information derived from MCA analysis
the multiple correlation coefficient,

R.

is

This coefficient, when

squared, indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent

variable which can be explained by all independent and control variables together.

Footnotes

Party membership data was obtained from Paulo E. Forero,
"JQue se hicieron los 184 ministros del Frente ftacional ?" Cromos,
145, No. 2947 (1974), 42-47; and information obtained by the author
from interviews in Bogota ir. August, 1 977.
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Sources for this information were, Organization of American
States, Secretary General, Cuadr os e stadfs ticos c^l fin aciamiento
£Xt.eiiilQ_Q^il]igMQ_£or^]_a_s_ agend as oficia es con s i-de en Was hi n o ton
Prog r ama Sector Externo (Wa sing ton, D. C:
D. C
1976), Cuadro 2,
pp. 1-6; and America en Cifras, various issues.
l

,

.

OOP

Colombia, Contralon'a General de la Republica, Informe financiero (Bogota:
Imprenta Nacional
1961 -1976).
,

221

/

Colombia, Direccion Nacional del Presupuesto, Manual de
prepara ci6n del presupuesto (Bogota
Imprenta Nacional, 1963),
pp. 398-417.
:
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Frank Andrews, James Morgan, and John Sonquist, Mul tiple
Classificat ion Anal ysis: A Report o n a Computer Prog ram for Regres sion Using Categorical Predictors (Ann Arbor:
Survey Research Center,
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967).
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